PLT AND INSTRUCTOR PLT ABOARD PA28T LAND GEAR UP FOLLOWING SIMULATED ENG FAILURE MANEUVER.

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THE MISSION WAS PLANNED AND FLOWN FROM THE LCL AERO CLUB FOR MY CHKOUT IN THE PIPER ARROW IV; MY NIGHT CHKOUT AND INST CHKOUT. THE FINAL EVENT OF THE EVENING WAS A FULL STOP ON RWY 23L AT FFO. AFTER BEING CLRED L CLOSED OFF OF RWY 23L; I PROCEEDED TO DOWNWIND AT 1800 FT MSL; AT WHICH TIME THE INSTRUCTOR PLT INFORMED ME THAT WE WOULD SIMULATE AN ENG OUT LNDG TO COMPLETE THE ARROW CHKOUT. I WAS UNSURE OF WHICH RWY THE TWR WANTED US TO FULL STOP ON; AND DID NOT WANT TO TURN BASE UNTIL I KNEW WHICH RWY TO PROCEED TO. AFTER DETERMINING THAT WE WERE TO FULL STOP ON RWY 23L; WE SIMULATED AN ENG FAILURE. BY THIS TIME WE WERE SLIGHTLY EXTENDED ON DOWNWIND. I SIMULTANEOUSLY TURNED BASE; SET UP BEST GLIDE SPD AND GRABBED FOR THE GEAR HANDLE AS I CAME OFF THE PERCH. HOWEVER; SINCE WE WERE EXTENDED; I OPTED TO DELAY CONFIGURING THE ACFT TO EXTEND THE GLIDE. THE INSTRUCTOR PLT PERFORMED THE BASE RADIO CALL AND CALLED 'GEAR DOWN.' I TOLD THE INSTRUCTOR PLT THAT I DIDN'T THINK I'D MAKE THE RWY; BUT THAT I WOULD MAKE THE AIRFIELD FOR THE SIMULATION. I CLRED THE ENG TO ENSURE PWR WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE. THE INSTRUCTOR PLT NOTED THAT I HAD NOT SET THE PROP TO FULL DECREASE FOR THE ENG OUT AND THAT I WAS NOT IN THE MINIMUM DRAG CONFIGN. I PROMPTLY RESET THE PROP LEVER APPROPRIATELY AND NOTED WHAT SEEMED TO BE AN IMPROVED GLIDE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; I ADDED PROP AND PWR IN ORDER TO LAND ON RWY 23L FOR THE FULL STOP. I NOTED TO THE INSTRUCTOR PLT THE HIGHER PITCH ATTITUDE DUE TO THE ZERO FLAP CONDITION AND SET MYSELF UP FOR A NO-FLAP LNDG. UPON TOUCHDOWN; WE HEARD THE SCRAPING AND I INITIALLY THOUGHT THAT THE GEAR HAD COLLAPSED; BUT QUICKLY REALIZED WE HAD LANDED GEAR UP. WE HAD TOUCHED DOWN APPROX 5 FT R OF CTRLINE; WINGS LEVEL IN A SLIGHTLY NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE. THE LNDG WAS SURPRISINGLY NON VIOLENT AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. I SHUT OFF THE FUEL AND IGNITION WHILE THE INSTRUCTOR PLT SHUT OFF THE ELECTRICAL SYS. WE EGRESSED AND WAITED FOR A RESPONSE FROM THE FFO FIRE DEPT. AFTER THE ACFT WAS JACKED UP; THE GEAR WERE DROPPED AND IT WAS TOWED BACK TO THE AERO CLUB. OTHER THAN THE PROP; THERE WAS LITTLE APPARENT DAMAGE; ALTHOUGH THE MECH IS STILL INVESTIGATING. IN MY OPINION; A ROOT CAUSE WAS THE LACK OF AN ACFT SPECIFIC HABIT PATTERN AND THE INTERRUPTION OF THE GENERIC 'GUMP' CHK DUE TO THE ENG OUT SCENARIO. MY DECISION TO DELAY CONFIGN WAS CORRECT FOR THE SCENARIO; HOWEVER; NORMAL PROCS CAN NEVER BE NEGLECTED FOR REAL OR SIMULATED EMERS. NEITHER THE INSTRUCTOR PLT NOR I RECALLED HEARING THE LNDG GEAR WARNING HORN ON THE APCH; ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN WORKING NORMALLY EARLIER IN THE FLT. AFTER TOUCHDOWN; I SPECIFICALLY LISTENED FOR THE HORN AND HEARD IT PRIOR TO SHUTTING DOWN PWR. I SUSPECT IT MAY HAVE BEEN WORKING NORMALLY; BUT I CAN'T EXPLAIN WHY NEITHER OF US HEARD IT. I DON'T FEEL MY PERSONAL FACTORS HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT. I HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT FRUSTRATED WITH DOMESTIC CHORES; A SICK PET; ETC; BUT I HAVE ALWAYS FOUND THE FOCUS I ACHIEVE WHILE FLYING TO ACTUALLY BE HELPFUL. KEEPING THESE ISSUES IN MIND; I HAD PERFORMED A PERSONAL PREFLT (IE; I WASN'T ILL; I WAS A LITTLE FATIGUED; BUT HAD AMPLE SLEEP. I HAD EATEN AND WAS HYDRATED; AND I HAD PREPARED FOR THE CHKOUT). IN HINDSIGHT; I CAN'T BE TOTALLY OBJECTIVE AND; THEREFORE; CAN'T ELIMINATE PERSONAL ISSUES; BUT I DON'T THINK THEY WERE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR. I WAS NOT RELYING ON THE INSTRUCTOR PLT AS A SAFETY NET AND WAS; IN FACT; TREATING THE INSTRUCTOR PLT MORE AS A CHK PLT. WHY THE INSTRUCTOR PLT DIDN'T CATCH THE GEAR WHEN I MISSED IT I CAN'T SAY; ALTHOUGH MY EXPERIENCE LEVEL MAY HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE (HIGH TIME MIL PLT). OUR CREW COORD HAD BEEN GOOD THROUGHOUT THE FLT PRIOR TO THIS EVENT. I WAS SPECIFICALLY CONCERNED ABOUT COMPLACENCY BEFORE THE FLT; AND HAD MADE AN EFFORT TO COUNTER IT BEFORE AND DURING THE FLT. I CAN'T BE TOTALLY UNBIASED; BUT I FEEL MY CHAIN CAN BE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 1) UNRECOGNIZED TASK SATURATION ON DOWNWIND (CONFUSION OVER LNDG RWY; EXTENDED DOWNWIND AND GLIDE; CORRECTION OF IMPROPER PROP SETTING). 2) POOR PRIORITIZATION (FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH NORMAL 'GUMP' CHK DUE TO CONCENTRATING ON THE ENG-OUT SCENARIO). PREVENTION: AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL TASK SATURATION AND STRICT ADHERENCE TO NORMAL PROCS IN REAL OR SIMULATED EMERS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ADVISED THEY WERE USING HEADSETS; BUT DIDN'T BELIEVE EITHER WERE OF THE NOISE CANCELING VARIETY.