RIC TWR CTLR DESCRIBED LNDG ACR VS. CESSNA CONFLICT; CITING LACK OF COORD BY PCT CTLR AS PRIMARY CAUSAL FACTOR.
Synopsis
RIC TWR CTLR DESCRIBED LNDG ACR VS. CESSNA CONFLICT; CITING LACK OF COORD BY PCT CTLR AS PRIMARY CAUSAL FACTOR.
Narrative
AIR TFC HAS MANY RULES -- BOTH WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN. ONE IMPORTANT UNWRITTEN RULE: EITHER RESOLVE ALL CONFLICTS BEFORE EFFECTING A FREQ CHANGE OR LET THE RECEIVING CTLR KNOW ABOUT THE SITUATION. ANOTHER IMPORTANT UNWRITTEN RULE: ASSUMPTIONS CAN BE PROBLEMATICAL; EVEN DANGEROUS. WHILE WORKING LCL CTL AT RICHMOND ARPT; THE SITUATION I ENCOUNTERED REINFORCES THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE UNWRITTEN RULES. IT ALSO ILLUMINATES THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FAA QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM; ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF LONGSTANDING; INTERFAC PROCEDURAL AND COORD PROBS. IN THIS SITUATION; THE JAMES RIVER SECTOR AT POTOMAC CONSOLIDATED TRACON; WHICH IS OUR RADAR CTL FACILITY; WAS WORKING A C172; 7 MI NW OF THE ARPT. THE C172 WAS MAKING TIGHT; RAPIDLY CHANGING ORBITS AT 1500 FT. AN ACR CHKED IN ON MY FREQ; APPROX 8 MI NW OF THE ARPT; AT 2000 FT; FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16; AND HEADING RIGHT FOR THE C172. IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES; IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE RADAR CTLR HAD PROPERLY APPLIED SUCH REQUIREMENTS AS MERGING TARGET PROCS; TFC CALLS; AND/OR ENSURED APPROPRIATE VERT SEPARATION. ASSUMPTIONS CAN BE DANGEROUS. I CLRED THE ACR TO LAND AND ASKED TO VERIFY THAT THEY HAD THE CONFLICTING TFC IN SIGHT. A TFC ALERT; IT TURNS OUT; WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE. WHILE THE ACR PLT HAD THE CESSNA IN SIGHT; THEY DID NOT EXPECT THE TFC; IN THE WORDS OF THE CAPT; TO BE ON A COLLISION COURSE. PCT LATER EXPLAINED THAT THE ACR WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE STRAIGHT-IN FINAL; WHICH; HE ASSUMED; WOULD AVOID ANY CONFLICT. PCT FAILED TO COORD THE RESTR. IF I HAD KNOWN ABOUT IT; I WOULD HAVE NOT ISSUED A LNDG CLRNC UNTIL AFTER THE ACR PASSED THE TFC BECAUSE I WOULD NOT WANT SUCH A CLRNC TO IMPLY AN AUTH TO DSND. IDEALLY; MOREOVER; AIRPLANES WITH CONFLICTS SHOULD ALL BE ON THE SAME FREQ. PLTS CAN HEAR EACH OTHER; HEAR THE CTL INSTRUCTIONS; AND KNOW THE SITUATION IS UNDER CTL. IN THIS SITUATION; PCT CUT CORNERS; WHICH IS NOT UNUSUAL. EARLY FREQ CHANGES ARE JUST ONE EXAMPLE OF THEIR LACKADAISICAL APPLICATION OF AIR TFC RULES. ARRS OFTEN CHK IN WITH THE TWR; DSNDING ON THE VISUAL APCH; AND FLYING NEAR OR THROUGH THE PATTERN OF NEARBY UNCTLED ARPTS. THEY DON'T SEEM AWARE THAT THERE COULD BE A CONFLICT WITH VFR POP-UP TFC. WHILE IT IS NOT AN ILLEGAL OP; IT IS NOT A PARTICULARLY WISE ONE. PCT'S LACKADAISICAL OPERATING PRACTICES ARE A HABITUAL PROB. WE OFTEN FILE LCL QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEWS ON THEIR ERRORS AND POOR CTL TECHNIQUE. UNFORTUNATELY; DUE TO A LACK OF OUTSIDE OVERSIGHT AND INVOLVEMENT; NO IMPROVEMENTS IN METHODS AND PRACTICES HAS BEEN OBSERVED. QAR'S BTWN FACILITIES SHOULD NOT BE LEFT TO THE 2 FACILITIES TO RESOLVE. THE REGIONAL OFFICE AND/OR HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE INVOLVED TO ENSURE THE BIG; POWERFUL FACILITY DOES NOT DISMISS OR IGNORE THE PROB. WITH GREATER OVERSIGHT; WE MIGHT SEE A WISER APPLICATION OF AIR TFC RULES; BOTH WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN; ACROSS THE NAS.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.