CE550 FO RPTS THE INABILITY OF THE CAPT TO LEVEL OFF AT ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN ACFT TYPE.
Synopsis
CE550 FO RPTS THE INABILITY OF THE CAPT TO LEVEL OFF AT ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN ACFT TYPE.
Narrative
THE HIGHER RANKING PF FAILED TO MAINTAIN AN ATC REQUIRED ALT. I WAS THE PNF OR COPLT. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND ASSIGNED A SOUTHERLY HDG AND TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 10000 FT. THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. AT 9000 FT WE GOT AN AUDIBLE WARNING OF 1000 FT TO LEVEL OFF. I HAD MY HEAD DOWN RUNNING CHKLISTS. I LOOKED UP AND WE WERE STILL IN A RAPID CLB. I NOTIFIED THE PF '200 FT TO LEVEL OFF.' HE ACKNOWLEDGED. HE HAD BEEN HAND FLYING THE ACFT AND DECIDED TO QUICKLY ARM THE AUTOPLT IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE 10000 FT ALT. HE APPEARED FLUSTERED. ATC THEN ASKED IF WE WERE MAINTAINING 10000 FT. I REPLIED 'WE ARE TRYING TO...SORRY.' ALBUQUERQUE DEP ACKNOWLEDGED. THEY THEN TOLD AN AIRLINER OF OUR POS AHEAD OF THEM AT 10000 FT. THEY WERE AT 11000 FT. I KNEW THERE MIGHT BE A TFC CONFLICT AND LOOKED AT THE TCAS DISPLAY TO LOCATE NEARBY TFC. I THEN LOOKED OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO GET A VISUAL ON ANY TFC IN THE VICINITY. I THEN LOOKED BACK AT THE ALTIMETER AND THE PF HAD LEVELED AT 10650 FT; BUT HAD NOT STARTED A DSCNT TO MY SURPRISE. I TOLD HIM 'WE NEED TO GET THE PLANE DOWN TO 10000 FT NOW!' HE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED AND PROCEEDED TO USE THE AUTOPLT TO DSND AT A RATE OF 600 FPM. I WAS ABOUT TO RECOMMEND A FASTER DSCNT RATE WHEN ATC CLRED US TO A HIGHER ALT. THE ATC INSTRUCTIONS WERE CLR. WE HAD NO CONFUSION ON THAT END. I THINK THE PF'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT CAUSED HIM TO ACT SLOWLY TO THE PROB AT HAND. I THINK HE ALSO SLOWED DOWN UNDER PRESSURE. HIS THINKING THE AUTOPLT WOULD SAVE HIM WAS NOT CORRECT IF THE INPUTS ARE NOT ACCURATE. OUR DEPT ALSO HAS A LACK OF GOOD CRM. I HAVE ASKED FOR TRAINING IN THIS AREA FOR ALL PLTS; BUT HAVE BEEN DENIED. THE 'MGT' PLTS COME FROM A SINGLE PLT BACKGND AND DO NOT LIKE THE CREW ENVIRONMENT AND TRY TO FLY IN A MANNER THAT EXCLUDES CREW INVOLVEMENT. I ALSO THINK THERE WAS A LACK OF FOCUS ON HIS PART. I SHOULD HAVE REACTED QUICKER AND TAKEN THE CTLS TO BRING THE ACFT TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. I HESITATED BECAUSE HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROB AND CLAIMED HE WAS CORRECTING. I PUT MY ATTN TO OTHER POTENTIAL PROBS THAT COULD ARISE BECAUSE OF THE ERROR AND EXPECTED HIM TO COMPLETE HIS TASK UNASSISTED. I SHOULD NOT HAVE LET HIS RANK AND FEAR OF WORKPLACE RETALIATION KEEP ME FROM ACTING QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY TO CORRECT THE SITUATION AND TAKE CTL AS NEEDED. TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES; THE FLT DEPT NEEDS TRAINING IN CRM AND ALSO NEEDS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP POS. IT IS A POOR INSTITUTIONAL MIND-SET THAT LEADS TO PROBS. THERE IS LITTLE TO NO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POOR PLT PERFORMANCE AND NO CHAIN THAT ONE CAN FILE COMPLAINTS OR ADDRESS PROBS WITHOUT FEAR OF REPRISAL. ANY MENTION OF SAFETY RELATED ISSUES ON OUR DEPT LEADS TO HARSH WORKING CONDITIONS AND POSSIBLE SLANDER.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.