ISSUES WITH ADVANCED NAVIGATION SYSTEM CONTRIBUTES TO CHKOUT PLT ON TBM7 EXPERIENCING UNSTABLE APCH AND LONG LNDG.

Narrative

THE FLT'S PRIMARY MISSION WAS A TRAINING/TRANSITION FOR THE NEW OWNER OF A TBM 850. AS HIS ACFT HAS NOT YET BEEN DELIVERED; WE WERE FLYING A TBM 700C2. THE FLT WAS MADE TO TEB FOR THE OWNER TO CONDUCT BUSINESS AND GAIN EXPERIENCE IN THE TBM. FLT PROGRESSED SMOOTHLY FROM START UNTIL APPROX 20 NM W TEB. BASED UPON ATIS; WE EXPECTED AND BRIEFED FOR THE ILS RWY 06 APCH. A LATE ATIS CHANGE REQUIRED THE ILS RWY 19 APCH TO BE QUICKLY CHANGED ON THE EFIS AND GNS 530. TO COMPOUND OUR PROBS; WE ACCEPTED A HIGH APCH SPD (220 KTS) AND A TIGHT TURN TO FINAL. THE GNS 530 WAS NOT SELECTED TO THE VLOC MODE; THEREBY IT WAS NOT SENDING LOC/GS INFO TO THE EHSI AND EADI. FURTHERMORE; IN THE TBM IT IS POSSIBLE TO HAVE A LOC MODE SELECTED ON THE EHSI AND A GPS MODE SELECTED BY THE GNS 530; THEREBY NOT SUPPLYING THE EHSI WITH LOC SIGNAL INFO. OUR INTERCEPT OF THE LOC WAS A CLOSE-IN OVERSHOOT; FOLLOWED BY AN S-TURN TO ESTABLISH; AND A FULL DOWN GLIDESLOPE INDICATION. AUTOPLT WAS THEN DISCONNECTED AND LOC SELECTED ON THE GNS 530; REESTABLISHING PROPER LOC AND GLIDESLOPE INDICATIONS. THE RESULTING HIGH FAST APCH CREATED A LONG LNDG REQUIRING HARD REVERSE TO STOP. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) INSTRUCTIONAL FLT. 2) FAST APCH (SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED VECTORS WITH THE DELAY). 3) LAST MINUTE IAP CHANGE (SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED MORE TIME TO CHANGE). LNDG WAS CONDUCTED BY TBM EXPERIENCED CFI; OTHER WISE A GO AROUND WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRUDENT. LNDG WAS 'ROUTINE;' BUT LONG. IN SHORT; I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE TOO FAST; TOO CLOSE; TOO RUSHED; AND TOO UNPREPARED FOR THE APCH.