B737-700 FLT CREW PREVENTS FUELER FROM FUELING ACFT UNNECESSARILY WHILE ACFT DOORS CLOSED WITH PAX ON BOARD.
Synopsis
B737-700 FLT CREW PREVENTS FUELER FROM FUELING ACFT UNNECESSARILY WHILE ACFT DOORS CLOSED WITH PAX ON BOARD.
Narrative
PAX LOADING AND FUELING WAS COMPLETE PRIOR TO OUR DEP. FUEL LOAD WAS AT 17.1 WITH THE FUEL TRUCK DISCONNECTED BUT STILL UNDER THE WING; MINIMUM WAS 14.5 AND LOAD PLANNING WAS 21.0. I CHKED WITH OPS TO UNDERSTAND THEIR INTENT WITH REGARDS TO FURTHER FUELING AND TOLD THEM THAT WE CURRENTLY HAD 17.1 AND WE WERE GOOD WITH THAT LOAD. THEY TOLD US THAT IF WE WERE HAPPY WITH THE FUEL THEY WOULD LEAVE IT THERE AND TELL THE FUELER TO CLR THE ACFT. WE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE FINAL HEAD COUNT AND WE GAVE THE OK TO CLOSE THE DOOR TO THE CUSTOMER SVC AGENT. AS THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT CONFIRMED THE NUMBERS WITH US AND I LOOKED OUT OF THE FLT DECK WINDOW ONE MORE TIME TO CHK THE FUELER'S STATUS; THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT CLOSED THE FLT DECK DOOR AS I OPENED MY WINDOW TO GET A BETTER LOOK. AS I LEANED OUT THE WINDOW I WATCHED THE FUELER PICK THE HOSE UP OFF HIS TRUCK AND LIFT IT TO OUR ACFT. I TRIED TO CALL FOR HIM TO DISCONNECT BUT HE COULD NOT HEAR ME. ONE OF THE GND HANDLERS (I THINK THE LEAD BUT I'M NOT SURE) HEARD MY CALL AND ASKED IF I HAD OVER 17.0. I TOLD HIM YES WE HAD 17.1 AND HAD COORD WITH OPS TO THAT BEING OUR FINAL FUEL. HE THEN TOLD THE FUELER TO DISCONNECT. AS I WATCHED THE COMPLETE EVENT; I AM SURE THAT THE FUEL HOSE WAS ONLY CONNECTED TO THE ACFT FOR ABOUT 15 SECONDS AND NO FUEL WAS ON-LOADED. THE FUELER NEVER REACHED FOR THE CTL HANDLE AND WAS JUST BEING TOLD TO DISCONNECT AS HIS HANDS WERE COMING DOWN FROM LOCKING THE HOSE TO THE ACFT. SINCE THE FLT DECK DOOR WAS ALREADY CLOSED AND I HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE GND CREW WE DID NOT REOPEN THE ACFT. THE JETWAY WAS STILL NEXT TO THE ACFT DURING THE ENTIRE EVENT. THE COM FROM OPS TO THE GND CREW TO THE FUELER SEEMED TO NOT BE COMPLETE. THE FUELER AT NO TIME DURING THIS EVENT EVEN LOOKED UP AT THE FLT DECK. IF HE OR THE GND CREW HAD CHKED WITH US PRIOR TO CONNECTING FOR A SECOND TIME THIS EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.