EMB145 FLT CREW EXPERIENCED CONFUSION REGARDING VISUAL APCH TO TPA AND THE ALT RESTR ISSUED BY ATC.

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ATC CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36L AT TPA. FO HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT SINCE IT WAS ON HIS SIDE OF ACFT. APCH CTLR MENTIONED SOMETHING ABOUT MACDILL AFB IN HIS APCH CLRNC WHICH I DID NOT UNDERSTAND. THE FO HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT MACDILL SO I ASKED HIM TO ASK THE APCH CTLR TO CLARIFY. APCH SAID 'STAY AT 2600 FT UNTIL YOU'RE W OF MACDILL.' I THOUGHT THAT HE HAD SAID 'N OF MACDILL' THE FIRST TIME. SO; AGAIN; I WAS UNSURE. SO I ASKED THE FO TO ASK THE CTLR 'WE ARE UNFAMILIAR; CAN WE TURN THE BASE LEG HERE?' THE CTLR SAID 'AFFIRMATIVE' SO WE STARTED THE TURN AND THE DSCNT TO JOIN THE FINAL ON THE GLIDE PATH. WHILE ON THE BASE LEG; WE LOST THE ARPT IN THE EARLY MORNING SUNLIGHT; HAZE; AND A DEVELOPING CLOUD COVER. I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE CONTINUING A VISUAL APCH; SO I ASKED THE FO TO REQUEST VECTORS AROUND FOR THE ILS. AT THIS SAME TIME; THE CTLR CHASTISED US FOR DSNDING BELOW 2600 FT. THERE WAS NO POINT IN ARGUING; SO WE AGAIN ASKED FOR VECTORS FOR THE APCH. HE SAID THAT WE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED HIS CLRNC 3 TIMES; WHICH IS DEFINITELY NOT EITHER OF OUR RECOLLECTIONS. I KNEW OUR PROX TO MACDILL BECAUSE I BRIEFED ITS LOCATION TO TPA IN MY APCH BRIEF. I ALWAYS BRIEF OTHER ARPTS IN THE VICINITY TO AVOID LNDG AT THE WRONG ARPT. APCH CTLR WAS BUSY DEALING WITH AN ACFT ON AN EMER INBOUND TO TPA. HE WAS TRYING TO GET US IN BEFORE THE EMER ACFT. WE WERE IN NO HURRY BECAUSE WE WERE LNDG. IN FACT; WE HAD SLOWED TO .70 MACH IN CRUISE TO SAVE FUEL SINCE WE WERE SO EARLY. AFTER TALKING WITH FELLOW COMPANY PLTS; THEY INFORMED ME THAT TPA APCH WANTS ACFT ABOVE 2600 FT BEFORE N OF MACDILL AFB. IT SEEMS TO BE WELL-KNOWN TO PLTS FLYING IN AND OUT OF TPA. MY RECOMMENDATION TO CORRECT THIS WOULD BE TO CREATE A 'VISUAL APCH; RWY 36L' CHART FOR VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 36L WITH THE MACDILL 2600 FT RESTR CHARTED FOR ALL TO SEE AND BRIEF. ATC'S AMBIGUOUS CLRNC TO STAY AT 2600 FT UNTIL N OF MACDILL DIDN'T MAKE ANY SENSE BECAUSE WE WERE N OF MACDILL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) ATC'S HVY WORKLOAD IN DEALING WITH AN INBOUND EMER ACFT. 2) ATC'S VAGUE CLRNC WITH AN ALT RESTR THAT IS ESOTERIC AT BEST. 3) WORSENING WX CONDITIONS THAT DISTR THE FLT CREW AS WE DISCUSSED THE NEED TO DISCONTINUE THE VISUAL APCH. 4) THE FLT CREW'S UNFAMILIARITY WITH TPA'S PROCS THAT INVOLVE NONSTANDARD VISUALS. AGAIN; I'D LIKE TO REITERATE THE NEED FOR A CHARTERED VISUAL APCH FOR THAT RWY. STAYING AS HIGH ON A VISUAL APCH WHERE THERE ARE NO MOUNTAINS OR SIMILAR OBSTRUCTIONS IS COUNTER-INTUITIVE. WE PLTS HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO FLY A STABILIZED APCH AND HAVING TO DROP 2600 FT IN A FEW MI IS NEAR IMPOSSIBLE WHEN SUCH A PROC IS NEITHER PLANNED NOR BRIEFED.