A B737-700 FO RPTS CABIN ATTENDANTS VIOLATE STERILE COCKPIT WITH CALLS NOT OF AN EMER NATURE.

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FLT XXX WAS A SCHEDULED FLT FROM SNA TO HNL. THE COCKPIT CREW CONSISTED OF CAPT AAA; FO BBB. THE CABIN CREW CONSISTED OF LEAD FLT ATTENDANT XXX; SECOND FLT ATTENDANT YYY; AND THIRD FLT ATTENDANT ZZZ. THE FLT WAS ENTERING THE FINAL PHASES OF THE DSCNT AND APCH. THE WX AT THE TIME WAS MVFR WITH ISOLATED RAIN SHOWERS BTWN THE FIELD AND THE ACFT. IN ADDITION; THE WX WAS CONTRIBUTING TO A SEQUENCING BACK-UP OF ACFT FOR APCHS TO THE FIELD. WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH ZHN RECEIVING VECTORS TO AN APCH TO ILS RWY 8L AT HNL. DURING THE LAST 30 MINS OF THE FLT; THE FLT CREW RECEIVED MULTIPLE CALLS FROM FLT ATTENDANTS REGARDING SEVERAL CABIN ISSUES. THE FLT ATTENDANT INTERRUPTIONS WERE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO THE COCKPIT'S PERFORMANCE AND DETRACTED FROM THE FLT CREW MEMBERS RECEIVING CRITICAL DIRECTIONS FROM ATC. ON THE AFOREMENTIONED FLT; AT APPROX 10 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG; THE SECOND FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO INQUIRE IF WE WERE STILL LNDG AT THE PREDICTED LAND TIME (THIS WAS AFTER HE HAD ALREADY CALLED 2 PREVIOUS TIMES TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE SAME THING SEVERAL HRS PRIOR). IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THAT; LEAD FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO ASK IF 'WE KNEW WHAT GATE FLT DDD WAS PARKING AT SINCE WE HAD SOME PAX CONNECTING AND IT WOULD BENEFIT THEM TO KNOW WHERE IT WAS AT.' ALMOST 2 MINS LATER; AGAIN CALLED UP TO ASK IF WE COULD NOTIFY HNL RAMP THAT THEY WOULD NEED EXTRA AGRICULTURE CLRNC FORMS SINCE THEY 'FAILED TO MAKE SURE (!) THEY HAD ENOUGH FORMS FLYING OUT OF ORANGE COUNTY.' WHEN I ASKED HOW MANY HE NEEDED; HE RESPONDED; '...A WHOLE BUNCH SINCE I RAN OUT RIGHT AROUND THE EXIT ROW.' I HAVE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL THESE CALLS CAME WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME SPAN WHILE THE ACFT WAS BEING VECTORED AROUND INCLEMENT WX AND MULTIPLE TFC CONTACTS AROUND US. AT THE VERY LEAST; THIS IS HIGHLY UNPROFESSIONAL (SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THESE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED AT ALT PRIOR TO THE DSCNT) AND AT ITS EXTREME; I FEEL; CAN ULTIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO A HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENT WHERE A FLT CREW CAN MISS CALLS AND RESULT IN A MISHAP. ONCE ON THE GND; CAPT ZZZ COUNSELED THE INDIVIDUALS AS TO THEIR CONDUCT AND THE IMPACT THEY HAD ON COCKPIT PERFORMANCE. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) DISTRIBUTE/PROMULGATE INTO FLT ATTENDANT SAFETY NEWSLETTERS THE OBSERVANCE OF THIS TREND AND THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE THAT THEY RESPECT THE WORKLOAD THAT EXISTS IN THE COCKPIT DURING TKOF/APCHS/LNDGS. FURTHERMORE; REINFORCE AMONG CABIN PERSONNEL THE NEED FOR PROFESSIONALISM AND PROACTIVISM IN STAYING AHEAD OF CABIN DUTIES. WHILE IT IS EASY TO PROCRASTINATE AND 'WAIT TILL THE DSCNT' TO HANDLE PROBS; IT IS ABSOLUTELY NOT FAIR TO FELLOW CREW MEMBERS (AND VERY OFTEN OUR PAX) TO TREAT THEIR DUTIES WITH SUCH A LAX ATTITUDE WITH THE RESULTANT HIGHER WORKLOAD AND INCONVENIENCES TO OUR PAX. 2) INCLUDE TRAINING DURING THE FLT ATTENDANT RECURRENT CRM PHASE THAT EMPHASIZES THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FLT ATTENDANTS PLAY IN A COHESIVE CREW ENVIRONMENT. ALSO INCLUDE REVIEWING THE PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF A STERILE COCKPIT AND THE ASSOCIATED PROCS. FLT ATTENDANT'S DISREGARD FOR THESE ESTABLISHED PROCS CAN SEVERELY HAMPER A FLT CREW'S EFFECTIVENESS DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT. 3) INCLUDE TRAINING DURING PLT RECURRENT CRM PHASE THAT EMPHASIZES THE CAPT'S AND FO'S RESPONSIBILITY TO CULTIVATE A PROFESSIONAL COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT THAT ADHERES TO PRESCRIBED STERILE COCKPIT RULES AND FLT CREW PROFESSIONALISM. ANY DEVS FROM THESE GUIDELINES BY INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH FOLLOWING FLTS WITH INSTRUCTION AND; IF FURTHER PROBS OCCUR; ARE DEALT WITH THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS.