B737-500 EXPERIENCES TAIL PIPE FIRE DURING START OF R ENG. SITUATION RESOLVED PRIOR TO EVAC.

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WHILE TAXIING TO RWY 30 AT IAD; I STARTED THE #2 ENG. N2 RISE WAS SLOW BUT WITHIN FLT MANUAL PARAMETERS. WHEN MAX MOTORING OCCURRED AT APPROX 20%; I PUT THE START LEVER TO IDLE. AFTER NOTICING NO EGT RISE OR N2 INCREASE WITHIN 10 SECONDS; I DETERMINED WE HAD A HUNG START. WHILE STARTING TO DISCUSS THE HUNG START WITH THE CAPT; WE WERE INTERRUPTED BY A FIRE VEHICLE XING RWY 19. HE ASKED IF WE WERE DOING A COLD START BECAUSE HE WAS SEEING A LOT OF SMOKE COMING FROM THE #2 ENG. THIS WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A SECOND CALL SAYING WE HAD A FIRE IN THE #2 ENG. GND CTL CONFIRMED THE FIRE. AT THAT POINT THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE EVAC QRC. WE COMPLETED THE EVAC QRC DOWN TO THE FINAL ITEMS AND STOPPED SHORT OF GIVING THE EVAC COMMAND BECAUSE WE WERE TOLD BY THE FIRE PERSONNEL AND BY GND CTL THAT THE FIRE HAD GONE OUT. WE THEN VERIFIED THIS INFO WITH OUR FLT ATTENDANTS AND OUR ENG INDICATIONS. THE CAPT ELECTED NOT TO EVAC THE ACFT BASED ON THE INFO WE HAD. WE THEN RA THE TAILPIPE FIRE QRC CHKLIST AND REFERENCE ITEMS. NEXT WE TALKED TO THE FIRE PERSONNEL AND A MAINT SUPVR CAME TO THE AIRPLANE. THE FIRE PERSONNEL SAID WE HAD RESIDUAL FUEL UNDER THE ENG AND ON THE LNDG GEAR. THE MAINT SUPVR EXAMINED THE AIRPLANE AND PLUGGED INTO OUR FLT INTERPHONE. HE CONFIRMED WITH THE CAPT THAT IT WOULD BE SAFE TO START THE #1 ENG AND TAXI BACK TO THE GATE. WE COMMUNICATED WITH DISPATCH; OPS; AND MAINT AND COORD A RETURN TO THE GATE WITH THE FIRE TRUCKS FOLLOWING US.