AN ACR CREW RPTS NOT READY FOR TKOF IN AN ILS CRITICAL AREA FORCING ATC TO ISSUE AN APCHING ACFT A GAR. ATC COUNSELED CREW ABOUT CALLING NOT READY LATE.

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GETTING READY TO LEAVE SYR. HAVE A FEW EARLY MORNING SNAFU. FINALLY GET PEOPLE; BAGS; AND PUSHBACK EARLY. SYR WX IS IFR: CEILING 500 OVERCAST; 10 MILES VISIBILITY; DEPARTING RWY 28. THINGS ARE GOING SMOOTH. WE HAVE OUR NUMBERS; CALL FOR TAXI; AND ARE TOLD 'ACR XXXX RUNWAY 28: ECHO; ALFA; SHORT OF MIKE.' AS WE TAXI OUT WE ARE APCHING MIKE GROUND SAYS; 'ACR XXXX; CROSS RWY 33 AND TAXI TO RWY 28.' ON THE E SIDE OF RWY 33; WE SWITCH OVER TO TOWER FREQ; AND TOWER CTLR SAYS 'ACR XXXX CLRED FOR TAKEOFF.' CHKLISTS WERE DONE; WT AND BAL RECEIVED AND LOADED; AND WE WERE READY TO GO EXCEPT FOR ONE THING. FIRST FLT OF THE DAY; AND WE NEEDED ANOTHER MINUTE FOR THE ENGINES TO WARM UP -- WE WERE AT ABOUT 3:45 SECS. FO SAID WE WOULD NEED ANOTHER MINUTE. TOWER CTLR'S REPLY WITH GREAT ZEAL: 'ACR XXXX; THAT'S RIDICULOUS. YOU'RE IN A CRITICAL AREA WITH ANOTHER ACFT...YOUR OWN COMPANY ACFT; ON FINAL. NOW WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO SEND HIM AROUND. THE AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL STATES THAT A TURBOJET MUST BE READY TO GO AT THE END OF THE RUNWAY. IF NOT READY; THEN YOU NEED TO LET THE CTLR KNOW AHEAD OF TIME.' MY FO REPLIED; 'YOU CLRED US TO THE END OF THE RUNWAY.' 'AS I SAID YOU ARE TURBOJET AND ARE EXPECTED TO BE READY TO GO WHEN YOU REACH THE END OF THE RWY.' I PICKED UP THE MIKE AND SAID; 'BUT WE'RE NOT AT THE END OF THE RWY. WE HAVE A LITTLE WAYS TO GO.' 'YOU ARE IN A CRITICAL AREA; AND THEREFORE MUST GO. ACR YYYY GO AROUND. YOUR COMPANY IS IN THE CRITICAL AREA AND ARE NOT READY TO TAKE OFF; ACR YYYY GO-AROUND.' AFTER THAT EXCHANGE; I BELIEVE HE WANTED US TO VACATE THE AREA ASAP. I THINK HE TOLD US TO TAXI ON RWY 28; R TURN ECHO; R TURN ALPHA. HOWEVER; WE WERE READY TO GO BY THEN; AND STATED SAME. 'ACR XXXX CLRED FOR TAKEOFF.' PRIOR TO SWITCHING OVER TO CENTER; WE ASKED FOR A NUMBER TO CALL THE TOWER. UPON LNDG; I ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE SUPVR ON AN UNRECORDED LINE. HE GAVE ME; AND I CALLED; A SECOND NUMBER. THE TOWER CTLR'S ACTIONS WERE REINFORCED BY HIS SUPVR. 'I LISTENED TO THE TAPES; AND YOU'RE GOING TO GRIPE ABOUT YOUR SERVICE? MY CTLR WAS RIGHT ON. YOU WERE IN AN ILS CRITICAL ZONE' IS WHAT THE SUPVR SAID. ANYWAY; THE CONVERSATION WENT DOWN FROM THERE. I DID MENTION HOWEVER; THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO KNOW THAT WE WERE EXPECTED TO BE READY WHEN CROSSING THE RWY AS OPPOSED TO BE READY AT THE END. HE REPLIED THAT YOU ARE A TURBOJET ACFT; AND AS SUCH.... SECOND; IF YOU HAVE AN ACFT 7 MILES OUT; 2 MILES MAYBE FROM THE CRITICAL AREA; WOULDN'T IT BE PRUDENT TO HOLD A TAXIING ACFT OUTSIDE OF THE CRITICAL AREA TO AVOID A POTENTIAL GO-AROUND? ACCORDING TO HIM; WHEN I CROSSED THE OVER INTO THE CRITICAL AREA; IT IS INCUMBENT UPON ME TO BE READY INSTEAD OF ASKING IF I AM READY; EVEN IF HE CLEARS ME ALL THE WAY TO THE RWY IN THE CRITICAL ZONE. ALSO I WAS TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF MIKE ON MY INITIAL CALL; WHICH ON MY CHART IS DEPICTED INSIDE THE ILS CRITICAL AREA. I ASKED IF THAT WAS CONSIDERED SOP? I THOUGHT IT A LITTLE DISINGENUOUS TO TELL SOMEONE TO TAXI TO THE RWY; WHILE KNOWING THAT AN ACFT IS NEARING THE MARKER ON AN APCH IN IFR CONDITIONS; AND THEN BERATE THEM FOR NOT TAKING OFF SEEMS FRIGHTFULLY CLOSE TO ENTRAPMENT AT WORST; POOR PROCS AT BEST.