FLT CREW REPORTS QUESTIONABLE ALTITUDE CLEARANCES BY SKBP TRACON DURING RNAV GPS RWY 33 APPROACH TO SBKP AND TRAFFIC CONFLICT DURING THE PROCEDURE TURN INBOUND.

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ON JULY/WED/2007 WE -- A CREW OF THREE -- WERE INBOUND TO CAMPINAS; BRAZIL. BASED ON FORECAST WINDS AND ATIS; WE BRIEFED THE RNAV (GPS) APCH TO RWY 33; USING VNAV PROCS. WX WAS IFR WITH RAINSHOWERS AND NUMEROUS TSTMS IN THE VICINITY. SAO PAULO APCH (RADAR CTLED) CLRED US DIRECT TO CPN VOR BEFORE HANDOFF TO CAMPINAS APCH; WHICH ADVISED THEY DID NOT HAVE RADAR SURVEILLANCE (EXCEPT; WE REALIZED SHORTLY; THROUGH PHONE ADVISORIES FROM SAO PAULO RADAR). REFERENCE THE RNAV (GPS) APCH TO RWY 33; CAMPINAS; BRAZIL. AS WE APCHED CPN VOR FROM THE N; THERE WAS A VERY LARGE RAINSHOWER LESS THAN A MILE E OF THE FINAL COURSE; FROM ATOX (FAF) TO RWY 33; DOMINATING THE LENGTH OF THE FINAL COURSE SEGMENT AND MOVING NW TOWARD THE FIELD. AREA CLOUDS OUTSIDE SHOWERS WERE ABOUT 2000 FT SCATTERED; 4000 FT BROKEN. THE CAMPINAS CTLR SAID WE COULD EXPECT THE GPS APCH TO RWY 33; THEN CLRED US TO IK BEACON; WHICH IS NOT ON THE RNAV (GPS) RWY 33 APCH. WE THEN CLEARLY ASKED FOR DIRECT CPN VOR AND THE RNAV (GPS) PROC AND WERE CLRED AS REQUESTED. NEAR CPN VOR; THE CTLR CLRED US TO 5000 FT; WHICH IS 500 FT BELOW THE RECOMMENDED PROC ALT OUTBOUND FROM THE IAF; AFAV. WE VERIFIED THE ALT ASSIGNED; WE HAD GOOD VISIBILITY AHEAD LEAVING 5500 FT AND 5000 FT WAS SAFE OF TERRAIN. WE REPORTED OUTBOUND FROM AFAV ON THE PROC. WE HAD TURNED LEFT TO THE MANEUVERING SIDE FOR A 'TEARDROP' OUTBOUND. THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY CLRED US 'DIRECT TO ATOX' (THE FAF) AND 'DESCEND TO 3300 FT.' (THAT ALT IS ALLOWED ON THE PROC ONLY AFTER ESTABLISHED ON COURSE; INBOUND.) WE BEGAN A RIGHT TURN TO ATOX AND BEGAN A SLOW RATE OF DESCENT TO 3300 FT UNTIL ON AN INTERCEPT TO FINAL COURSE. AS WE BEGAN OUR DESCENT TO 3300 FT IN THE RIGHT TURN TO FINAL AND ATOX; THE CAMPINAS CTLR INFORMED US THAT 'SAO PAULO RADAR ADVISES' WE HAD TFC IN OUR TURN; MOVING ACROSS OUR PATH SOUTH TO NORTH.. WE HAD TFC ON TCAS 600 FT BELOW US; CONVERGING AT 2 O'CLOCK POSITION. WE STOPPED DESCENT AS CAMPINAS APCH DIRECTED 'YOU MUST MAKE A LEFT TURN TO FINAL TO AVOID TFC -- YOU ARE CLRED DIRECT ATOX AND 3300 FT FOR TFC.' WE ADVISED WE HAD TFC ON TCAS AND WOULD DESCEND AFTER CLR. WE CLBED BACK TOWARD 5000 FT TO INCREASE TFC SEPARATION IN THE DIRECTED LEFT TURN. THE LEFT TURN SERVED TO KEEP US IN THE PATH OF THE ACFT LONGER THAN THE COMPLETED TURN TO FINAL WOULD HAVE; WE REMAINED WELL ABOVE THE TFC'S ALT. INBOUND TO ATOX; WE VISUALLY CONFIRMED A LIGHT TWIN-PROPPED ACFT MOVING SLOWLY AWAY FROM OUR 5 TO 3 O'CLOCK POSITION. ON AN INTERCEPT TO FINAL; AND ABLE TO SEE THE GND; WE AGAIN BEGAN DESCENT TO 3300 FT AS CLRED. WE PROGRAMMED 'DIRECT TO ATOX' IN THE LEGS PAGE; THEN EXECUTED THE 'DIRECT.' THIS CAUSED THE LT PROGRAMMED AT ATOX (3300 FT) TO DELETE. RE-ENGAGING THE VNAV PROFILE THAT REMAINED IN THE BOX CAUSED THE AUTOPLT TO ATTEMPT A RAPID DESCENT TO 2600 FT; THE SELECTED FINAL MDA ON THE MCP; EVEN BEFORE REACHING ATOX; THE FAF. (PUBLISHED APCH MDA IS 2580 FT.) THE HIGH DESCENT RATE CAUSED A MOMENTARY ACTIVATION OF THE GPWS. WE AGGRESSIVELY ENSURED CORRECT FAF ALT AT ATOX. TAKING TIME TO CONFIRM POSITION; ALT AND CORRECT PROGRAMMING; CAUSED A SLIGHTLY LATE DESCENT AFTER THE FAF. APCH SPD WAS 158. HVY RAINSHOWERS WERE NOW MOVING ACROSS THE FINAL COURSE AND THE FIELD. CAMPINAS APCH ADVISED CEILING AT 1200 FT AND VISIBILITY AT 2000 METERS IN HVY RAIN (COMPATIBLE WITH THE APCH). OUR DESCENT PUT US OVER THE VDP; BUT ABOVE MDA; IN A DENSE RAIN SHAFT; AT THE SAME TIME WE SAW THE FIELD. WE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH AS PUBLISHED. CAMPINAS APCH CLRED US TO 5000 FT; DIRECT AFAV. AGAIN AT AFAV; WE REPORTED OUTBOUND ON THE MANEUVERING SIDE OF THE PROC AND THE CTLR CLRED US FOR 'LEFT TURN; DIRECT ATOX; DESCEND TO 3300 FT.' THIS SEEMS CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF THE PROC; FOLLOWING THESE DIRECTIONS AT THE POINT GIVEN WOULD PUT AN ACFT 2200 FT BELOW THE RECOMMENDED ALT FOR THE PUBLISHED TURN PROC. NOTABLY; THIS INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN WITHOUT RADAR SURVEILLANCE TO CONFIRM IF WE WERE AT ALL THE NEAR THE FINAL COURSE; OR EVEN INBOUND. BY NOW; THE RAINSHOWERS HAD MOVED ON AND THE WX WAS RAPIDLY CLEARING. NOW IN VMC; AND ON AN INTERCEPT TO FINAL AND ATOX; WE DESCENDED TO 3300 FT AND COMPLETED THE APCH AND NORMAL LNDG. A SAFETY CONCERN; ESPECIALLY IN A GLASS COCKPIT; WHEN CLRED FOR A PROC THEN TOLD TO 'PROCEED DIRECT' TO THE FINAL APCH FIX IN THE MIDST OF THE PROC: IF THE LEGS PAGE ONE WERE TO PROGRAM 'DIRECT' TO THE FAF: 1) THE ACFT WILL PROCEED DIRECT IN THE SHORTEST TURN DIRECTION; NOT NECESSARILY IN THE DIRECTION OF TURN PROCS AND THE ALT PROGRAMMED AT THE FIX MAY DELETE. 2) THE VNAV ALT PROTECTION PROGRAMMED AT THE FIX PRIOR TO THE FAF IS REMOVED WHEN THAT FIX IS DELETED AS A DE-FACTO OF THE 'DIRECT.' IN VNAV AUTOPLT MODE; THE ACFT WILL TRY TO DESCEND AS RE-PROGRAMMED; EXACTLY AS IT DID IN OUR CASE NEAR THE FAF; AND THE CHANGED PROFILE MAY NO LONGER INCLUDE SAFE ALT CONSTRAINTS. CAMPINAS APCH IS ISSUING DIRECTIONS WHICH CAN COMPLICATE PROFILE MANAGEMENT; PARTICULARLY IN GLASS COCKPITS. CAMPINAS APCH DIRECTED NUMEROUS TURNS AND ALTS WITHOUT KNOWING EXACTLY WHERE WE WERE LOCATED. SAO PAULO RADAR WAS NOT ABLE TO PROTECT THE AIRSPACE IN THE CAMPINAS APCH CORRIDOR.