HELI OPERATOR IN GRAND CANYON EXPERIENCES NMAC WITH HELI FAILING TO FOLLOW SFAR OPERATIONAL PROCS.

Date: 2005-08 · Aircraft: Helicopter · Phase: cruise

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|conflict-airborne-conflict|conflict-nmac|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

HELI OPERATOR IN GRAND CANYON EXPERIENCES NMAC WITH HELI FAILING TO FOLLOW SFAR OPERATIONAL PROCS.

Narrative

I WAS FLYING A TOUR TO THE GRAND CANYON. WE LEFT LAS VEGAS IN AN EC130. AT APPROX XA50 WE WERE APCHING THE ENTRANCE TO THE GREEN 4 HELI RTE LOCATED INSIDE THE GRAND CANYON NATIONAL PARK SFAR AREA. WE WERE CLBING UP TO 5000 FT MSL ON AN EBOUND HDG WHEN I OBSERVED ANOTHER HELI S OF MY POS. WE WERE CATCHING UP ON THEM; AND I TRIED TO CALL THEM UP ON THE RADIO. THEY DID NOT ANSWER AFTER MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS; AND I DECIDED TO SLOW DOWN AND FOLLOW THEM. I MADE A RADIO CALL TO ENTER THE GREEN 4 RTE. THE OTHER HELI NEVER MADE THE RADIO CALL; WHICH IS REQUIRED BY THE SFR. I POSITIONED MYSELF WITH THE OTHER ACFT AT MY 2 O'CLOCK POS AND 1/4 - 1/2 NM SEPARATION. BEHIND ME AT MY 4-5 O'CLOCK POS WAS ANOTHER HELI WITH SIMILAR SEPARATION; AND BEHIND HIM WAS ANOTHER. IT IS A VERY BUSY AIRSPACE. I MADE SEVERAL MORE ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THIS GUY ON THE RADIO -- STILL NO ANSWER. ALL OF A SUDDEN HE INITIATES A VERY ABRUPT AND AGGRESSIVE L TURN; BRINGING HIM ON COLLISION COURSE WITH US. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A RAPID DECELERATION (QUICK STOP) TO AVOID IMPACT; AND HE CROSSED APPROX 100 FT IN FRONT OF US CONTINUING FLYING 'SLALOM' ON A RTE THAT DOES NOT ALLOW SO -- YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO FLY A STRAIGHT LINE. EVERYBODY BEHIND ME ALSO SLOWED DOWN; AND WE INCREASED SEPARATION TO APPROX 1 NM TO THIS GUY WHO APPEARED TO BE ON A RAMPAGE. AT THE NEXT MANDATORY RPTING POINT; HE MADE A RADIO CALL; AND WHEN ASKED WHY HE DID NOT ANSWER EARLIER; HE STATED THAT HE HAD TURNED THE VOLUME DOWN ON HIS RADIO?! THE GRAND CANYON SFAR AREA IS A VERY BUSY AIRSPACE; AND IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT EVERYBODY FOLLOWS THE RULES. I HAVE FLOWN IN THIS ENVIRONMENT ALMOST 3 YRS; THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY INCREASE IN TFC; AND ALL OPS HAVE GROWN. OBVIOUSLY; THERE ARE A LOT OF 'NEW GUYS' OUT THERE. JUST LOOKING AT MY OWN COMPANY; ALMOST 70% OF OUR PLTS HAVE BEEN THERE LESS THAN 1 YR. ALL THE OTHER OPERATORS HAVE SIMILAR STATISTICS. ONE APPARENT RESULT OF THIS MASS HIRING AND TRAINING OF NEW PLTS IS THAT SAFETY IS REDUCED. I HAVE NEVER SEEN AS MANY PLT ERRORS; INADVERTENT AND UNFORTUNATELY ALSO DELIBERATE VIOLATIONS OF THE REGS ON A REGULAR BASIS BEFORE. THERE ARE INCIDENTS ALMOST ON A DAILY BASIS. SINCE THE OPERATORS MAINLY FOCUS ON THE PROFIT RATHER THAN SAFETY; THE ONLY SOLUTION -- AS I SEE IT -- IS THAT THE FAA NEEDS TO BE MORE ACTIVE. THEY NEED TO EVALUATE THE TRAINING BEING CONDUCTED; AND ALSO ENFORCE THE REGS THAT EXIST CURRENTLY; THEY MOSTLY CONDUCT RAMP CHKS; WHILE THE FLT PORTION APPEARS TO BE UNMONITORED. IT IS ALSO SCARY TO SEE THAT WHEN ONE OPERATOR TERMINATES A PLT FOR BEING UNSAFE; THE VERY SAME PLT JUST WALKS OVER TO THE NEXT OPERATOR AND GETS HIRED. MY LESSON FROM THIS CLOSE ENCOUNTER IS: TRUST NO ONE; ASSUME NOTHING; AND STAY AS FAR AWAY FROM EVERYBODY ELSE AS POSSIBLE!

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.