FLT CREW OF B747-400 PERFORM HIGH SPD REJECTED TKOF AT ZSPD WHEN L BODY GEAR REAR TIRES FAIL.

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WE BEGAN OUR TKOF ON RWY 34 AND ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. AT APPROX 100 KTS; WE HEARD MUFFLED BANG OR POP; FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY LIGHT; MID FREQ VIBRATIONS; WHICH I ASSOCIATED WITH A BLOWN TIRE. I INITIATED AN ABORTED TKOF WITH REJECTED TKOF AUTOBRAKES AND IDLE REVERSE. WHEN WE CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP; MOMENTARILY THE FIRST RELIEF PLT MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED; PER OUR PREDEP BRIEFING; AS OUR STOP WAS STRAIGHT AHEAD WITHOUT SWERVING OR SCRAPING OF METAL. THE FLYING FO MADE THE CALL TO THE TWR TO INFORM THEM OF OUR ABORT. WE EXITED THE RWY AT TXWY F-6. WE TAXIED TO T-4 TO A POINT 150 YARDS E OF THE FIRE STATION AND SHUT DOWN ENGS #2 AND #3 TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM ROLLING WITH THE PARKING BRAKE RELEASED TO PREVENT BRAKE OVERHEAT. AS WE TAXIED TOWARDS T-4; WE REQUESTED THAT THE FIRE DEPT BE SENT TO CHK OVER THE ACFT (FOR OBVIOUS DAMAGE; WHEEL DAMAGE; OR BRAKE FIRE). EVEN AFTER OUR SECOND REQUEST FOR THE SAME ACTION IN A 15 MIN PERIOD; NO FIRE EQUIP EVER ARRIVED. WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER FOR THE ABORT; AS WE FELT THE ACFT DAMAGE WAS MINIMAL AND NO RPTS OF SMOKE/FIRE WERE RECEIVED FROM THE FLT ATTENDANT CREW OR OTHER ACFT; THAT HAD WITNESSED THE ABORT; OR ZSPD TWR. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME LANGUAGE BARRIER; INTERP PROBS AS TO EXACTLY WHAT WE WANTED SINCE WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. THE FLT THAT WAS NEXT FOR TKOF ON RWY 34; RPTED THAT THERE WAS LOTS OF DEBRIS ON THE RWY AND THAT WE MAY HAVE BLOWN 2 TIRES. AFTER WE PARKED ON TXWY T-4; WE WERE IN INTERMITTENT CONTACT WITH SHANGHAI OPS; RADIO RECEPTION WAS VERY POOR. IT TOOK ABOUT 45 MINS TO GET A COMPANY MECH TO THE ACFT AND INSPECT AND ADVISE THAT THE ACFT SHOULD NOT BE TAXIED FURTHER. SOME POINTS OF EMPHASIS; LESSONS LEARNED; 1) THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE DONE TO THE TIRE/WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS MUCH MORE THAN I HAD EXPECTED. MORE PHOTOS OF THESE AND OTHER TYPES OF ACFT INCIDENTS TO GIVE A BETTER IDEA WHAT HAPPENS TO ACFT COMPONENTS DURING ABORTED TKOFS. 2) TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON 'GOING' ONCE IN THE HIGH SPD REGIME; IE; 'WILL ABORT ONLY FOR THE FOLLOWING....' 3) BETTER STATION OPS TRAINING FOR IRREGULAR ACFT OPS. PLANNED DRILLS OR 'WALK THROUGH' CONFERENCES FOR THE STATION PERSONNEL. 4) I GUESS IF YOU WANT FIRE EQUIP YOU DECLARE AN EMER AT FOREIGN STATIONS (ALL OR NOTHING). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 680533: ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO HYD LINES AND GEAR FAIRINGS AS A RESULT OF TIRE FAILURE ON L BODY GEAR REAR TIRES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 680531: TAXI OUT TO RWY 34 WAS NORMAL WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE OTHER RELIEF PLT TALKED ABOUT HAVING A NOSEWHEEL TIRE BLOW OUT ON TAXI OUT; ALSO TO RWY 34; ON HIS PREVIOUS FLT ABOUT A WK EARLIER. WE LOOKED CLOSELY AT THE TXWY AT THE POINT WHERE THE TIRE FAILED TO SEE IF THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF THE BLOWN TIRE ON THE TXWY. THE INITIAL TKOF WAS NORMAL AS WE PASSED THROUGH 80 KTS AND A FEW SECONDS BEYOND THAT. SUDDENLY THERE WAS A POP THAT WAS DISTINCT BUT NOT REALLY LOUD. THE CAPT HESITATED ABOUT 2 SECONDS SINCE THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF A PROB. THEN THE ACFT STARTED TO VIBRATE; AT WHICH POINT THE CAPT ABORTED THE TKOF.