B737-300 FO IS RELUCTANT TO ASSERT CTL OF THE ACFT DURING HIGHLY UNSTABILIZED INST APCH TO BDL. CAPT CONTINUES APCH TO MINIMUMS; BREAKS OUT AND LANDS.

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I WAS ORIGINALLY INFORMED BY THE UNION AS WELL AS THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE THAT THE TIME LIMIT HAD EXPIRED TO FILE A RPT. HOWEVER; I HAVE NOW LEARNED THAT EXCEPTIONS ARE MADE AND THAT PROGRAM OFFICE MAY ACCEPT THIS RPT. ON DSCNT INTO HARTFORD; THE WX WAS 2 MI VISIBILITY IN RAIN AND 300 FT OVCST. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND BRIEFED A FLAPS 30 APCH AND LNDG TO RWY 6. HE BRIEFED A CAPT FLOWN APCH USING THE AUTOPLT AND THE HUD. THE DSCNT WAS NORMAL UNTIL TURNING FINAL WHEN WE REALIZED A STRONG TAILWIND OF ABOUT 30 KTS. TWR THEN CALLED AND ADVISED US WHAT TO DO IN THE EVENT OF A GAR. I BELIEVE IT WAS A HINT. IT BECAME EVIDENT TO ME AT THAT TIME THAT MEETING STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA MAY BE A LITTLE TOUGH. WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR AS WELL AS BEGAN CONFIGURING THE WING FLAPS. APCHING 1000 FT AGL; I WAS SURE THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MEET STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT IN AN ATTEMPT TO SAVE THE APCH. I CALLED FOR A GAR AT 1000 FT. THE AIRSPD WAS INCREASING. THE VERT SPD WAS IN EXCESS OF 2000 FPM; THE GS WAS FULL SCALE DEFLECTION DOWN; THE THROTTLES WERE AT IDLE AND WE HAD NOW DRIFTED 1.5 DOTS R OF COURSE ON THE LOC. THE CAPT RESPONDED TO MY GAR CALL WITH SOMETHING LIKE; 'WE'RE OK.' I THEN CALLED ALL THE DEVS AS REQUIRED; AIRSPD; LOC; SINK RATE AND GS. HE DID NOT RESPOND. THE AIRSPD HAD INCREASED ENOUGH NOW TO FORCE THE FLAPS TO 'BLOW' BACK UP TO 30 DEGS. I DID CONSIDER TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT; BUT I HESITATED TO CONSIDER WHAT THE CAPT'S REACTION WOULD BE AND I DID NOT WANT A FIGHT IN THE COCKPIT AT THAT TIME. BY THE TIME I HESITATED; WE WERE APCHING MINIMUMS AND I MADE THE APCHING MINIMUMS CALL. JUST PRIOR TO MINIMUMS; THE RWY BECAME VISIBLE; THE EXCESSIVE DSCNT RATE CONTINUED DOWN BELOW THE GS TO ABOUT 1.5 DOT TO WHICH I CALLED 'GS' AS DID THE ACFT. THE CAPT SLOWLY LEVELED OFF AND WE LANDED NORMALLY AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. I TRIED TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE CAPT BUT HE JUST SAID 'SORRY' AND DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT. I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN MYSELF FOR NOT TAKING THE ACFT FROM THE CAPT. I WAS DISTRESSED THAT HE HAD PUT ME IN THAT POS. I WAS ANGRY HE DID NOT GO AROUND AT MY COMMAND. I FEEL I FAILED MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MYSELF; MY FAMILY; MY PAX; MY AIRLINE AND MY CAPT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS MAY INCLUDE THE FACT THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE A STRONG 'CAPT'S ACFT' MENTALITY AT OUR COMPANY. I DID NOT WANT TO PISS OFF A CAPT BY TAKING 'HIS' ACFT FROM HIS CTL. I REALIZE NOW THAT I HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO AS WRITTEN IN OUR OPS MANUAL. I ALSO BELIEVE THE CAPT BECAME FIXATED ON THE GS AND OMITTED EVERYTHING ELSE. I WILL BE MORE VIGILANT THAN EVER FROM THAT POINT FORWARD ON ENSURING WE DO MEET ALL STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. I WILL NOT HESITATE IN THE FUTURE TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE FROM A CAPT DESPITE THE ATMOSPHERE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 680156: I WOULD LIKE TO REMARK THAT NOWHERE IN THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL DOES IT TALK ABOUT CHKING WIND COMPONENTS PRIOR TO LNDG CONFIGN OF THE PLANE. ONCE GS CAPTURE OCCURRED; I DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND REDUCED VERT SPD FOR FUTURE FLAPS 40 DEG EXTENSION. AT THIS POINT; WE WERE ABOVE GS WITH TAILWIND 25-30 NM AND V TARGET SPD 155-160 KTS. BY THE TIME WE CROSSED 1000 FT CALLOUT; WE HAD SEVERAL DEVS; BUT I WAS SO CONCENTRATED UPON FLYING ACCORDING TO ALL PARAMETERS THAT I DISREGARDED THE FO'S SUGGESTIVE COMMENT: 'MAYBE WE SHOULD GO AROUND?' HAD HE/SHE VOICES THIS COMMENT IN A LESS CASUAL AND MORE ASSERTIVE MANNER; SOMETHING LIKE: 'UNSTABILIZED APCH; GO AROUND!' I WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE PLANE AROUND. I HAVE LEARNED THE FOLLOWING LESSONS FROM THIS INCIDENT: 1) UNDER ALL UNCOMFORTABLE LNDG CIRCUMSTANCES; IT IS BETTER TO GO AROUND AND GIVE ONESELF TIME TO EVALUATE THE SIT; RATHER THAN CONTINUING ON THE WAY AND TRYING TO MEET THE PARAMETERS. 2) BEFORE FLYING WITH A FO FOR THE FIRST TIME; IT IS IMPORTANT TO LET HIM OR HER KNOW THAT THE CAPT IS NOT THE SUPREME AUTH WHOSE DECISIONS CANNOT BE QUESTIONED. IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE FO FEEL THAT;IF HE OR SHE IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH SOMETHING DURING THE FLT; HE/SHE CAN ALWAYS VOICE PERSONAL OPINION ASSERTIVELY AND EXPECT IT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.