AN ACR FO TALKS ABOUT BEING COERCED BY HIS CHIEF PILOT TO FLY WITH A CAPT FOLLOWING A SERIES OF EVENTS ON THE TRIP THAT THE FO FELT WERE UNSAFE.

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CAPT AND FO CONFLICT. CAPT AND FO BEGAN THIS TRIP BY STATING THAT BOTH HAD 'THICK SKIN.' IF SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE SAID; 'SPEAK UP.' I 'SPOKE UP' 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP ON FLT XXX. THE CAPT ASKED FOR THE BEFORE STARTING ENGS CHKLIST TWICE; AT 10 MINS PRIOR; JUST AS THE 'GOOD BOOK' SAYS. IT SEEMED THAT STICKING TO THE TIMELINE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN MAKING SURE EVERYTHING WAS DONE; AND BOTH PLTS IN THE LOOP. WITH RTE PAPERWORK STILL IN HAND; I WAS CLRLY NOT READY FOR THE CHKLIST. I WAS STILL VERIFYING THE RTE AND LEGS PAGES OF THE FMS. THE RTE WAS A SID TO A STAR; A SHORT HOP WITH MANY POINTS TO VERIFY. I SAID AS MUCH AFTER THE SECOND TIME THE CHKLIST WAS REQUESTED. FOR 3 DAYS IT SEEMED THERE WAS LITTLE REGARD FOR BOTH PLTS TO COMPLETE THE RTE AND WT AND BAL PORTION OF THE PREDEP SET-UP. FOR 3 DAYS IT SEEMED THERE WAS LITTLE REGARD FOR SAFETY CONCERNS THAT WERE BROUGHT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN. THERE WAS THE ISSUE OF AN RA AT ZZZ BECAUSE THE CAPT OVERSHOT FINAL TO RWY; WE ENDED UP IN THE PATH OF AN ACFT FOR PARALLEL RWY. THE CAPT SEEMED OVER RELIANT ON THE AUTOMATION; TOO MUCH 'HEADS DOWN' AT LOW ALT ON A VISUAL APCH. THERE WERE TAXI ISSUES WHERE THE CAPT HAD HIS HEAD DOWN FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME DURING TAXI OUT FROM THE RAMP. DURING THE ROLLOUT PORTION OF A LNDG WITHIN THE LAST 1000 FT STILL INDICATING BTWN 60-80 KTS THE CAPT HAD A PEN IN HAND; HEAD DOWN; WRITING THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWR...I STEPPED ON THE BRAKES BECAUSE IT NEEDED TO BE DONE; THE BOSS DIDN'T AGREE WITH THAT DECISION. THERE WERE CONTINUOUS PARKING ISSUES WITH EXCESS SPD APCHING THE CHOCKS. AFTER THE SECOND REQUEST TO READ THE CHKLIST; I MADE THE STATEMENT THAT 'I WASN'T READY; BUT IF THE CAPT WOULD LIKE TO RUN A SINGLE PLT OP; HE'S WELCOME TO DO SO; I'LL GET OFF.' AT THIS POINT IN THE TRIP I HAD SEEN ENOUGH RED FLAGS THAT I FELT IT WAS TIME TO BE EVEN MORE DIRECT THAN I HAD BEEN DURING THE FIRST 2 DAYS OF FLYING. THE CAPT STATED THAT 'IF I WAS GOING TO GIVE HIM AN ATTITUDE; I NEEDED TO GET OFF THE AIRPLANE.' I INTERPED HIS TONE TO MEAN THAT I WAS TO GET OFF THE AIRPLANE. I CALLED CREW TRACKING; I PACKED UP; I GOT OFF. WHILE ON THE PHONE WITH TRACKING REQUESTING A NEW FO; I WAS PLACED ON HOLD. EVENTUALLY I WAS SPEAKING TO A CHIEF PLT. I THOUGHT HE WAS A MGR IN THE CREW TRACKING DEPT. I DIDN'T REALIZE HE WAS A CHIEF PLT UNTIL AFTER HE WAS FINISHED TALKING TO ME. ONCE WE HUNG UP; THE GATE AGENT BROUGHT IT TO MY ATTN. THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE REPORT IS THIS: I REMOVED MYSELF FROM A VOLATILE SITUATION WHICH AFFECTED SAFETY. I DID SO WHILE THE BRAKES WERE PARKED AND THE FORWARD DOOR WAS STILL OPEN. I THOUGHT; AND STILL THINK; I DID THE RIGHT THING. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY I WAS 'BREAKING THE CHAIN' THAT I THOUGHT COULD POTENTIALLY LEAD TO A MUCH BIGGER INCIDENT. WHAT'S BOTHERING ME IS THAT I WAS COERCED INTO GETTING BACK ON TO AN AIRPLANE AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGEMENT. THE COERCION OCCURRED WHEN A CHIEF PLT THREATENED; POINT BLANK; THAT I WAS GOING TO BE TERMINATED IF I DID NOT GET BACK ON THE ACFT. IN HIS WORDS 'IT WAS GOING TO GET VERY UGLY.' I LOVE THIS JOB; THIS CAREER. I WASN'T WILLING TO LOSE IT WITHOUT TAKING THE TIME TO FURTHER REFLECT ON THE WHOLE EVENT. I FELT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO GET BACK ON; SO I INFORMED HIM THAT I WAS WILLING; BUT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY UP TO THE CAPT SINCE IT APPEARED AT THE TIME THAT HE NO LONGER WISHED TO FLY WITH ME. AFTER TALKING TO THE CHIEF PLT; THE CAPT DECIDED I COULD RETURN TO MY SEAT. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE CHIEF SAID TO CAPT TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN. CLRLY I DID WHAT THE CHIEF PLT WANTED ME TO DO. WHETHER IT WAS THE BEST DECISION OR NOT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY; I DON'T THINK SO. MAYBE IN ANOTHER MONTH OR SO I'LL SEE IT IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. RIGHT NOW IT'S A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW; I FEEL AS IF I 'SOLD OUT' THE SAFETY OF PAX AND CREW TO SAVE MY OWN BUTT. PART OF MY JOB IS TO STAND UP FOR EVERYBODY BEHIND THE DOOR. I WAS TRYING TO DO MY JOB. THAT'S ALL.