B737 FLT CREW DURING ILS APCH ELECTS TO PERFORM A GAR DUE TO UNSTABLE APCH.

Date: 2006-01 · Aircraft: B737-300 · Phase: approach

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-overshoot|deviation-altitude-excursion-from-assigned-altitude|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW DURING ILS APCH ELECTS TO PERFORM A GAR DUE TO UNSTABLE APCH.

Narrative

FO WAS PF. LAST LEG DAY 4 OF A 4-DAY TRIP. WE WERE VECTORED TO ILS RWY 11. FO HAD BRIEFLY BRIEFED THE APCH. MINIMAL BRIEFING THEN 'TO A VISUAL APCH.' THE WX WAS ABOVE VFR MINIMUMS; BUT FAF WOULD BE IN THE CLOUDS IF WX WAS AS RPTED. DURING THE BRIEFING I POINTED OUT; AND FO NOTED; THAT I HAD THE VOR TUNED FOR DME. AS WE TURNED ONTO THE LOC; A FEW MI OUTSIDE PLAZA AT 2000 FT MSL; I NOTED THAT THE GS WAS ALIVE AND SHOWING US ABOUT 1.5 DOTS LOW. I CALLED OUT 'GS ALIVE.' FO WAS CALLING CONFIGN CHANGES; AND AS WE APCHED PLAZA WE WERE GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 15 DEGS MAYBE 25 DEGS; AND SLOWING; AND I NOTED THAT WE WERE ABOVE THE GS AT ABOUT 1950 FT OR 2000 FT MSL. I BELIEVE THAT THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE WERE BOTH ENGAGED AT THIS TIME. THE FO HAD NOT ARMED THE APCH MODE. I ASKED; 'ARE YOU GOING TO GET THE GS?' FO CHANGED FLT PATH TO INTERCEPT THE GS. DURING THIS APCH CALLED WITH AN INSTRUCTION TO CONTACT THE TWR AND ISSUED A XING ALT THAT NEITHER OF US UNDERSTOOD. FO AND I DISCUSSED THE XING ASSIGNMENT. I'M NOT SURE WHAT STATE OF AUTOMATION WAS BEING USED AT THIS POINT; AND IN DEBRIEFING THE FO LATER; HE WASN'T SURE EITHER. LOOKING UP FROM MY CHART I SAW THE AIRSPD WAS LOW AND DECREASING. IT WAS AT ABOUT 110 KIAS. REF WAS ABOUT 123 KIAS FOR THIS APCH WITH FLAPS 30 DEGS TARGET AT 128 KIAS. I CALLED OUT AIRSPD AND PUSHED THE CTL COLUMN FORWARD; WHILE REACHING OVER TO PUSH THE THROTTLES FORWARD. THE FO GOT WITH IT AND PUSHED THE THROTTLES UP AND MADE POSITIVE CTL INPUTS TO RECOVER THE AIRSPD. OUR FLT PATH WAS ERRATIC AND I STATED THAT WE NEEDED TO GO AROUND. IN THE NEXT FEW MOMENTS IT WAS APPARENT THE FO WAS STILL TRYING TO CAPTURE THE GS AND I RESTATED GAR. I TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND AND THE FO MADE NORMAL GAR CALLS AND CTL INPUTS. THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 1600 FT. WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 2000 FT AND IT SEEMED THAT THE FO HAD DIFFICULTY CTLING THE ACFT. WE WERE STILL CLBING; EVEN THOUGH FO HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED TO DSND TO 1600 FT. FO REDUCED PWR BUT THE PITCH ATTITUDE REMAINED AT ABOUT +10 DEGS. I STATED 'GET THE NOSE DOWN.' PRIOR TO GETTING TO 1600 FT; ATC INSTRUCTED A CLB TO 3000 FT OR 4000 FT. THE FO REGAINED WHAT APPEARED TO BE NORMAL CTL OF THE FLT PATH; AND ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS NORMAL. COMMENTS: THIS WAS THE UGLIEST THING I HAVE EVER SEEN IN AN AIRPLANE. I WAS HESITANT TO AND DID NOT TAKE OVER THE CTLS FOR A COUPLE REASONS. 1) I WAS UNSURE OF THE TRIM CONDITION OF THE PLANE AND DIDN'T WANT TO SORT IT OUT AT THAT MOMENT; CONSIDERING #2 BELOW. I HAVE BEEN ON RESERVE FOR THE PAST COUPLE YRS AND HAVE FLOWN VERY LITTLE IN THE PAST 15 MONTHS OR SO. I AM NOT TERRIBLY CONFIDENT OF MY STICK AND RUDDER SKILLS IN THE B737 THESE DAYS. CHANGING ACFT TYPES AND THEN NOT FLYING IT CONSISTENTLY IS NOT A GOOD THING. I'VE DONE OK ON MY PT AND PC'S PRIMARILY; PERHAPS; BECAUSE THEY ARE VERY 'CANNED.' THE APCH DID NOT REQUIRE THE USE OF DME; AND LOOKING BACK IT IS OBVIOUS I SHOULDN'T HAVE TUNED IT FOR FO'S (AND MY) CONVENIENCE. HAVING COME OFF THE AIRBUS I HAVE BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO BEING ABLE TO TUNE AND MONITOR NEARLY ANY COMBINATION OF RADIOS. IN THE HARDBALL PLANES I GUESS YOU HAVE TO CHEAT AND USE FMS DISTANCES INSTEAD OF DME. FO IGNORED MY COMMAND TO GO AROUND. DID HE THINK I WAS JOKING? MAYBE HE DIDN'T HEAR ME; BUT I DOUBT IT.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.