IFR BE33 LOST ELECTRICAL PWR SHORTLY AFTER DEP; HAD DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING TRACK; PLT DECISIONS WERE QUESTIONED BY ATC AFTER LNDG.

Narrative

CLBING THROUGH AN OVCST THE AIRPLANE LOST ALL ELECTRICAL PWR. PWR CAME BACK FOR A COUPLE OF MINS AS I LEVELED OFF AT 7000 FT. I NOTIFIED ZSE OF THE LOSS OF PWR AND REQUESTED A VECTOR TO THE CLOSEST ARPT THAT I THOUGHT COULD ACCOMMODATE THE EMER. SEATTLE REFUSED TO PROVIDE THE VECTOR CITING AN INABILITY TO SEE ME ON RADAR WITHOUT A XPONDER FUNCTIONING. I THEN STARTED TO TROUBLESHOOT THE FAILURE BY RESETTING THE ALTERNATOR AND PULLING BREAKERS. I DISCOVERED THAT I WAS ABLE TO GET SOME CHARGE BACK ON THE BATTERY BY TURNING OFF THE BATTERY AND LEAVING THE ALTERNATOR ON. I WAS ABLE TO GET ABOUT 18.5 VOLTS (ON A 28 VOLT SYS) AFTER ABOUT 20 MINS. I USED THAT PWR TO CALL THE TWR AT THE ARPT I WAS TRYING TO LAND AT. I HAD TO HAND CRANK THE LNDG GEAR WHICH TOOK ABOUT 30 MINS. I HAD THE GEAR IN WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A DOWN AND LOCKED POS APPROX 15 MINS PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT THE ARPT I HAD CHOSEN TO LAND AT. I LATER CONFIRMED THE DOWN PART BY FLYING OVER THE TWR AT REDMOND; OR. DURING THAT TIME THERE WERE TIMES WHEN I WAS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN MY ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO THE WORKLOAD OF HAND CRANKING THE GEAR (THE CRANK IS BEHIND THE PLT SEAT AND THE AUTOPLT WAS INOP). THERE WERE ALSO TIMES I WAS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE AIRWAY CTRLINE BECAUSE I WAS USING A MAGNETIC COMPASS FOR HDG. UPON LNDG THE TWR CALLED AND TOLD ME TO CALL ZSE. THE MGR AT CTR TOLD ME I SHOULD HAVE LANDED AT THE DALLES; OR. I CHOSE NOT LAND AT THE DALLES BECAUSE I WAS STILL TROUBLESHOOTING THE PROBS AND WANTED THE BENEFIT OF THE TWR AT REDMOND TO VISUALLY INSPECT MY LNDG GEAR. I DID LAND AT REDMOND WITH THE BENEFIT OF HELP FROM THE TWR CREW AND THE ON FIELD EMS AND FIRE CREW AVAILABLE IN CASE OF A PROB. I THINK I MADE THE RIGHT DECISION BASED ON THE FACTS THAT WERE AVAILABLE TO ME AS PIC. I THINK THAT SEATTLE DID WHAT THEIR EQUIP ALLOWED THEM TO DO. I DON'T AGREE WITH THE CTR MGR'S ASSESSMENT THAT I SHOULD HAVE LANDED AT THE DALLES. FAR 91.185 SAYS THAT I WAS SUPPOSED TO 'LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICAL;' NOT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WAS MY JUDGEMENT THAT I WOULD BE SAFER LNDG AT THE TWR CTLED ARPT RATHER THAN AT AN UNCTLED; MOSTLY UNATTENDED ARPT THAT WAS UNDER A PARTIAL CLOUD COVER. I FOUND LOSING ALL ELECTRICAL PWR IN IMC TO BE A BUSY SITUATION TO MANAGE. CTLING THE AIRPLANE WAS FAIRLY NORMAL BECAUSE MY ATTITUDE GYRO IS PRESSURE OPERATED. THE MOST DIFFICULT PART WAS NAV. I HAD SET MY CLOCK AT ENG START SO I USED THAT TO DETERMINE MY POS. SEATTLE TOLD ME I CUT THE CORNER (TURNING FROM 070 DEGS TO 160 DEGS) AT THE LTJ VOR. THE GND WAS STILL MOSTLY COVERED WITH CLOUDS SO I MADE THE TURN BASED ON TIME AND A LITTLE PEEK AT THE COLUMBIA RIVER. I WAS ABOVE THE CLOUDS BY THEN AND COULD ALSO SEE THE PEAKS OF THE CASCADES. I EVIDENTLY DIDN'T SUBTRACT ENOUGH TIME FOR THE VECTOR TO THE NW I GOT AFTER TKOF FROM PORTLAND INTL. THE PROB WAS FOUND TO BE A DEFECTIVE VOLTAGE REGULATOR. I ALSO HAD THEM REPLACE THE ALTERNATOR AND THE BATTERY.