LACK OF PROACTIVE FLT CREW RESPONSE TO APPARENTLY FALSE INDICATION OF A CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE ABOARD A DHC8 TRIGGERS POST FLT REEVALUATION BY FIRST OFFICER.

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THE FIRST TIME THIS ISSUE OCCURRED WAS DURING DEP; AFTER CLB POWER HAD BEEN SET AND THE AFTER TAKEOFF CHKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED. FOR ABOUT 2 TO 3 SECONDS; THE MASTER WARNING AND SMOKE LIGHT ILLUMINATED; THEN EXTINGUISHED ON ITS OWN. THE CAPT LOOKED AT THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST TO SEE WHAT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS SHOULD BE IF THE SMOKE LIGHT ILLUMINATED AGAIN AND REMAINED ILLUMINATED. OUR COMPANY'S CHKLIST CALLS FOR THE FLT ATTENDANT TO OPEN THE DOOR TO THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT AND CHK FOR A FIRE. IF THERE IS A POSITIVE INDICATION OF FIRE; THE AIRPLANE IS TO BE LANDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS A CREW; WE DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NOT A POSITIVE INDICATION OF A FIRE; BEING THAT THE WARNING LIGHT DID NOT REMAIN ILLUMINATED; AND WE CONTINUED ON WITH THE FLT. ABOUT 10 MINS LATER; THE SMOKE AND MASTER WARNING LIGHTS ILLUMINATED; AGAIN FOR ABOUT 3 SECONDS; THEN EXTINGUISHED ON THEIR OWN. BEING THAT THERE IS NO PROC AT OUR COMPANY FOR A WARNING LIGHT THAT EXTINGUISHES ON ITS OWN; WE USED OUR OWN THOUGHT PROCESS TO DETERMINE THE PROB. THE CAPT TESTED THE SMOKE WARNING SYSTEM; AND THE TEST SWITCH WOULD NOT RETURN TO THE NEUTRAL POSITION THE RIGHT WAY. WE DETERMINED THAT THE TEST SWITCH WAS CAUSING AN INDICATION MALFUNCTION AND CONTINUED ON WITH THE FLT. LOOKING BACK ON THIS ISSUE; I BELIEVE THAT WE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION; BUT THAT WE COULD HAVE USED OUR RESOURCES BETTER TO ENHANCE SAFETY. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THE CHKLIST; JUST IN CASE THERE WAS AN ACTUAL FIRE. WE SHOULD HAVE COM WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT AND HAD HER CHK THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT FOR SIGNS OF A FIRE. AFTER SHE WOULD HAVE DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS NO FIRE; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE THE FLT WITH NO QUESTION OF SAFETY LINGERING AT ALL.