A B737-400 INCURRED A LENGTHY DELAY DUE TO FUELING #2 TANK WITH THE FUEL QUANTITY SYS DEFERRED AS INOP. SPECIAL MEL FUELING PROCS NOT APPLIED.

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ACTUAL DEP TIME XC45; 3 HRS 34 MINS LATE. FLT COULD HAVE DEPARTED BY APPROX XA45; 'ONLY' 1 HR 30 MINS LATE WERE IT NOT FOR THE MEL THAT ALREADY HAD BEEN CARRIED FOR 4 DAYS. THE MEL: ACFT CAME TO GATE FROM INTL. WHEN WE CAME ON BOARD; BOTH FUEL TANKS HAD ALREADY BEEN FUELED TO APPROX 9800 LBS. THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH TO TRIGGER THE AUTOMATIC SHUTOFF; WHICH WOULD HAVE COMPLIED WITH OPTION 1 ON THE FUEL SLIP AND THE MEL BOOK. THE FUEL SLIP FORM WAS ALSO ALREADY ON THE ACFT AND FILLED OUT BY THE CONTRACT MECH WHO DID THE FUELING AND HAD SUBSEQUENTLY GONE HOME. MAINT CTL VERIFIED THAT FUEL SLIP OVER ACARS (OPTION 2) FUEL XFER METHOD SECTION WAS FILLED OUT. THE 'WARNING' NOTE APPLICABLE TO OPTION 2 STATES THAT '...A FLT CREW MEMBER MUST VERIFY THE GALLONS DELIVERED TO THE INOP TANK. IF THE FLT CREW MEMBER DOES NOT VERIFY THE FUEL QUANTITY DELIVERED TO THE INOP TANK; THEN A FUEL STICK READING MUST BE TAKEN TO VERIFY THE FUEL LOAD.' OBVIOUSLY; NEITHER OF US (THE FLT CREW MEMBERS) HAD A MEANS OF VERIFYING THE FUEL LOAD. ZZZ IS A CONTRACT MAINT STATION. CONTRACT MAINT IS NOT ALLOWED TO DO FUEL STICK READINGS. MAINT CTL: I THEN CALLED MAINT CTLR IN ORDER TO OBTAIN DIRECTION AS TO HOW VERIFICATION OF THE FUEL LOAD COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. MAINT CTLR DECIDED TO USE THE FUEL STICK READING METHOD FOR VERIFICATION. THEY THEN CALLED ANOTHER CONTRACT MECH WHO THEN INFORMED US THAT HE DIDN'T HAVE THE AUTH TO DO A DRIP STICK; PER ACR PROCS. HE WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. ANOTHER CALL TO MAINT CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO 'OBSERVE' THE MECH DOING THE DRIP STICK AND VERIFY THE AMOUNT OF FUEL. MAINT CTLR STATED THAT THIS WOULD SERVE AS THE REQUIRED 'VERIFICATION' OF THE FUEL LOAD. THIS IS ILLEGAL ON 2 COUNTS -- FLT CREW AND CONTRACT MAINT. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE FUELING MANUAL STATES THAT '...IS PERFORMED BY MAINT ONLY.' THIS OBVIOUSLY PRECLUDED US OR THE CONTRACT MECH FROM PARTICIPATING IN A FUEL STICK PROC; MUCH LESS VERIFYING THE OBSERVED FUEL QUANTITY. MAINT CTLR THEN MADE THE DECISION TO USE THE FUEL XFER METHOD (XFER R TANK TO CTR TANK AND THEN XFER THE NOW KNOWN QUANTITY BACK INTO THE R TANK). THIS PROCESS BEGAN AT APPROX XB45. FUEL XFER WAS COMPLETED AT APPROX XC35. PUSHBACK AND DEP WERE UNEVENTFUL -- JUST 3 HRS 44 MINS LATE. THIS FLT-CRITICAL MEL HAD BEEN ALREADY CARRIED FOR 4 DAYS; CREATING AN INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS ERRORS OCCURRING FOR AS LONG AS THE MEL WAS CARRIED. A SERIOUS SAFETY SIT WAS CREATED AS A RESULT OF COMPOUNDING MISTAKES FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES AND CONTRADICTORY ACR PROCS: THE ACFT BEING FUELED AND THE FLT CREW NOT BEING ABLE TO VERIFY THE LOAD. MAINT CTLR INCORRECTLY APPROVING A FUEL SLIP WITHOUT THE FUEL LOAD BEING LEGALLY AND CORRECTLY VERIFIED. MAINT CTLR DIRECTING ILLEGAL PROCS: CONTRACT MAINT DRIP STICKING WITH FUEL VERIFICATION FROM THE DRIP STICK BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY A FLT CREW MEMBER. CONTRADICTORY ACR PROCS. THIS FLT COULD HAVE DEPARTED WITHOUT VERIFICATION OF THE FUEL LOAD.