EMB135 CREW ON ARR SHUTS DOWN #2 ENG AFTER RECEIVING AN 'ENG #2 REVERSER DISAGREEMENT' EICAS MESSAGE.

Narrative

DURING ARR INTO ZZZ; ENG #2 WAS SHUT DOWN PER QRH PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST AS DIRECTED BY 'ENG THRUST REVERSER DISAGREEMENT' CHKLIST. ACFT WAS ON ARR APPROX 20 NM FROM ZZZ. DURING DSCNT EICAS MESSAGE 'ENG #2 REVERSER DISAGREEMENT' APPEARED ON EICAS ALONG WITH AMBER 'REVERSER' OVER ENG #2 N1 INDICATOR. IN ADDITION TO AFOREMENTIONED EICAS MESSAGE AND INDICATION; EICAS MESSAGE 'ENG #2 REVERSER FAIL' APPEARED MULTIPLE TIMES ON CAS. THIS SAME EICAS INDICATION AND EICAS MESSAGE WAS WRITTEN UP PREVIOUS DAY BY ANOTHER CREW FOR THE SAME ENG. IN ADDITION TO MULTIPLE EICAS MESSAGES AND INDICATIONS; CREW NOTICED VIBRATION OR RUMBLE IN ACFT SIMILAR TO SPD BRAKE USE ALTHOUGH SPD BRAKES WERE CLOSED. ALL PARAMETERS OF ENG THRUST REVERSER CHKLIST WERE MET (INFLT; N1 CHK; N1 DECREASE THEN TL IDLE; AIRSPD MAX 200 KIAS; PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN PROC ACCOMPLISH; LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT). PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST EXECUTED BY BOTH CREW MEMBERS PER POH AND QRH AND PREVIOUS TRAINING. OEI APCH AND LNDG; OEI GAR CHKLISTS WERE EXECUTED IN ADDITION TO ALL NORMAL CHKLISTS REQUIRED BY POH. EMER WAS DECLARED WITH ATC AND REQUESTED DIRECT TO ZZZ. FLT ATTENDANT WAS NOTIFIED AND GIVEN PERTINENT INFO. FLT ATTENDANT WAS TOLD THAT AN EVAC WAS NOT NECESSARY UPON SAFE LNDG AND THAT CAPT WOULD MAKE A PA ONCE SAFE ON THE GND. TAXIED UNDER ACFT PWR USING NORMAL SINGLE ENG OPS. PAX DEPLANED. I AM NOT SURE EXACTLY WHAT TO SUGGEST FOR THE FUTURE. I BELIEVE THAT AN EXPANDED OR MORE DETAILED QRH WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE EMB135 ACFT. IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO BE ABLE TO CONTACT MAINT CTL FOR GUIDANCE ON SYS TROUBLESHOOTING SINCE WE ARE NOT MECHS OR ENGINEERS AS OPPOSED TO GETTING THE SAME ADVICE OF 'RUN THE QRH.' I HAVE NEVER HAD TO SHUT AN ENG DOWN INFLT AND THE DECISION TO DO SO WAS NOT TAKEN LIGHTLY. ACFT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP THE PREVIOUS DAY FOR ENG #2 REVERSER PROBS (ENG #2 REVERSER FAIL MESSAGE AND AMBER REVERSER IN ADDITION TO ENG #2 NO DISPATCH) AND WAS SIGNED OFF 'OPS CHKED OK.' I NOTED THIS BEFORE DEP AND BRIEFED MY FO OF THE WRITE-UP PRIOR TO LEAVING THE GATE. I THINK IT'S GOOD PROC TO GATHER AS MUCH INFO FROM THE PREVIOUS WRITE-UPS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ONE AIDED ME LATER IN THE FLT. I MADE THE SAFEST CHOICES POSSIBLE BASED ON ALL OF MY PAST EXPERIENCES; THE EXPERIENCE OF MY FO; THE TOTALITY OF CURRENT INFO; (TO INCLUDE THE LIMITED CHKLISTS OF THE QRH; VISUAL/TACTILE CLUES; MULTIPLE EICAS MESSAGES AND INDICATIONS; ACFT SYS KNOWLEDGE; PAST ACFT DISCREPANCY HISTORY; A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE ON THE GND A FEW YRS AGO; CURRENT ACFT POS; NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT LNDG IN POINT OF TIME; TIME CONSTRAINTS; AND PHYSICAL AND MENTAL STRESSES). MY ADVICE TO OTHER CREW MEMBERS (ESPECIALLY TO CAPTS) IS TO AVOID GETTING OVERWORKED OR OVERLOADED. IF THERE IS ANYTHING I WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO HAVE SHARED THE WORKLOAD MORE. I OVERTAXED MYSELF IN HAND FLYING A SINGLE ENG ACFT; COMMUNICATING WITH ATC; COMMUNICATING WITH MY FLT ATTENDANT; TRYING TO KEEP UP WITH THE CHKLISTS; AND TRYING TO MAKE THE BEST DECISIONS BASED ON WHAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 683826: I BELIEVE AS A CREW WE ARRIVED AT THE SAFEST DECISION POSSIBLE. I FELT MORE PREPARED BECAUSE THE CAPT DID BRIEF ME IN DETAIL BEFORE LEAVING THE GATE ON POSSIBLE SCENARIOS RELATED TO THRUST REVERSER DISAGREEMENT/FAILURE ISSUES. I WOULD STRESS TO OTHERS THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT RUSHING THE PROCS; AND PAYING STRICT ATTN TO THE DETAILS OF THE CHKLISTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL PROCS ARE ACCOMPLISHED.