A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE L LOWER PITOT AND STATIC PORTS TAPED. ACFT RETURNED TO THE DEP ARPT.

Date: 2007-01 · Aircraft: B737-300 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance

Synopsis

A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE L LOWER PITOT AND STATIC PORTS TAPED. ACFT RETURNED TO THE DEP ARPT.

Narrative

I WAS ASKED TO ASSIST WITH A STALL WARNING TASK CARD. I HAD BEEN ASSIGNED 2 SVCS BY MYSELF AND OUR CREW WAS OVERLOADED WITH WORK INCLUDING NUMEROUS ACFT REPOS. WHEN I ARRIVED AT ACFT; XA00; MR X AND MR Y HAD ALREADY INSTALLED THE PITOT PROBE ADAPTERS TO BOTH UPPER PITOTS. THE AOA (ANGLE OF ATTACK) PROTRACTORS WERE ALSO INSTALLED. I APPLIED TAPE TO THE L-HAND LOWER PITOT. MR X APPLIED TAPE TO THE R-HAND PITOT. WHEN I APPLIED THE TAPE I DID NOT LEAVE A TAIL OR STREAMER ON THE END. IT HAD BEEN ABOUT 8 YRS SINCE I LAST TAPED A PITOT. WE PERFORMED THE TEST UNINTERRUPTED AND ONCE PASSED HAD BEGUN TO REMOVE THE TEST EQUIP. I REMOVED THE PITOT ADAPTER FIRST; THEN THE AOA PROTRACTOR. TO AVOID DROPPING THE AOA PROTRACTOR; I STEPPED DOWN FROM THE LADDER AND PUT IT IN ITS BOX. AT THIS TIME MY LEAD MECH STOPPED BY TO TAKE THE PROTRACTORS BACK TO THE HANGAR. MY LEAD HAD BEEN TELLING ME THAT ANOTHER MECH ON MY CREW; MIGHT NEED HELP. WHILE WE WERE TALKING; MR X SAID HE WOULD PUT THE 2 SCREWS BACK IN THE AOA MOUNTING FLANGE ON MY SIDE (L-HAND) THAT WERE REMOVED TO INSTALL THE PROTRACTORS. I LEFT TO ASSIST ON OTHER ACFT. OBVIOUSLY; I ASSUMED LEAD WOULD REMOVE THE TAPE AND HE PROBABLY THOUGHT I WOULD REMOVE IT OR HE DIDN'T SEE IT WITHOUT THE TAIL; AND I'M SURE HE THOUGHT EITHER MYSELF OR MR X HAD REMOVED IT AND HE PROBABLY WOULD NEVER HAD SEEN IT WITHOUT SHINING A LIGHT ON THE PROBE. ULTIMATELY I WAS INFORMED ABOUT THIS INCIDENT ON THE NEXT NIGHT BY MY MGR. I FEEL THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THERE HAD BEEN BETTER COM BTWN ALL INVOLVED AND HAD I BEEN USING BRIGHTLY COLORED TAPE WITH A 'TAIL' ON IT. I AM FULLY AWARE HOW SERIOUS THIS SITUATION IS; AND AM GRATEFUL NO ONE WAS HARMED CONSIDERING WHAT THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME COULD HAVE BEEN. I WILL BE SURE TO NEVER ASSUME MY TEAMMATES WILL COMPLETE A TASK. I WILL VERIFY MYSELF AND BETTER COMMUNICATE WITH FELLOW TEAMMATES IN THE FUTURE. I WILL ALSO NEVER USE BLACK TAPE WITH OR WITHOUT A TAIL ON A PITOT AGAIN. WE DO STOCK YELLOW AND RED/WHITE VINYL TAPE AND MY GOLF CART IS NOW STOCKED WITH BOTH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE JOB ASSIGNED WAS TO ASSIST IN A STALL WARNING TEST JOB CARD. THE RPTR APPLIED TAPE TO STATIC PORTS ON THE LOWER L PITOT PROBE AND BEGAN THE TEST PROC. AS THE JOB WAS CLOSING UP THE RPTR REMOVED THE PITOT TUBE ADAPTER AND THE ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSOR BUT FAILED TO REMOVE THE TAPE COVERING THE PROBE STATIC PORT. THE RPTR TALKED TO THE SYS ENGINEER AND THE JOB CARDS AND MAINT MANUAL WILL BE REVISED FOR A STEP ADDED TO REMOVE THE TAPE AND ADD A BRIGHT COLORED TAPE FOR VISIBILITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 723997 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE WORKLOAD WAS VERY HVY AND AS THE STALL WARNING TEST WAS FINISHING AND THE TEST EQUIP REMOVAL WAS IN PROGRESS; THE LEAD TECHNICIAN ASSIGNED TWO OF US (THE MECHS) TO ANOTHER ACFT. THE RPTR HAD TAPED THE UPPER R PITOT STATIC PROBE STATIC PORTS AND REMEMBERS REMOVING THE BLACK TAPE. THE JOB CARD HAS A STEP TO TAPE THE PORTS BUT NOTHING TO REMOVE THE TAPE. IT IS RPTED THE JOB CARD WILL BE REVISED.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.