A DHC8-400 DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF A NOSE GEAR STEERING PROB THE ACFT WAS TAXIED WITH #2 ENG PWR. LOSS OF ACFT CTL INCURRED DAMAGE TO ACFT AND GND EQUIP.
Synopsis
A DHC8-400 DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF A NOSE GEAR STEERING PROB THE ACFT WAS TAXIED WITH #2 ENG PWR. LOSS OF ACFT CTL INCURRED DAMAGE TO ACFT AND GND EQUIP.
Narrative
ANOTHER TECHNICIAN AND MYSELF WERE DISPATCHED TO WORK A NOSEWHEEL STEERING PROB ON ACFT X. WHILE I WAS DEBRIEFING PLTS ON MALFUNCTION; THE SHIFT SUPVR HAD ARRIVED AT ACFT AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO RETRIEVE FAULT CODES FROM NOSEWHEEL STEERING COMPUTER. PLTS ALSO STATED THAT THE ACFT WAS SCHEDULED AS A QUICK TURN. AFTER FINISHING WITH PLT'S DEBRIEF; I STARTED CHKING NOSEWHEEL STEERING SWITCH POS AND RESETTING OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN HOPES OF GETTING THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING COMPUTER TO SHOW ANY FAULTS IT HAD LOGGED. AT THIS TIME THE SUPVR HAD LEFT THE ACFT AND THE OTHER TECHNICIAN WENT TO GET THE AMM AND FLT INFO MANUALS TO HELP TROUBLESHOOT. ONCE HE ARRIVED BACK TO ACFT; WE HAD SUCCESSFULLY DOWNLOADED SEVERAL FAULTS AND WERE CHKING THEM OUT IN THE FLT INFO MANUAL. SOMEWHERE IN THIS TIME PERIOD; THE LEAD HAD COME OUT TO ACFT. WE DECIDED TO PERFORM AN OPS CHK OF NOSEWHEEL STEERING. ANOTHER TECHNICIAN AND MYSELF TRIED TO USE THE NOSEWHEEL JACK TO PLACE THE SKID PLATE UNDER THE TIRES BUT THE JACK PLACEMENT PREVENTED CLRNC. THE OTHER TECHNICIAN THEN CALLED FOR RAMP PERSONNEL TO CLR ACFT OF BAGGAGE LOADER AND BAGGAGE CARTS AND TO TOW ACFT ONTO SKID PLATES. IT WAS DECIDED TO USE THE #2 ENG AS HYD PWR SOURCE TO PERFORM OPS CHK. RAMP HAD COME OUT AND MOVED BAGGAGE CARTS AND LOADER AS REQUESTED; BUT THEN LEFT WITH NO SIGNS OF TOW TEAM. I CALLED THE SUPVR THINKING HE WAS WORKING MAINT CTL THAT DAY; TO FIND OUT WHEN TOW TEAM WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MOVE ACFT FOR US. THE SUPVR STATED TO HOLD ON AND CAME OUT TO ACFT. HE STATED TO ME IT WOULD BE FASTER TO JUST ROLL ACFT ONTO SKID PLATES ONCE I HAD THE #2 ENG STARTED; THEN TO WAIT FOR TOW TEAM. I ALREADY HAD THE ACFT READY TO START AND HAD PERFORMED MY PRE-ENG RUN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MENTAL CHKLIST PRIOR TO THIS CHANGE IN PLANS. I FOLLOWED THE RUN/TAXI CHKLIST AND STARTED THE #2 ENG FOR GAIN #2 HYD PRESSURE OF OPS CHK. NOT RE-ACCOMPLISHING MY PRE-ENG RUN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MENTAL CHKLIST AGAIN AFTER IT WAS DECIDED TO ROLL ACFT ONTO SKID PLATES; I FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO HAVE #1 HYD SYS PRESSURE FOR NORMAL BRAKES OR THE NEED TO HAVE A SECOND PERSON IN COCKPIT AS REQUIRED FOR ALL ACFT TAXIES. THE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS AN ACFT TAXI MOVEMENT DID NOT OCCUR TO ANYONE AT THIS TIME. AT THE TIME OF ENG START; I HAD ANOTHER TECHNICIAN; THE LEAD; AND THE SUPVR AT NOSE OF THE ACFT. I VERIFIED I HAD GOOD #2 SYS HYD PRESSURE BUT OVERLOOKED ENSURING MY STANDBY HYD AND PTU SWITCHES WERE ON. THE OTHER TECHNICIAN MARSHALED ME FORWARD WHEN I THEN BROUGHT THE #2 CONDITION LEVER TO MINIMUM AND RELEASED PARKING BRAKES. THE ACFT FAILED TO MOVE FORWARD UNDER THIS PWR SETTING; SO I MOMENTARILY MOVED #2 PWR LEVER TO FLT MINIMUM UNTIL ACFT STARTED TO MOVE. THE NOSE IMMEDIATELY STARTED SLIDING TO THE L ONCE IT HIT THE GREASE PLATES. I BROUGHT THE #2 PWR LEVER BACK TO DISC AND APPLIED TOE BRAKES. GND CREW WERE SIGNALING ME TO STOP; BUT NORMAL BRAKING DID NOT OPERATE. I TOOK THE #2 PWR LEVER MOMENTARILY TO RESERVE; WHICH STOPPED FORWARD MOVEMENT AND THEN IT STARTED ROLLING FORWARD AGAIN. THE ONLY THING I COULD THINK TO DO WAS TO SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG; WHICH I DID. I WAS STILL APPLYING TOE BRAKES WITHOUT SUCCESS BEFORE I FINALLY REALIZED TO USE THE PARKING BRAKE LEVER. AT THIS TIME I WAS UNAWARE THAT THE ACFT HAD CAME INTO CONTACT WITH ANYTHING UNTIL I DEPLANED. BY THE TIME I STOPPED THE ACFT I HAD ROLLED 33 FT; WEDGED #1 PROP BLADE AGAINST MAINT VAN; AND STRUCK A MAINT STAND WITH THE SPOOLING DOWN #2 ENG PROP. I PERFORMED POST ENG RUN SHUTDOWN PROCS AND ENSURED ACFT WAS CHOCKED. I THEN WENT TO THE OFFICE TO START RPTING PROCS.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.