AN LR25 MEDICAL FLT ENCOUNTERED NON FORECAST DEST WX AND WINDS. THE CREW DIVERTED TO A NEARBY ARPT AND LANDED FATIGUED WITH LOW FUEL IN A 100 FT CEILING.

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THE FLT WAS AN AMBULANCE FLT THAT HAD ORIGINATED IN ZZZ; STOPPED IN ZZZ1 FOR FUEL AND INBOUND CUSTOMS AND CONTINUED ON TO THE DROP-OFF ARPT OF ZZZ2. THE FLT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 WAS UNEVENTFUL FOR THE FIRST 95% OF THE FLT ASIDE FROM A COUPLE MINOR GENERATOR PROBS. IT WAS PLANNED TO BE 2 HRS 30 MINS WITH THE ACFT'S RANGE OF ABOUT 3 HRS AND 30 MINS. WX IN ZZZ2 WAS FORECAST TO BE OK WITH SOME SNOW SHOWERS AND LOWER VISIBILITY IN THE VICINITY AND A STRONG GUSTY NW WIND; TYPICAL WINTER WX. ABOUT 150 MI S OF ZZZ1; I PICKED UP THE ZZZ2 ATIS TO GET AN IDEA OF THE WX AT ZZZ1 WHICH HAS A WEAK ATIS AND YOU HAVE TO BE WITHIN 100 MI AT TIMES TO BE ABLE TO HEAR IT. THEY WERE CALLING 3 MI SNOW AND MIST WITH 1500 FT CEILINGS AND TWR VISIBILITY OF 5 MI; CLOSE TO THE FORECAST. WHEN I PICKED UP THE ZZZ1 WX; IT WAS ACTUALLY A LITTLE BETTER THAN ZZZ2 AND THEY WERE DOING THE ILS TO RWY 24R. THE ZZZ1 WINDS; HOWEVER; WERE 350 DEGS AND 26 KTS GUSTING TO 37 KTS; NEARLY A DIRECT XWIND NEAR THE AIRPLANE'S LIMITATION. KNOWING THAT IT HAD BEEN SNOWING ALL NIGHT IN THE AREA; I ASKED ZZZ2 APCH IF THERE WERE ANY BRAKING ACTION RPTS AT ZZZ1 TO PLAN ON OUR LNDG DISTANCE DATA TO SEE IF WE COULD LAND THERE. NO RPTS WERE AVAILABLE WHEN HE CALLED THE ZZZ1 TWR; ALTHOUGH THEY SAID THERE WAS BLOWING SNOW ON ALL SURFACES. THE CAPT AND I DECIDED THAT WE WOULD SHOOT THE ILS TO ZZZ1 AND SINCE THE VISIBILITY WAS MORE THAN 3 MI; WE WOULD TAKE A LOOK AT THE RWY SURFACE AND DECIDE ON WHAT WE WOULD DO. WE BROKE OUT ON THE ILS TO ZZZ1; A GOOD 5 MI OUT; AND AS WE GOT CLOSER THE CAPT ADVISED ME TO TELL TWR WE WERE GOING TO GO AROUND AND LAND AT ZZZ2. WE PERFORMED THE MISSED APCH AND MISSED APCH CHKLIST AND CHKED ON WITH ZZZ2 APCH ON A N HDG AT 3000 FT. WE ADVISED THAT WE WANTED TO DO THE ILS TO RWY 24L OR RWY 24R. THEY GAVE US A S HDG AND TOLD US TO EXPECT RWY 24L. AT ABOUT THIS TIME THE LOW FUEL LIGHT HAD COME ON STEADY MEANING THERE WAS LESS THAN 600 LBS IN EITHER OR BOTH WINGS MEANING LESS THAN 30 MINS OF LOW ALT FLYING. WE WERE GIVEN A HDG TO JOIN THE LOC AND ADVISED THAT THE RWY 24L RVR WAS 1400 FT; A FAR CRY FROM THE 5 MI THAT HAD BEEN RPTED APPROX 20-25 MI EARLIER; AND ASKED OUR INTENTIONS. WE ADVISED WE WOULD CONTINUE THE APCH; BOTH OF US AGREEING THERE WASN'T ANY OTHER OPTION DUE TO THE FUEL SITUATION AND LACK OF THE WX KNOWLEDGE AT NEARBY ARPTS THAT WE COULD HAVE USED. THE REQUIRED RVR FOR RWY 24L IS 3200 RVR OR 300 FT CEILINGS AND 5/8 MI VISIBILITY. WE HAD NONE OF THESE. I HAD GND CONTACT ABOUT 6 MI OUT AND WAS JUST HOPING THAT MAYBE IT WAS A PASSING SQUALL THAT WOULD BE OVER BY THE TIME WE GOT TO THE ARPT. I LATER CHKED THE WX FOR THE TIME OF LNDG AND IT WAS 1/4 MI VISIBILITY; VV100 AND A FAIRLY STEADY 40 KT XWIND; JUST ABOUT THE WORST CONDITIONS YOU COULD ASK FOR. THE HAND FLOWN APCH WAS DONE WITH GREAT ACCURACY DESPITE THE WINDSHEAR OF +/-10 KTS ALL THE WAY IN FROM 5 MI AND STRONG XWIND. AS WE NEARED DECISION HEIGHT IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO BREAK OUT. THE CAPT ADVISED ME THAT IN ADDITION TO GIVING HIM TRACK INFO THAT AFTER DECISION HEIGHT I WAS TO CALL OUT HEIGHT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ELEVATION. WE BOTH CAUGHT THE APCH LIGHTS AT ABOUT 150 FT AND CONTINUED TO 100 FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AND THEN 50 FT AND I CALLED 50 FT STEADY A COUPLE OF TIMES AS THE CAPT TRACKED THE LOC. THE VISIBILITY WAS TERRIBLE WITH THE BLOWING SNOW AND I DID NOT SEE ANY LANDMARKS AS I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. AS SOON AS WE PASSED THE THRESHOLD LIGHTS AND WERE IN BTWN THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS; THE PWR WAS PULLED TO IDLE AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. TWR ASKED US FOR THE FLT CONDITIONS ON APCH AND I ADVISED +/-10 KTS ON APCH AND THAT WE HAD THE APCH LIGHTS AT MINIMUMS; A SLIGHT STRETCH IN THE TRUTH. NOTHING ELSE WAS ASKED OF US AND WE WERE HANDED OFF TO GND FOR THE TAXI TO THE FBO. 15 MINS LATER; VISIBILITY WAS GREATER THAN 5 MI WITH A 3000 FT SCATTERED CEILING WITH OCCASIONAL SNOW SQUALLS DROPPING VISIBILITY DOWN TO 1000 FT OR LESS AS I SAT WITH THE MEDICAL CREW AND PATIENT AS THE CAPT HAD GONE INSIDE TO MAKE A COUPLE PHONE CALLS TO COMPANY. AS FAR AS PREVENTING THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN; I AM NOT SURE WHAT TO SAY. THE WX HAD GONE FROM FORECAST MARGINAL VFR TO BELOW APCH MINIMUMS WITHOUT WARNING TO US. IN A WAY; I FEEL IT WAS OUT OF OUR HANDS AND WITH THE LACK OF FUEL WE COULD NOT HAVE EASILY FOUND AN ARPT CLOSE ENOUGH WITH WX THAT WE KNEW WAS GOING TO BE STEADY ENOUGH FOR US TO GET IN. THE ONLY THING THAT WE COULD HAVE DONE TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION WOULD BE TO HAVE MADE A FUEL STOP ENRTE BUT SINCE THE WX WAS FORECAST TO BE OK; WE JUST WANTED TO GET THE PATIENT TO THEIR DEST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I THINK A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS CREW FATIGUE. WE HAD BOTH BEEN UP APPROX 24 HRS AND ON DUTY FOR ABOUT 13 HRS WITH ABOUT 8.5 HRS OF FLT TIME AT THE TIME OF THE APCH INTO ZZZ1. FLYING FOR A LARGE PART 135 COMPANY; WE DO A LOT OF LONG DAYS AND NIGHTS AND AS MUCH AS YOU'D LIKE TO THINK YOU ARE USED TO IT; YOU NEVER ARE. THE SAME GOES FOR THE WX. BOTH THE CAPT AND I HAVE LIVED AND FLOWN IN THE AREA OUR ENTIRE LIVES AND WE BOTH KNOW NOW MORE THAN EVER THAT THE WX CAN NEVER BE EXPECTED TO STAY AS PREDICTED. I GUESS FROM HERE ON OUT I WILL TRY AND LOOK AT WX TRENDS TO GET A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN IN ADDITION TO WHAT IS EXPECTED. I WILL ALSO THINK TWICE ABOUT DOING LONG LEGS INTO AREAS WITH QUESTIONABLE WX AND TO CARRY EXTRA FUEL WHEN POSSIBLE TO HELP WITH DECISION MAKING. THE ONLY OTHER WAY TO GET MORE REST AT A PART 135 COMPANY IS NOT TO FLY FOR A PART 135 COMPANY. UNFORTUNATELY; WITH THE WAY THE CHARTER INDUSTRY HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO GET; PLTS WILL ALWAYS BE EXPLOITED TO THE FULL EXTENT OF THEIR DUTY DAY WITHOUT REGARD TO NATURAL SLEEP HABITS AND GOOD REST.