A BE58 EXECUTED A GAR FOLLOWING A GEAR UP SINGLE ENG APCH IN WHICH THE PROPS; FLAPS; AND STEPS MADE RWY CONTACT.

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ON A TRAINING FLT IN A BARON 58; I WAS THE PF FROM THE R SEAT OF THE ACFT DURING A SINGLE ENG PRACTICE APCH. AFTER STABILIZING THE ACFT INBOUND TO RWY 30L; THE APCH SPD WAS STILL HIGH. WHILE THE INSTRUCTOR PLT WAS RUNNING THE APCH CHKLIST; I DEPLOYED THE FLAPS TO FULL. THE IP NOTED THAT I HAD TOO HIGH OF AN AIRSPD FOR FULL FLAPS. WE LEFT THEM IN AS I PITCHED TO SLOW THE AIRSPD BELOW FLAP SPD. DURING THIS TIME; THE LNDG GEAR WARNING HORN WAS UNCONSCIOUSLY IGNORED BY ME. IT HAD BEEN SOUNDING SINCE WE PULLED A THROTTLE BACK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ENG OUT PRACTICE ON A SHORT R BASE LEG. APPARENTLY; THE WARNING HORN NEVER STOPPED AS I PUT IN FULL FLAPS. AS WE SLOWED TO A MORE REASONABLE APCH SPD; BOTH OF US CONCENTRATED ON AIRSPD AND THE SIGHT PICTURE AND THE IP DISCONTINUED THE READING OF THE CHKLIST. DURING THE FLARE; I LEFT PWR IN FOR A SMOOTHER TOUCHDOWN. AS THE PLANE GRADUALLY SANK DURING THE LONG ROUNDOUT; WE BEGAN TO HEAR METAL CONTACTING THE RWY. THE IP THOUGHT HE HEARD DRAGGING FLAPS WHILE I THOUGHT I HEARD THE TICKING OF SOMETHING LIKE A PROP HITTING. WITHOUT HESITATION; I PITCHED UP WHILE ADDING GAR PWR. THE IP WAS SAYING; 'GO; GO; GO!' ON THE CLBOUT; WE NOTICED BOTH THE GEAR HANDLE UP AND THE WARNING HORN. WE SELECTED FLAPS UP AND THE WARNING SILENCED. THE PLANE FLEW EXACTLY AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. THERE WAS NO OUT-OF-BAL FEELING FROM EITHER ENG. THE PLT ACTING AS IP FOR THAT APCH (HE WAS LISTED OFFICIALLY AS PIC FOR THE FLT) DECIDED THAT WE MUST HAVE ONLY DRUG A FLAP. BASED ON THAT; WE FLEW THE EXTRA SHORT DISTANCE FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1; THE HOME BASE FOR THE PLANE. I FLEW THE PLANE TO A FULL STOP USING A NO FLAP APCH. IT WAS WHEN WE STOPPED THE ENGS WHEN WE DISCOVERED THAT WE DID INDEED STRIKE THE 6 PROP BLADES. THE DAMAGE WAS TO THE LAST 3 OR 4 INCHES OF THE PROP TIPS. ALSO DAMAGED WAS THE L INBOARD FLAP AND THE ENTRY STEP THAT PROTRUDES LOW BEHIND THE R INBOARD FLAP. HUMAN FACTORS FOR THIS INCIDENT MAY INCLUDE THE COMPLACENCY WE EACH FELT WITH THE OTHER EXPERIENCED PLT ON BOARD; THE SHORT TURN TO FINAL WITH THE SIMULATED LOSS OF AN ENG DURING THE TURN; AND THE CONCEPT THAT WE CAN PUSH OURSELVES IN A TRAINING SIT WHERE WE MIGHT OTHERWISE FLY AROUND TO BUY TIME TO FIX A PROB AND RUN AN ABNORMAL OR EMER CHKLIST IN A REAL LIFE SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 658000: BOTH OF US ARE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED PLTS WHO RECEIVE ANNUAL TRAINING ON TURBOJET ACFT. ADDITIONALLY; WE FLEW SEVERAL LIGHT ACFT QUARTERLY AS PART OF OUR JOB REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS CASE; THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT AFTER BEING ON LEAVE. THE LAST ACFT FLOWN WAS A BE400 AND THE BE58 WAS LAST FLOWN APPROX 95 DAYS PRIOR TO THE EVENT. FOR SOME REASON; I BECAME DISTR WITH THE AIRSPD AND FORGOT BASIC PROCS -- FLY THE AIRPLANE. POSSIBLY THE LONG TIME SINCE MY LAST FLT; THE PF'S FAILURE TO COORD FLAP EXTENSION WITH THE PNF; AND THE SIMULATED ENG FAILURE ADDED UP TO A BAD SIT. WE COORD THIS FLT PRIOR TO DEP AND AGAIN INFLT.