IAD LCL CTLR DESCRIBED UNSAFE PROC WHEN SIMULTANEOUS APCHS TO RWYS 1 WERE IN USE WITH RWY 30 DEPS; ALLEGING UNPROTECTED BREAKOUT PROCS.

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IAD LNDG ILS AND VA TO RWYS 1R AND 1L; DEPARTING RWY 30. I WAS WORKING THE LCL CTL E POS AT IAD AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RWY 1R ARRS. AT APPROX XA50; PCT CALLED THE CIC TO ASK FOR 2000 FT ON THE E DOWNWIND TO RWY 1R FOR '15 MINS' TO FACILITATE VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 1R; WHICH I APPROVED. APPROX 5 MINS LATER PCT CALLED THE CIC AGAIN AND STATED THEY WISHED TO CHANGE THE APCHS TO SIMULTANEOUS ILS APCHS TO RWY 1L AND RWY 1R. ACFT WERE DSNDING TO 3000 FT ONLY ON THE DOWNWIND AT THAT POINT AND I BELIEVED THAT PCT HAD ABANDONED THEIR PLAN TO RUN VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 1R. OVERRIDE CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED; AND PCT ADVISED THE CIC OF THE FIRST 2 ACFT FOR EACH ILS. ACCORDING TO IAD PROCS; AT THIS POINT WE ARE REQUIRED TO UTILIZE THE PROCS IN OUR SOP/LOA RELATING TO 'SIMULS.' SHORTLY THEREAFTER; I REALIZED THAT ACFT ON THE E DOWNWIND HAD IN FACT NOW BEGUN DSNDING TO 2000 FT WHEN THE CONFLICT ALERT ACTIVATED REF A VFR HELI AT 1000 FT. AT THIS POINT I ADVISED THE CIC WHO WAS BUSY PERFORMING TMU FUNCTIONS. THIS OP IS ILLEGAL AND ILL-ADVISED; AS THE N 'SIMULS' PROC IN OUR LOA MANDATES THAT A RWY 1R PULLOUT BE TURNED R TO A 015 HDG AND CLBED TO 2000 FT. AS THE E DOWNWIND IS 3 MI E OF RWY 1R; THIS RESULTS IN AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF SEPARATION AND PLACES THE PULLOUT ACFT ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE DOWNWIND ACFT. A FEW MINS LATER THE FLM RETURNED TO THE CAB; AND I ADVISED HIM THAT I WAS WORKING UNDER ARTICLE 65 DUE TO THE UNSAFE NATURE OF THIS OP; AND RECORDED THAT STATEMENT USING THE BRIEFING KEY. I DID NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE FLM; IF ANY; AS THE PRACTICE CONTINUED. IN ADDITION TO NOT PROVIDING SEPARATION TO A PULLOUT; THIS SITUATION ALSO LEAVES THE LCL CTLR IN LIMBO; AS WE HAVE NO IDEA IF PCT IS NOW STILL PROVIDING SEPARATION FOR THESE ACFT FROM THE PARALLEL ILS TFC; OR IF THE ACFT ARE MAINTAINING VISUAL SEPARATION FROM EACH OTHER ON FINAL; OR IF THEY EXPECT THE TWR TO PROVIDE VISUAL SEPARATION. IT WAS A LESS THAN OPTIMUM SITUATION FOR THE ACFT INVOLVED AS WELL AS THEY WERE FORCED TO FLY LEVEL AT 2000 FT OVER A HIGHLY CONGESTED AREA FOR SOMETIMES EVEN MORE THAN 30 FLYING MI AND I FAIL TO SEE WHAT OPERATIONAL BENEFIT WAS ACHIEVED. I BELIEVE SOME OF THE ACFT WERE FAR ENOUGH S THAT THEY WERE OPERATING BELOW THE FLOOR OF THE CLASS B AIRSPACE; IN VIOLATION OF FAR'S AND ATC PROCS. I WAS ALSO FORCED TO DENY A TFC WATCH CESSNA ENTRY INTO THE CLASS B AIRSPACE DUE TO INABILITY TO PROVIDE WAKE TURB SEPARATION FROM THE DOWNWIND ACFT. I BELIEVE THE PCT-IAD LOA MUST BE REVISED TO STATE THAT IF PCT STATES THAT THEY WILL BE USING 'SIMUL' ILS PROCS THEN THEY SHALL NOT DSND TO 2000 FT ON THE DOWNWIND UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD NOT ISSUE ACFT VISUAL APCHS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS.