MEM GND CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE LCL CTLR'S FAILURE TO ENSURE ACCURATE RWY LNDG DATA WAS PRESENT IN THE DATA BLOCK.
Synopsis
MEM GND CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE LCL CTLR'S FAILURE TO ENSURE ACCURATE RWY LNDG DATA WAS PRESENT IN THE DATA BLOCK.
Narrative
I WAS WORKING GND CTL #2 (GC2) DURING THE AFTERNOON ACR DEP PUSH. MEM WAS PRIMARILY DEPARTING RWYS 36L AND 36R. OCCASIONAL DEPS OFF OF RWY 36C; AND PRIMARILY LNDG RWY 36C. I OBSERVED ACR ON FINAL FOR RWY 36C; WITH A 'C' IN THE SCRATCH PAD AREA INDICATING THAT THE ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36C. I OBSERVED THAT ACR HAD BEEN WRITTEN DOWN IN THE '36C' COLUMN OF THE PAPER PAD AT THE LCL CTL #1 POS. I ALSO OBSERVED THAT ACR HAD A 'CHK MARK' NEXT TO THE CALL SIGN; FURTHER INDICATING THAT ACR HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 36C. AS ACR APCHED THE RWY; I OVERHEARD THE LCL CTLR #1 CLR AN ACFT TO DEPART FROM RWY 36C; AND THE DEPARTING ACFT WAS ISSUED TFC ON THE ACR THAT WAS 'LNDG RWY 36R.' WHEN I QUESTIONED LCL CTLR #1 ABOUT THIS; I WAS INFORMED THAT ACR HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 36R. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE SUPVR AND THE CAB COORDINATOR OFTEN COORDINATE RWY XINGS WITH GND CTL #1 AND GND CTL #2 DURING BUSY PERIODS OF TFC; AND THESE XINGS ARE OFTEN BASED ON INFO THAT IS DISPLAYED ON THE STARS DISPLAY. THE LCL CTLRS SHOULD CHANGE THE SCRATCH PAD INFO TO REFLECT THE RWY WHERE THE ACFT HAS BEEN CLRED TO LAND.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.