B737-300 CAPT CONTINUED A HIGH; UNSTABILIZED VISUAL APCH DESPITE GPWS ALERTS AND ADMONITION FROM THE FO. AFTER IMMEDIATE REVERSE AND BRAKING; ACFT EXITED ONTO A HIGH SPD TXWY AT OVER 60 KTS.

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THE PROB AROSE FROM ATTEMPTING TO EXPEDITE OUR ARR. WE WERE ORIGINALLY BEING VECTORED TO RWY 13; WHEN APCH CHANGED OUR RWY TO RWY 7 TO ACCOMMODATE A SINGLE ENG ACFT MAKING A PRACTICE APCH TO RWY 13. AS WE NEARED; I NOTICED THE SINGLE ENG WAS NOT ON THE TCASII. AT APPROX 1100 FT AND VFR; I NOTICED RWY 13 WAS CLR AND MENTIONED TO FO THAT MAYBE I SHOULD REQUEST THAT RWY. HE MADE AN AMBIGUOUS COMMENT AND I RESTATED. THEN I REQUESTED RWY 13 MYSELF; AND TWR CLRED US TO LAND. I ASKED THE FO TO INSERT THE ILS FOR RWY 13. HE WAS HEADS DOWN DOING THAT AS I INITIATED A BANK TO LINE UP WITH THE RWY AT ABOUT 600 FT. I HAD TO INCREASE MY SINK RATE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SLOWER DSCNT I HAD MADE IN CONSIDERING RWY 13. WE RECEIVED A 'SINK RATE' ALERT FROM GPWS; AND I IMMEDIATELY ANSWERED 'CORRECTING.' THEN WE RECEIVED THE FIRST 'PULL UP' AND I AGAIN ANSWERING 'CORRECTING.' WHEN WE RECEIVED THE NEXT GPWS ALERT; I STATED 'I SHOULDN'T HAVE DONE THIS...' BUT CONTINUED THE APCH AND INCREASED THE RATE OF DSCNT TO MAKE THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AND BUILD SPD (ENERGY) FOR THE FLARE. WE EXCEEDED 1000 FPM AT FLT IDLE. THE FO WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LOOP UNTIL HE MADE THE 5000 FT; 3000 FT; 1000 FT CALLS. LATER HE COMMENTED THAT WHEN I SAID 'I SHOULDN'T HAVE DONE THIS;' HE THOUGHT I WAS GOING TO GO AROUND; AND WAS SHOCKED I TOUCHED DOWN IN THE FIRST 3000 FT (BARELY) AND IMMEDIATELY INITIATED BRAKING AND REVERSE. WE EXITED THE HIGH SPD ABOVE 60 KTS AND FROM A PAX PERSPECTIVE; NOT VERY COMFORTABLY. MY JUDGEMENT WAS CLOUDED NOT ONLY BY THE DESIRE TO BE ON TIME; BUT MY FRUSTRATION AT THE INEFFICIENCY OF GND OPS AT BWI FOR MAKING US LATE; AND THE HANDLING BY ATC IN CHANGING OUR RWY AND VECTORING US. INSTEAD OF LETTING IT GO AND HOPEFULLY MAKING UP TIME ON THE GND; I WAS TRYING TO DO IT MYSELF. I RESORTED TO SOME OLD 'COMPANY' TECHNIQUES. I SHOWED TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THE FIRST 2 PARTS OF THE 'SAFETY; COMFORT; SCHEDULE' THAT I LEARNED YRS AGO. MY HURRIED ACTIONS AND THE REQUEST FOR THE ILS TOOK THE FO TOTALLY OUT OF THE LOOP. I HAVE EXTREMELY VIVID MEMORIES OF A PREVIOUS INCIDENT AND THIS APCH AND LNDG WILL RANK RIGHT BESIDE HOPEFULLY; FOREVER. ANOTHER FACTOR THAT MAY HAVE AFFECTED MY JUDGEMENT WAS THE RECENT PURCHASE OF A HIGH PERFORMANCE TAILWHEEL ACFT. I HAD PRACTICED ABOUT 10 LNDGS THE DAY BEFORE THE TRIP AND THE VIEW FROM BASE TO FINAL WAS SIMILAR; THEREFORE; COMFORTABLE TO ME. I WILL KEEP THIS IN MIND AND MENTALLY PREPARE MYSELF TO FLY DISSIMILAR ACFT AS I USED TO DO IN MY PREVIOUS FLYING; AND NEVER TRY TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DELAYS BY DOING SOMETHING STUPID.