A DA-90 FLT CREW LNDG AT EGE EXPERIENCED A WIND SHIFT TO A TAILWIND; RESULTING IN A LONG LNDG.

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INCIDENT: LONG LNDG AT EGE DUE TO SIGNIFICANT SUDDEN WIND SHIFT. PRIOR TO DEP FROM BTL; THE WX BRIEFING OBTAINED FOR EGE WAS INDICATING THAT THE VAIL VALLEY WOULD BE EXPERIENCING THE TYPICAL SUMMER TIME AFTERNOON CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY. ALONG WITH THIS FORECASTED CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY; THE EGE FORECAST WAS CALLING FOR SHIFTING AND GUSTING WINDS AS THE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY PASSED THROUGH THE AREA. THE FORECAST WAS CALLING FOR CLRING CONDITIONS AND DIMINISHED WINDS FOR OUR PLANNED ARR TIME. WHILE ENRTE TO EGE; WE KEPT CONSTANT VIGILANCE OF THE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY OVER COLORADO USING THE WX RADAR AND TEXTUAL WX FEATURES. THE WX RADAR AND TEXTUAL METARS WERE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FORECAST AND SHOWING THAT WX SHOULD NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR AT OUR ETA. AS WE APCHED THE DENVER AREA; THE MAJORITY OF THE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY HAD PASSED TO THE E AND NE OF EGE WITH NO SIGNIFICANT WX IN THE EGE AREA. ZDV THEN ISSUED US CLRNC DIRECT TO THE AVVVS INTXN (APPROX 20 KM NW OF DEN) THEN DIRECT RLG. AT THIS TIME WE DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS FOR AN APCH TO EGE AND ELECTED TO PROCEED AS PLANNED EARLIER IN THE FLT FOR THE LDA RWY 25 WITH THE TRANSITION OFF OF THE RLG VOR. THE DENVER AREA WAS EXPERIENCING HVY CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY THAT WAS REQUIRING THAT ACFT ARRIVING AND DEPARTING THE DENVER AREA; BE REROUTED. BECAUSE OF THIS REROUTING OF ACFT DEPARTING DENVER; ZDV TURNED US N OF OUR INTENDED RTE OF DIRECT THE RLG (KREMMLING) VOR AND DELAYED OUR DSCNT UNTIL WE WERE W OF RLG. WHILE BEING VECTORED BY ATC AND PRIOR TO BEING ISSUED A DSCNT CLRNC; WE OBTAINED THE CURRENT EGE WX; AWOS WAS RPTING THE WX AS WINDS 170 DEGS AT 13 KTS GUSTING TO 17 KTS; CLR BELOW 12000 FT TEMP 28 DEGS C; ALTIMETER SETTING 30.25 INCHES. WITH THE PLANNED RWY FOR LNDG BEING RWY 25; WE WERE EXPECTING A 13 KT L XWIND WITH A 2 KT EQUIVALENT HEADWIND. ONCE WE WERE W OF RLG; ZDV TURNED US DIRECT EGE AND ISSUED US DSCNT TO 14000 FT MSL. WHILE THE DSCNT CLRNC WAS DELAYED DUE TO TFC CLBING OUT OF DEN; THE DSCNT TO 14000 FT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND DID NOT REQUIRE ANY ABNORMAL MANEUVERING TO GET TO 14000 FT IN TIME TO ASCERTAIN THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT AND DETERMINE A PLAN TO EXECUTE A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25. AS WE APCHED 14000 FT WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT APPROX 10-15 MI N OF EGE AND I ELECTED TO ENTER A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 25. AS I TURNED DOWNWIND; I SLOWED THE ACFT AND BEGAN TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT EARLY SO AS TO TURN A 5-7 MI FINAL FULLY CONFIGURED AND STABILIZED SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY NEED FOR ABNORMAL MANEUVERING ON FINAL AND TO PROVIDE ENOUGH TIME FOR ALL COCKPIT TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED SO THAT BOTH PLTS COULD CONCENTRATE ON THE LNDG. THE APCH TO LNDG WAS NORMAL; WITH 10-20 KT AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS WITHIN 1000-1500 FT OF TOUCHDOWN; WHICH WE ATTRIBUTED TO THE GUSTING WINDS; MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN AND THE THERMAL UPLIFTING DUE TO THE 28 DEGS C LCL TEMP. BECAUSE OF RWY CONSTRUCTION AT EGE; THE RWY 25 THRESHOLD HAS BEEN DISPLACED 600 FT AND THE PAPI AND GS FOR RWY 25 ARE OTS. WHILE THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED FOR RWY 25; THE PSEUDO GS WAS PROVIDING PATH INFO TO THE ORIGINAL THRESHOLD AND NOT THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. BECAUSE THERE WAS NO VALID GS INFO; A VERY IMPORTANT CUE TO JUDGE ACFT PERFORMANCE ON FINAL APCH WAS MISSING. PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN (BTWN SHORT FINAL AND FLARE); THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT WIND SHIFT THAT BECAME EVIDENT WHEN I WAS REQUIRED TO CLOSE THE THRUST LEVERS TO AVOID LNDG BEYOND MY AIM POINT OF THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE MARKINGS. THE ACFT CROSSED THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD AT REF +10 KTS (REF SPD WAS 116 KTS); AND ON A NORMAL GLIDE PATH. AS I BEGAN THE FLARE; THE CHANGE IN WIND DIRECTION CAUSED THE ACFT TO 'FLOAT' FOR AN EXCESSIVE DISTANCE. AT THIS POINT; A GAR WAS DISCUSSED AND I DEEMED IT UNSAFE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE ENGS WERE UNSPOOLED AIRSPD WAS DISSIPATING AND I DIDN'T BELIEVE THERE TO BE ENOUGH RWY FOR A BALKED LNDG. THEREFORE; A SUCCESSFUL GAR COULD NOT BE ASSURED. EXTENDING THE AIR BRAKES TO KILL THE LIFT WAS ALSO CONSIDERED; BUT I WAS HESITANT TO MAKE SUCH A MANEUVER WHEN I WAS UNSURE OF THE OUTCOME OF DOING SO. THE ACFT FINALLY TOUCHED DOWN NEXT TO THE 4000 FT REMAINING SIGN. NOTE: WHEN ULTRA-NAV WAS PROGRAMMED FOR THE CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF LNDG WITH THE MAX OF A 10 KT TAILWIND. LNDG DISTANCE WAS CALCULATED TO BE 3640 FT. AS WILL BE SHOWN LATER; IT IS ESTIMATED THAT WE EXPERIENCED A 15-20 TAILWIND FROM SHORT FINAL TO TOUCHDOWN. WHEN THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN; I APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE BRAKING PROCS. WHILE THE BRAKING APPLIED WAS AGGRESSIVE; IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE BRAKING BEING APPLIED WAS INSUFFICIENT TO STOP THE ACFT; AND BOTH PLTS APPLIED MAX BRAKING EFFORT TO STOP THE ACFT ON THE PAVEMENT. THE ACFT STOPPED IN THE 'CHEVRON' AREA AT THE END OF RWY 25. THERE WERE NO INJURIES; AND THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO ACFT; OR ARPT SURFACE AND LIGHTING. THE ACFT WAS TURNED AROUND IN THE CHEVRON AREA AND TAXIED TO PARKING UNASSISTED. WHILE TAXIING TO PARKING; WE OBSERVED THE WINDSOCK AT THE ROLLOUT END OF THE RWY INDICATING A XWIND AND THE WINDSOCK AT THE TOUCHDOWN END INDICATING A DIRECT TAILWIND WITH THE WINDSOCK FULLY EXTENDED. FURTHERMORE; THE FLAGS LOCATED ON THE FBO RAMP WERE FULLY EXTENDED INDICATING A 15-20 KT TAILWIND. THE FIREMEN ON DUTY SAID THAT THEY HAD NOTICED THE SUDDEN SHIFT OF WIND AS THE ACFT WAS IN THE FLARE AND THEY DISPATCHED BECAUSE OF PRIOR EXPERIENCES. AFTER SPEAKING WITH HEAD FIREMAN ON DUTY AT THE FIRE HOUSE; HE SAID HE SAW THE ACFT TOUCH DOWN ABEAM TXWY A3; LEAVING 4000 FT OF REMAINING RWY THE FIRE CREW WAS ON ALERT AND FOLLOWED THE ACFT TO PARKING. AFTER PARKING THE ACFT; WE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH LCL ARPT PERSONNEL WHO ALL AGREED THAT THE WIND SHIFT OCCURRED AS WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL APCHING THE THRESHOLD. AFTER PARKING AND INSPECTING THE ACFT WAS COMPLETE WE OBTAINED THE CURRENT WX (XA34Z); THE AWOS WAS RPTING THE WINDS AT 060 DEGS AT 16 KTS GUSTING TO 24 KTS. THIS EQUATES TO A 16-20 KT TAILWIND ON LNDG. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) WHILE AWOS AND ASOS WX IS MACHINE GENERATED AND SUBJECT TO NUMEROUS LIMITATIONS; I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR AT LEAST ONE PLT TO MONITOR THE AWOS/ASOS FREQ WHEN ARRIVING AT AN UNCTLED ARPT. WHILE IT MAY SEEM DISTRACTING; IT MAY ALERT THE PLTS TO CHANGING CONDITIONS IN TIME TO TAKE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 2) EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE LIMITED CUES TO INDICATE THAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING A TAILWIND; AND THOSE CUES MANIFESTED LATE IN THE APCH TO LNDG; THERE WERE STILL CUES THAT WERE EITHER IGNORED OR ATTRIBUTED TO WRONG ASSUMPTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO REINFORCE THE PARAMETERS THAT MANDATE A GAR WHEN EXPERIENCING CONDITIONS THAT INDICATE THAT AN APCH IS BECOMING UNSTABILIZED; (IE; GPWS CALLOUTS; SINK RATE; TERRAIN; ETC; EVIDENCE THAT THE LNDG MAY BE UNINTENTIONALLY LONG). 3) I NORMALLY OBSERVE THE WIND VECTOR ON THE HSI. HOWEVER; I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH CTLING THE ACFT BY VISUAL CUES AND MISSED A VERY IMPORTANT CLUE THAT I WAS EXPERIENCING A TAILWIND. IT MAY BE A GOOD IDEA TO INCLUDE THIS AS PART OF THE PNF'S APCH CALLOUTS (IE; 10 KT R XWIND; TAILWIND; ETC). 4) I WOULD RECOMMEND A REVIEW OF OUR APCH BRIEFING PROCS TO INCLUDE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES IN THE EVENT THAT ATC MAY GIVE UNEXPECTED INSTRUCTIONS OR APCHS LATE IN THE DSCNT OR APCH PHASE.