B767-300 FLT CREW HAS A DISCREPANCY BTWN FMC DATABASE AND PUBLISHED CHART FOR ESLAR 3 DEP FROM SCEL.

Date: 2006-06 · Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER · Phase: ground

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

B767-300 FLT CREW HAS A DISCREPANCY BTWN FMC DATABASE AND PUBLISHED CHART FOR ESLAR 3 DEP FROM SCEL.

Narrative

AFTER RECEIVING OUR CLRNC FROM SANTIAGO CLRNC DELIVERY; WE PROCEEDED WITH THE RTE AND LEGS CHK PER SOP. THE RTE CHK PROVED SATISFACTORY; HOWEVER; IN CHKING THE LEGS PAGE OF THE FMC WITH FLT PLAN AND THE COMMERCIAL CHART FOR THE FILED AND ASSIGNED SID (ESLAR 3); WE NOTICED 2 DISCREPANCIES. FIRST; THERE WAS AN EXTRA WAYPOINT INSERTED IN THE DATABASE FOR THE SID THAT DOES NOT APPEAR ANYWHERE ON THE ESLAR 3 SID PAGE. THIS WAYPOINT WAS NAMED 'SNO32.' BY ITS DESCRIPTION; WE DETERMINED ITS LOCATION ON THE SNO 074 DEG RADIAL 5 MI PRIOR TO ESLAR. HOWEVER; AS WE SAID EARLIER; IT IS NOT DEPICTED ON THE ESLAR 3 DEP PAGE; 20-3A. SINCE THE FMC DREW THE COURSE AS A DIRECT LEG BTWN DESIT AND ESLAR; WE DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE SAFE TO FLY THAT COURSE AS DEPICTED ON THE FMC; SINCE IT WAS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE PUBLISHED SID. WHAT DISTURBS US IS THAT THERE WERE 2 ALT CONSTRAINTS SHOWN ON THE FMC FOR THIS WAYPOINT; AT OR ABOVE 6500 FT AND BELOW 9000 FT; NEITHER OF WHICH; OBVIOUSLY; WERE ON THE PUBLISHED SID. WHERE DID THOSE CONSTRAINTS COME FROM? ALSO; THE FLT PLAN HAD THIS SNO32 WAYPOINT LISTED FIRST; FOLLOWED BY DESIT AND THEN ESLAR; WHICH IS ABSOLUTELY OUT OF ORDER; ASSUMING THE DATABASE IS DESCRIBING SNO32 CORRECTLY. THE SECOND PROB IS THAT THE FILED AND ASSIGNED SID; THE ESLAR 3 VENTANAS TRANSITION PROCEEDS FROM ESLAR TO THE VENTANAS VOR VIA THE VTN 334 DEG RADIAL INBOUND; BUT THE FLT PLAN LEGS SHOWED US GOING FROM ESLAR TO THE TABON VOR 199 DEG RADIAL 36 DME FIX FIRST; THEN TO VTN. THIS TBN FIX IS PART OF THE ESLAR 3 TABON TRANSITION; NOT THE VENTANAS TRANSITION. THIS IS A NEW DEP PROC FOR SANTIAGO; REPLACING THE ELBOS DEP. WE CHKED BOTH OUR SID PAGE AND THE FMC DATABASE FOR CORRECT DATES. WE SUSPECT EITHER THAT SOMETHING HAS BEEN INCORRECTLY CODED IN THE FMC DATABASE AND THE FLT PLANNING SOFTWARE THAT DISPATCH USES TO GENERATE THIS RTE; OR THAT THE PUBS ARE INCORRECT. SINCE THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST TERRAIN CRITICAL ARPTS THE B767 SERVES IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE GUIDANCE GIVEN TO OUR FLT CREWS BE CORRECT AND THAT EACH PIECE LOGICALLY FITS WITH ALL OTHER PARTS OF THE PUZZLE.

More incidents for this aircraft family →

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.