A B737-700 WAS FOUND TO HAVE #3 MAIN TIRE MISSING 3 INCHES OF TREAD FROM THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE TIRE. TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY REPLACED. FAILED TO MAKE A REQUIRED CONDITIONAL THROWN TREAD INSPECTION.

Date: 2005-12 · Aircraft: B737-700 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

A B737-700 WAS FOUND TO HAVE #3 MAIN TIRE MISSING 3 INCHES OF TREAD FROM THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE TIRE. TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY REPLACED. FAILED TO MAKE A REQUIRED CONDITIONAL THROWN TREAD INSPECTION.

Narrative

I WAS CALLED OUT TO ACFT X WHICH WAS ORIGINATING OUT OF ZZZ1 TO INSPECT THE #3 TIRE AT APPROX XA30. UPON INSPECTION; I FOUND THAT APPROX 2-3 INCHES OF TREAD WAS MISSING FROM THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE TIRE. I THEN CHKED AMM 32-45-00-6; WHICH SAYS: 'TIRES WITH THROWN TREAD ARE NOT SVCABLE.' UTILIZING AMM 32-45-11-4; I REMOVED THE UNSVCABLE TIRE AND INSTALLED ONE THAT WAS SVCABLE. AFTER COMPLETING THE REQUIRED PAPERWORK AND SIGNING OFF THE LOGBOOK; THE ACFT LEFT ZZZ WITH A 35 MIN DELAY. DURING A PHONE CALL LATER IN THE MORNING WITH MY MGR; I DECIDED TO TAKE PICTURES OF SAID UNSVCABLE TIRE TO SEND TO HIM IN AN EFFORT TO EXPRESS MY CONCERN THAT THE TIRE WAS FOUND AT THE LAST MIN. THESE PICTURES WERE FORWARDED TO MAINT CTL WHO DETERMINED THAT A TREAD LOSS CONDITIONAL INSPECTION WAS REQUIRED AMM 05-51-54-2); OF WHICH I DID NOT COMPLETE. THE CONDITIONAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED BY ZZZ1 A FEW HRS LATER. ALTHOUGH I FOLLOWED THE AMM IN THE INSPECTION/CHK AND ULTIMATELY THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE TIRE; I WAS UNAWARE OF THE CONDITIONAL INSPECTION ASSOCIATED WITH THE TREAD LOSS; THUS I FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE INSPECTION. IT IS MY HUMBLE OPINION THAT VARIOUS STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THIS FROM RECURRING AGAIN. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) ATTACH A LINK TO THE CONDITIONAL INSPECTION IN: A) INSPECTION/CHK (AMM 32-45-00-6). B) REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT (AMM 32-45-11-4). 2) ATTACH A NOTE TO RAISE AWARENESS OF THE CONDITIONAL INSPECTION IN: A) INSPECTION/CHK (AMM 32-45-00-6); B) REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT (AMM 32-5-11-4). THESE STEPS WOULD PREVENT THE MECH WHO UTILIZED THE AMM FROM INADVERTENTLY MISSING A REQUIRED INSPECTION. FINALLY; TO ADDRESS HUMAN FACTORS; I DID NOT FEEL ANY EXCESS PRESSURE TO HASTEN THE TASK. ALTHOUGH IT WAS SNOWING; I DO NOT FEEL THAT WX WAS A FACTOR. I WAS NOT TIRED NOR COMPLACENT; JUST UNAWARE. I HOPE THIS INFO HELPS IN PREVENTING ANOTHER LIKE OCCURRENCE.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.