PHL TRACON CTLRS EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING OPPOSITE DIRECTION OPS DURING RWY CHANGE; CITING LACK OF COORD AND POOR SUPVR DECISIONS.

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WHILE WORKING THE FINAL VECTOR #1 RADAR POS; I WAS RUNNING INST AND VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 27R IN MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS. THE ARPT WAS AT THE TAIL END OF A BUSY ARR PUSH THAT INCLUDED LOSING THE SECONDARY RWY. TFC WAS STILL HVY AT THE TIME A DECISION WAS MADE TO RUN OPPOSITE DIRECTION APCHS TO RWYS 27R AND 9R. I WAS NEVER TOLD THAT WE WERE GOING TO START RUNNING APCHS TO RWY 9R WHILE I WAS STILL RUNNING APCHS TO RWY 27R. ALTHOUGH THE LEGALITY OF THE OP REMAINS IN QUESTION; THIS OP UNQUESTIONABLY DECREASED THE SAFETY OF THE OP. NO LESS THAN 12 COMMERCIAL AIRLINERS CARRYING HUNDREDS OF PAX WERE PUT AT RISK IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO AVOID ARR DELAYS. AIMING ACFT AT EACH OTHER WITH A CLOSURE SPD OF A COMBINED 400 KTS IN MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS WITH NO PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE MISSED APCHS; COM FAILURE OR ANY OTHER EQUIP OR MECHANICAL CONSIDERATION IS A CARELESS DECISION MADE BY PHL MGMNT. THIS OP ALONG WITH MANY OTHER RECENT DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO THE OP DISPLAYS A DISREGARD FOR SAFETY AND QUITE POSSIBLY GROSS NEGLIGENCE BY THE PHL MGMNT TEAM. IT WOULD BE ADVISED FOR AN AGENCY OTHER THAN THE FAA TO INVESTIGATE THE CONTINUED INCOMPETENCE OF PHL MGMNT BEFORE AN ACTUAL DISASTER OCCURS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 733762: WHILE WORKING THE S ARR RADAR POS I WAS IN A HOLD WITH 5 ACFT AT 2 SEPARATE FIXES. THE ARPT WAS JUST FINISHING UP A BUSY ARR PUSH THAT INCLUDED LOSING THE SECONDARY RWY. TFC WAS STILL HVY AT THE FINAL VECTOR #1 POS RUNNING VISUALS TO RWYS 27R AND RWY 26 (A W FLOW). THE WINDS FAVORED A RWY 17 OP AND AS SUCH THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS OP WOULD BE A RWY 9R; RWY 17 CONFIGN (AN E FLOW). WHILE FV1 HAD 7-8 ACFT THAT THEY WERE STILL VECTORING FOR THE W FLOW I WAS DIRECTED TO COME OUT OF THE HOLD AND 'RUN TO RWY 9R.' I WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE SUPVR TO RUN THE NEW E FLOW SIMULTANEOUSLY WHILE THE FV1 CTLR WAS STILL RUNNING TFC TO RWYS 27R AND 26. I WAS ALSO REQUIRED TO 'SHARE FINAL' WITH THE N ARR CTLR; WHICH IN A RWY 27 OP IS STILL TECHNICALLY N AND S DEP AIRSPACE RESPECTIVELY. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THE DEPS WERE NOT AWARE THAT WE WERE GOING TO START USING THEIR AIRSPACE; ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLR THAT THERE WERE NO MORE DEPS FROM RWY 27L. FURTHERMORE; AND QUITE IMPORTANTLY FV1 WAS UNAWARE THAT WE WERE RUNNING TO A RWY THAT WAS EXACTLY OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM THE STILL SIGNIFICANT ARR FLOW FROM THE E. TO TOP THIS OFF THE FIRST ACFT I WAS REQUIRED TO RUN TO RWY 9R COULD NOT SEE THE ARPT; AND AFTER COORDINATING WITH THE LCL CTLR I WAS FORCED TO ISSUE AN ILS APCH TO RWY 9R. THE LCL CTLR STATED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO APPLY VISUAL SEPARATION AND THAT HE WOULD SEPARATE THE ARR FROM THE OTHER TFC INVOLVED; HOWEVER THIS IS CERTAINLY A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. I REPEATEDLY INFORMED THE SUPVR THAT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SITUATION; AND THAT I FELT THAT THE SO CALLED COORD HAD NOT EVEN BEEN REMOTELY ACCOMPLISHED IN FULL. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO REASON TO RUN TO OPPOSITE DIRECTION RWYS; PERIOD.