RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE AND TRYING TO CATCH UP LEADS TO A REJECTED TKOF FOR A WARNING ASSOCIATED WITH A KNOWN MEL ITEM.

Date: 2007-05 · Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR · Phase: takeoff

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE AND TRYING TO CATCH UP LEADS TO A REJECTED TKOF FOR A WARNING ASSOCIATED WITH A KNOWN MEL ITEM.

Narrative

DURING TAXI OUT; CAPT'S BRIEF WAS INTERRUPTED BY THE CALL FROM GND CTL; REQUIRING THAT WE CONTACT THE COMPANY TO RE-FILE OUR TIMED OUT FLT PLAN. THIS WAS DONE NEAR THE END OF THE RWY AND THE TWR CONTACTED US QUICKLY THEREAFTER WITH A NEW CLRNC (SQUAWK CODE); AND INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO THE RWY. THIS LEFT US WITH LITTLE TIME TO START THE REMAINING ENG. WE WERE JUST COMPLETING THE TAXI CHKLIST AS TWR ISSUED OUR TKOF CLRNC. THINGS WERE PROGRESSING QUICKLY AND I NEVER COMPLETED A FULL TKOF BRIEFING. I HAD GIVEN A BRIEFING THAT THE MAIN CABIN DOOR WAS DEFERRED AT THE GATE; BUT NOT HOW THAT PERTAINED TO IGNORING EICAS WARNINGS ON TKOF. THUS; IN MY OWN MIND; I NEVER REPLACED THE BUILT-IN 'BTWN 80 KTS AND V1 WE'LL ABORT FOR ANY MAJOR MALFUNCTIONS OR RED EICAS MESSAGES;' WITH WE'LL IGNORE MAIN CABIN DOOR OPEN EICAS MESSAGES. ADDITIONALLY; THE SWITCH; THOUGH DEFERRED; HAD BEEN FUNCTIONING PROPERLY UP TO THIS POINT; SO I TRUSTED ITS INDICATIONS OVER WHAT THE MEL SAID. WE WERE RUNNING ABOUT 2 HRS BEHIND SCHEDULE DUE TO OUR RECEIVING A LATE INBOUND ACFT. RAMP CLRED US TO PUSH AND TAXI; GND CTL CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 10C VIA TXWY V AND TXWY E. JUST PRIOR TO REACHING TXWY D; GND CTL CLRED US TO TURN R ON TXWY D; HOLD SHORT OF TXWY W AND CONTACT THE COMPANY TO RE-FILE OUR FLT PLAN; AS THEY DID NOT HAVE A STRIP ON US. WE CONTACTED OPS FOR THIS REQUEST AND I WITHHELD STARTING THE #1 ENG UNTIL THIS WAS ALL SORTED OUT. GND CAME BACK RATHER QUICKLY FOR THIS TYPE OF THING; WITH A NEW SQUAWK CODE; EVERYTHING ELSE THE SAME; TAXI UP TO AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 10C. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC; PROCEEDED TO START #1; TAXIED UP TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE; FINISHED THE TAXI CHKLIST; TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANT; SWITCHED TO TWR; AND ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR TKOF CLRNC; ALL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. THE TKOF PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE FO AS PF; UNTIL AROUND 100 KIAS WE GOT A TRIPLE CHIME AND I ABORTED THE TKOF AS PER OUR SOP. AFTER THE SPLIT SECOND DECISION TO ABORT WAS MADE AND IMPLEMENTED; I SAW THAT THE EICAS MESSAGE WAS FOR THE MAIN CABIN DOOR OPEN; A MESSAGE WHICH COULD BE IGNORED AS PER THE DEFERRAL. WE CLRED THE RWY; DECLINED FURTHER ASSISTANCE; RE-VERIFIED THAT THE DOOR WAS STILL PROPERLY SECURED; ADVISED OPS AND THE COMPANY; BRIEFED THE PAX; WROTE UP THE ABORT IN THE LOG; WAITED APPROX 30 MINS FOR OUR BRAKES TO COOL; AND DEPARTED NORMALLY. AS A NEW CAPT; I FELT THAT AT A CERTAIN POINT IN TIME; I ALLOWED EVENTS OCCURRING TO DICTATE THE PACE OF THE FLT RATHER THAN TAKING COMMAND; TELLING GND THAT WE WOULD NEED A MIN; AND NOT SHORTENING THE STANDARD BRIEF WITH A PERFUNCTORY 'ANY QUESTIONS?' HAD I TAKEN A 'MIN FOR SAFETY' ON TXWY D SHORT OF TXWY W; I WOULD HAVE SAVED ABOUT 50 MINS OVERALL; AS WELL AS ELIMINATING THE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A HIGH SPD ABORT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.