A GV DEPARTING LSGG RECEIVED A TERRAIN ALERT FROM THE DEP CTLR. CREW CLBED THE ACFT TO SAFE ALT.

Narrative

UPON DEP OF RWY 23 AT LSGG; CLBING ON THE KONIL 2 JULIETT SID; ATC INFORMED FLT CREW OF TERRAIN IN VICINITY OF POS; QUESTIONED IF TERRAIN WAS IN SIGHT; AND ISSUED A CLB TO 7000 FT. INITIAL FLT CONDITIONS WERE INTERMITTENT IMC AT TIME OF ATC QUESTION OF WHETHER TERRAIN WAS IN SIGHT; WITH A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE FLT CREW. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE; TERRAIN BECAME VISIBLE. FLT CREW DID NOT INFORM ATC OF VISUAL CONTACT WITH VISIBLE TERRAIN. AT NO TIME DID GPWS INDICATE CONFLICTING TERRAIN OR THREAT. ATC ISSUED A COMMAND TO CLB TO 7000 FT TO AVOID TERRAIN WHICH WAS PERFORMED AT A MAX RATE OF CLB. ATC ADVISED THE FLT CREW THAT THE MAX SPD FOR THE KONIL 2 JULIETT SID WAS 190 KIAS; WITH A BANK OF 25 DEGS. THE ACFT FMS WAS PROGRAMMED TO FOLLOW THE KONIL 2 JULIETT SID; WHICH INCLUDED THE 190 KIAS SPD RESTR AND BANK ANGLE. THE ACFT WAS BEING MANUALLY FLOWN WITH GUIDANCE FROM THE FLT DIRECTOR AND FMS LNAV SOURCE. AUTOTHROTTLES WERE UTILIZED AND OPERATING PROPERLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) ENCOUNTERING A TAILWIND DURING THE INITIAL CLB AND TURN PUSHED THE ACFT OUTSIDE OF THE PROTECTED REGION OF THE SID. 2) MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB DURING THE INITIAL CLB AND TURN LIMITED CLB RATE AND BANK ANGLE. FUTURE FLT CREW ACTIONS: 1) STRICT ADHERENCE TO SID DEP INSTRUCTIONS WITH INCREASED AWARENESS OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS SUCH AS A TAILWIND COMPONENT WHICH WOULD MODIFY THE NORMAL FLT PATH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 698515: CLOSER ATTN SHOULD HAVE BEEN MONITORED TO ACTUAL FLT PATH OF THE ACFT WITH RESPECT TO STRONG WIND CONDITIONS.