A PA28-201 CFI DEMONSTRATING A LNDG AND TKOF FOR THE STUDENT RAISED THE LNDG GEAR LEVER INSTEAD OF THE FLAP LEVER ON THE GND.

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THIS WAS THE SECOND FLT AND INSTRUCTION SESSION WITH ME AND THE STUDENT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS FLT WAS TO PROVIDE MORE FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE ACFT FOR THE STUDENT AND TO PROVIDE TKOF AND LNDG PRACTICE. DURING THIS INSTRUCTION SESSION; I (THE CFI/PIC) WAS STRESSING THE NEED FOR CHKLISTS; ESPECIALLY THE POST TKOF CHKLIST AT THE FIRST PWR REDUCTION; THE LNDG CHKLIST (GUMPS) AT OR BEFORE THE DOWNWIND LEG; AND A FINAL GEAR DOWN CHK IN THE BASE TO FINAL TURN (OR ON FINAL APCH IF A STRAIGHT-IN APCH IS PERFORMED). DURING THIS FLT; THE STUDENT HAD PERFORMED 3 TKOFS AND LNDGS (TOUCH-AND-GOES) WITH MY COACHING. HIS LNDGS WERE SAFE; BUT NOT CONSISTENT IN TERMS OF PWR USE IN THE ROUND-OUT AND ATTITUDE AT TOUCHDOWN. SO I ELECTED TO DEMONSTRATE A TOUCH-AND-GO TO GIVE THE STUDENT A VISUAL IMAGE OF WHAT I EXPECTED. FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT OF THE PATTERN; I TOOK THE CTLS JUST AFTER TURNING ONTO THE DOWNWIND LEG. I PROCEEDED WITH THE GUMPS CHK (GAS ON PROPER TANK; BOOST PUMP ON; UNDERCARRIAGE DOWN; MIXTURE RICH; PROP TO HIGH RPM; SEATBELTS FASTENED). AFTER DOUBLECHKING 3 GREEN GEAR LIGHTS; I STATED ALOUD; '3 GREEN; LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETE.' THE APCH WAS NORMAL; WITH A PROGRESSIVE APPLICATION OF FLAPS AND REDUCTION OF PWR UNTIL THE BASE TO FINAL TURN. IN THE BASE TO FINAL TURN; I DOUBLECHKED THE LNDG GEAR INDICATORS AND STATED ALOUD '3 GREEN.' THE FINAL APCH WAS CONVENTIONAL WITH THE AIRSPD STABLE AT 75 KTS; USING ABOUT 18 INCHES OF MANIFOLD PRESSURE AND FULL FLAPS. THE LNDG ITSELF WAS UNEVENTFUL. I SLOWLY CLOSED THE THROTTLE DURING THE ROUND-OUT AND HELD THE PLANE A FEW INCHES OR SO OFF THE GND UNTIL THE STALL WARNING SOUNDED. THE AIRPLANE SETTLED ONTO THE MAINS AT APPROX 55 KTS; NOT A FULL STALL; BUT DEFINITELY SLOW. IT WAS PERFECTLY ON CTRLINE; ALIGNED WITH THE RWY; AND NO DRIFT. I HELD THE NOSEWHEEL OFF FOR A DELIBERATELY LONG PERIOD (ABOUT 3 SECONDS OR SO) TO DEMONSTRATE AERODYNAMIC BRAKING; UNTIL I RAN OUT OF ELEVATOR AUTH AND THE NOSEWHEEL SETTLED. OVERALL; IT WAS A VERY GOOD LNDG. WE THEN ROLLED FOR A FEW SECONDS; DURING WHICH I COMMENTED TO THE STUDENT ABOUT THE PITCH AND AIRSPD AT TOUCHDOWN; AND THE PWR REDUCTION THROUGH THE ROUND-OUT. AFTER THAT; WE WERE ROLLING ALONG RATHER SLOWLY; PROBABLY AROUND 30 KTS OF AIRSPD. IN PREPARATION FOR THE TKOF; I EITHER SAID ALOUD OR THOUGHT TO MYSELF (I'M NOT SURE WHICH) 'FLAPS UP.' AT THAT; I REACHED FOR AND ACTIVATED THE LNDG GEAR SWITCH. BEFORE I HAD COMPLETED THAT ACTION; WITH THE SWITCH BTWN THE DOWN AND UP POS; I REALIZED THE ERROR AND PUT THE SWITCH BACK IN THE DOWN POS. THE AIRPLANE ROLLED ON ABOUT 1/2 SECOND OR SO; AND THEN THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR COLLAPSED. THE AIRPLANE SLID A SHORT DISTANCE TO A STOP ON THE R EDGE OF THE RWY (RWY 17). WE SHUT DOWN THE AIRPLANE; TURNED THE FUEL VALVE AND ALL ELECTRICAL SWITCHES OFF AND EXITED THE AIRPLANE THROUGH THE NORMAL DOOR. WE THEN WAITED WELL CLR OF THE ACFT FOR THE EMER EQUIP TO ARRIVE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO ANYONE. THE ACFT DAMAGE WAS MAINLY TO THE R FLAP; R AILERON; AND UNDERSIDE OF THE R WING. THE DAMAGE; WHILE NOT MINOR; WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CLASSIFY THE EVENT AS AN ACCIDENT. THE ARPT MGR ARRIVED AND STATED THAT HE HAD CALLED THE FAA AND THE NTSB; THAT THE EVENT WAS BEING CLASSIFIED AS AN INCIDENT; AND THAT HE WOULD CLR THE AIRPLANE FROM THE RWY. WE THEN LEFT THE SCENE. I HAVE THOUGHT LONG AND HARD ABOUT THIS INCIDENT AND WHY IT OCCURRED. MAINLY; IT OCCURRED BECAUSE I PERFORMED A 'FLAPS UP' OP AUTOMATICALLY; WITHOUT DELIBERATE THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT I WAS DOING. CERTAINLY; IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; AUTOMATIC RESPONSES ARE REQUIRED. BUT IN A NORMAL TKOF; THERE IS NO URGENCY REQUIRING THIS. THERE IS PLENTY OF TIME FOR SLOW; DELIBERATE OPS. PLTS AND CFI'S MUST FORCE THEMSELVES TO BE DELIBERATE IN THESE OPS. COMPLEX AIRPLANES ARE JUST THAT -- COMPLEX. THERE ARE MORE THINGS TO DO AND MORE THINGS THAT CAN GO WRONG. AFTER EXPERIENCING THIS LNDG GEAR INCIDENT; I NOW BELIEVE THAT IT IS TEMPTING DISASTER TO CONDUCT TOUCH-AND-GO OPS IN A COMPLEX ACFT. A BETTER;SAFER METHOD IS TO USE FULL STOP LNDGS WITH TAXI-BACKS TO THE ACTIVE RWY FOR ANOTHER TKOF. THIS GIVES THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRACTICE AND READ THE 'POST LNDG' CHKLIST -- COWL FLAPS OPEN; FLAPS UP; XPONDER TO STANDBY; MIXTURE LEANED FOR TAXI. MOST IMPORTANTLY; IT REMOVES ALL OF THE POSSIBLE REASONS AND PERCEPTIONS TO NOT BE DELIBERATE WITH THE OPS. ONCE CLR OF THE RWY; THERE IS NO PERCEIVED OR ACTUAL URGENCY; SO EVERY MOVE SHOULD BE WITH DELIBERATE THOUGHT. I PLAN TO USE THIS PROC FOR ALL FUTURE COMPLEX TKOF AND LNDG PRACTICE. THAT IS NO GUARANTEE; OF COURSE. VIGILANCE AND DELIBERATE ACTIONS IN THE COCKPIT ARE STILL REQUIRED ON MY PART. HOPEFULLY; THESE CHANGES IN PROC; ALONG WITH THE STING OF THIS INCIDENT; WILL PREVENT A FUTURE RECURRENCE.