MD80 EXPERIENCES ENG SEIZURE ON FINAL APCH.

Date: 2005-09 · Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical

Synopsis

MD80 EXPERIENCES ENG SEIZURE ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative

WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 7R AT ZZZ ARPT; APPROX 3-4 MI FROM THE ARPT AT APPROX 1200-1400 FT AGL. WHEN THE THROTTLES ADVANCED; WE HEARD A LOUD BANGING NOISE FROM THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE. I NOTICED THAT THE R ENG HAD FAILED. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE OPTIONS -- TO GO AROUND OR TO JUST CONTINUE AND LAND. WE WERE ALREADY COMPLETELY CONFIGURED -- GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 28 DEGS; THE CORRECT CONFIGN FOR A SINGLE ENG LNDG. THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT; AND NOT KNOWING WHETHER WE HAD HIT A BIRD OR SOMETHING ELSE THAT WOULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMPROMISED THE L ENG; WE ELECTED TO LAND. IN RETROSPECT; I BELIEVE THIS WAS THE CORRECT DECISION. WE DECLARED AN EMER; ASKED TWR TO CALL OUT THE EMER EQUIP; AND NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS. WE LANDED NORMALLY AND PULLED OFF THE RWY. WE TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WOULD BE STOPPING TO RUN CHKLISTS. I CALLED FOR THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST. WE RAN IT; SECURED THE ENG; GENERATORS; HYDS; ETC; RAN THE OTHER NORMAL CHKLISTS; TALKED TO THE PAX AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS. THE EMER CREWS INSPECTED THE ACFT. I HAD REQUESTED SPECIFICALLY THAT THEY CHK THE R ENG; AND THEY SAID EVERYTHING LOOKED FINE -- NO EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE OR FIRE. WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. AFTERWARDS; WE DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH THE MAINT CREW WHO MET THE AIRPLANE AND IT BECAME APPARENT TO ME THAT WE HAD MIS-IDENTED THE PROB -- THAT IN FACT WE HAD HAD AN ENG SEIZURE RATHER THAN A FAILURE. I HAD LOOKED AT THE N1 AND N2 GAUGES BUT THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS SOME INDICATION. BECAUSE OF THIS; WE HAD RUN THE INCORRECT CHKLIST -- THE ENG FAILURE AS OPPOSED TO THE ENG SEIZURE CHKLIST. WE DID; OF COURSE; HOWEVER; GET THE ENG SHUT DOWN AND SECURED. I THINK THIS WAS PARTIALLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT I FELT RUSHED; OR ALLOWED MYSELF TO FEEL RUSHED. I THINK IF I HAD TAKEN A LITTLE MORE TIME WE WOULD HAVE IDENTED THE PROB CORRECTLY. DURING EVENTS LIKE THIS; THERE ARE SO MANY ITEMS TO COVER THAT IT IS VERY EASY TO RUSH; WHICH I UNFORTUNATELY DID HERE. I KNOW THAT IF THIS OR A SIMILAR SITUATION OCCURS AGAIN; I WILL HAVE LEARNED THAT IN ORDER TO BE SURE THINGS ARE DONE COMPLETELY CORRECTLY; THAT I NEED TO SLOW DOWN AND TAKE MY TIME.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.