B767 FLT CREW IS BEING VECTORED BY APCH CTL. WHEN FLT CREW REPORTS OTHER TFC IN SIGHT; ATC CLEARS FLT CREW FOR A NIGHT VISUAL APCH; BUT RESTRICTS THEIR ALT; NECESSITATING A STEEP APCH.

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LOUISVILLE APCH REQUESTED IF WE HAD TFC AHEAD OF US (ACR Y) WHILE WE WERE AT 4000 FT HEADED NBOUND ON THE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 17L. I LOOKED AHEAD AT ABOUT 4-5 MI IN THE NIGHT SKY AND NOTICED A FLT TURNING WBOUND; IN RESPONSE TO THE LOUISVILLE APCH VECTOR TO ACR Y TO TURN TO A HDG 270 DEGS. I ASKED THE PF IF HE HAD THE FLT IN SIGHT; WHICH HE DID; AND CONCURRED THAT THIS WAS THE FLT LA WAS REFING. NO SOONER HAD WE RESPONDED THAT WE HAD THE FLT IN SIGHT; THEN LA CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17L. THIS IS A VERY; VERY; CLOUDY AREA OF ATC AUTH IN MY VIEW; SINCE WE DID NOT REQUEST A VISUAL. WE HAD EXPECTED VECTORS TO THE LOC TO SHOOT THE ILS RWY 17L. COMPANY PROCS DO NOT REALLY SUPPORT FLTS SHOOTING VISUAL APCHS AT NIGHT WHEN AN ILS IS AVAILABLE; SO HERE AT LOUISVILLE; TO ME; AND I THINK ALL FLT CREWS; WE ARE CONFUSED WHEN LA; WITHOUT ASKING; CLRS US FOR A NIGHTTIME VISUAL. WE ARE EXPECTING A VECTOR TO THE LOC FOR AN ILS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR COMPANY HAS GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ADVOCATE A GOOD POLICY AND SAFE PROCS TO SUPPORT ILS APCHS AT NIGHT; AND IT SEEMS THAT THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE OF APCH AND LNDG SAFETY JUST HAS NOT BEEN FULLY EMBRACED BY FAA ATC. THIS IS DOUBLY CONFOUNDING TO ME BECAUSE I HAVE NEVER ATTENDED AN AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE WHEREIN SOME ORGANIZATION DOES NOT ADVOCATE ILS'S TO PREVENT NIGHT CFIT. APCH AND LNDG MISHAPS REMAIN AS A LEADING CAUSE OF MISHAPS IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION; YET THE FAA ATC SEEMS TO STUBBORNLY CLING TO THIS NIGHT VISUAL APCH ASSIGNED PROC AND I CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT THEY BELIEVE IT IS FOR INCREASING FLOW. I TOLD THE FO THAT WE WILL BE CONTINUING TO SHOOT THE ILS TO RWY 17L SINCE ESSENTIALLY; ONCE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH; A FLT IS CLRED TO CONTINUE TO THE RWY WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS AND CTL FROM SDF ATC. WELL; THAT WAS A WRONG ASSUMPTION ON MY PART AS CAPT. THE CTLR THEN TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL INTERCEPTING FINAL; WHICH WAS CONFUSING SINCE HE HAD JUST CLRED US FOR A VISUAL. THE FO CALCULATED HOW FAR OUT TO GO DOWNWIND TO BE AT GS INTERCEPT POINT AT 4000 FT AND CONTINUED TO PROCEED DOWNWIND TILL ABEAM THAT POINT. BUT BEFORE WE GOT TO THAT POINT; SDF ATC TOLD US TO TURN TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS; OSTENSIBLY TO KEEP THE DOWNWIND PATTERN TIGHT. WE WERE AGAIN TOLD TO REMAIN AT 4000 FT; MORE LIKELY TO ENSURE THAT RWY 17L TFC REMAINED 1000 FT ABOVE RWY 17R TFC DURING THE HEAD ON XWIND TURN TO FINAL. THE PROB WAS THAT THIS TURN AT 4000 FT TO 270 DEGS; NOW PUT US ON AN INTERCEPT COURSE FOR THE LOC; WHEREIN WE WERE WELL ABOVE GS INTERCEPT ALT AT THAT DISTANCE. WE WERE INTERCEPTING THE ILS LOC RWY 17L JUST OUTSIDE THE SLGRR AT 4000 FT. I THINK THAT THE CTLR LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND FORGOT TO GIVE US THE DSCNT ON GS; AFTER HOLDING US AT 4000 FT. WHY? I DON'T KNOW. SO TO GET DOWN TO THE GS; THE PF HAD TO ENGAGE VERT SPD; AND DSND IN EXCESS TO 1500 FPM. HE HAD TO FOCUS ON THAT INTERCEPT OF THE GS FROM ABOVE AND THEN CAPTURE THE GS; REENGAGE THE APCH FUNCTION OF THE AUTOPLT; AND THEN REESTABLISH A STABILIZED APCH. HE HAD TO DO ALL OF THIS AS HE INTERCEPTED THE LOC; SET FLAPS AND GEAR AND GOT BACK IN CTL OF THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THE PM AND THE RELIEF PLT BOTH ASSISTED THE PF TO KEEP THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; NOT GET DISTR; AND CONTINUE A SAFE FLT. WE LANDED SAFELY ON RWY 17L; BUT I WOULD SAY THAT THE PF WAS TEMPORARILY OVERLOADED BY THE POOR PLANNING FORCED ON THE FLT BY SDF ATC. IN THE FUTURE; IF THIS SITUATION REOCCURS; IT MAY BE WISE TO TAKE THE ONLY CTLED PATH; DECLINE THE VISUAL; DECLINE THE RUSHED SETUP; REQUEST TO GO AROUND; AND DEMAND BETTER HANDLING BY SDF ATC. AFTER A 9 HR OCEAN XING; THIS TYPE OF POORLY HANDLED ATC IS THE LAST THING THAT A FLT CREW NEEDS. IN FACT; THE CREW IS EXPECTING SOME KIND OF SUPPORTIVE ATC THAT A CREW COULD COORDINATE BETTER WITH. IT IS LATE; YOU'VE BEEN IN THE COCKPIT FOR OVER 10 HRS; AND YOU ANTICIPATE THAT SDF ATC COULD BE A LITTLE MORE ORGANIZED IN BRINGING FLTS ONTO THE LOC FOR LNDG. I MEAN; THIS APCH IS ALL PUBLISHED INFO; ISN'T IT? TO TOP IT OFF; TWR ASKED US OUR PARKING POS; WHILE WE WERE PASSING 120-100 KTS DURING OUR RWY 17L LNDG ROLLOUT OF THE 300000 LB ACFT. I THINK THAT THE TWR CTLR WAS THE SAME PERSON MANNING GND CTL; AND HE MAY HAVE JUST ANTICIPATED HIS GND CALL TO US A LITTLE TOO EARLY. I SOMETIME WONDER IF ATC IS PRIVY TO ALL OF THE GREAT SAFETY TRAINING THAT WE RECEIVE AS PLTS; ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF HUMAN FACTORS. AFTER THE TRAGIC EVENTS AT LEXINGTON; I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED ATC TO HAVE REVIEWED PROCS AND ELIMINATE OR REDUCE HUMAN FACTOR/HUMAN ERRORS INDUCING PROCS. I THINK THAT NOW ATC NEEDS TO REVIEW THEIR OWN HUMAN FACTORS SAFETY EFFORT; SO THAT AS PLTS; WE ARE INTERFACING WITH ATC PROCS THAT MAKE SAFETY SENSE. RIGHT NOW; THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE CASE. I SUGGEST THAT THEY REVIEW THEIR PRIORITY FOR CAPACITY AND LOOK TOWARDS A MORE ORGANIZED SET OF PROCS THAT SUPPORT A SAFER OP; ESPECIALLY IN A HUMAN FACTORS LOADED ENVIRONMENT. THAT SAFER AND MORE ORGANIZED APCH WILL IMPROVE CAPACITY IN THE LONG TERM BY PREVENTING AN ATC INDUCED CFIT.