AN AA5 PILOT FAILED TO PREFLT FUEL QTY FULLY AND RAN ONE FUEL TANK DRY IN THE LNDG PATTERN. ACFT LANDED ON AN INTERSECTING RWY.

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ON THE DATE OF THE EVENT; I HAD PLANNED TO COMPLETE A SOLO XCOUNTRY TO THE E OF MY HOME ARPT; ZZZ. HOWEVER; BECAUSE OF LOW CEILING IN THE AREA OF MY DEST; AND UPON CONSULTATION WITH MY INSTRUCTOR; WE DECIDED IT WOULD BE BEST TO NOT DO THE XCOUNTRY ON THAT DAY. HOWEVER; GIVEN THAT I ALREADY HAD THE ACFT BOOKED FOR MY USE DURING THE AFTERNOON; AND THE WX AT ZZZ WAS VMC; MY INSTRUCTOR AND I AGREED IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO PERFORM SOME SOLO LCL FLTS -- INCLUDING PATTERN WORK AT ZZZ AND 2 NEARBY ARPTS; BOTH OF WHICH I HAD FLOWN TO MULTIPLE TIMES AND WAS COMFORTABLE FLYING TO; AND WERE ONLY A SHORT DISTANCE AWAY. DURING MY PREFLT; I INSPECTED THE FUEL TANKS ON BOTH THE L AND THE R WINGS. THEY APPEARED LOWER THAN I EXPECTED THEM TO BE; AND WERE NOT UP TO THE BRIM OF THE TANK. I RETRIEVED THE LOGBOOK FOR THE ACFT TO DETERMINE WHO FLEW THE ACFT LAST; AND WHEN; FOUND THE LAST PERSON TO HAVE FLOWN IT WAS 4 DAYS PRIOR. I WALKED OVER TO THE FBO OFFICE; AND ASKED THE RECEPTIONIST TO CLARIFY THAT THEY HAD INDEED FUELED THE ACFT ON THAT DATE. THE RECEPTIONIST; UPON CHKING THE LOGS; DID SAY THEY FUELED THE ACFT ON THAT DAY FOR THE PERSON WHO HAD LAST FLOWN IT. I THEN DECIDED TO CALL MY INSTRUCTOR TO ASK FOR HIS OPINION. HE POINTED OUT THAT FUEL EXPANDS/CONTRACTS UNDER DIFFERENT TEMPS. IN THE PRECEDING DAYS; TEMPS HAD BEEN WARMER THAN USUAL FOR WINTER; AND TODAY IT WAS COLDER WITH OCCASIONAL DRIZZLING. I FINALLY DECIDED THAT; IN MY JUDGEMENT; THE FUEL LEVELS IN BOTH TANKS WERE MOST LIKELY A RESULT OF THE ATMOSPHERIC CHANGES; AND WOULD NOT NEED TO BE FILLED UP RIGHT TO THE POINT THEY WERE ALMOST SPILLING OVER THE TOP ONTO THE WING. ON START-UP; I USED THE L TANK; AND ALLOWED IT TO BURN FOR A FEW MINS WHILE I AWAITED MY TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE GND CTLR. AS I BEGAN TAXIING; I SWITCHED TO THE R TANK. ON TKOF; I FLEW APPROX 5 TOUCH-AND-GOES ON RWY XX AT ZZZ BEFORE DECIDING TO PROCEED NBOUND TO ZZZ1 (WHICH IS ABOUT 17 NM N OF ZZZ). I PERFORMED APPROX 5 TOUCH-AND-GOES AT ZZZ1; USING RWY 36; AND DECIDED TO PROCEED TO ZZZ2 (SE APPROX THE SAME DISTANCE). AT THIS POINT; I WAS STILL USING FUEL FROM THE R TANK. ON LEAVING ZZZ1; I CONTEMPLATED SWITCHING TANKS; AS I HAD BEEN BURNING THE R TANK ALMOST THE ENTIRE DURATION THE ENG WAS RUNNING. HOWEVER; I HAD ALREADY LEFT THE ZZZ1 CLASS D AIRSPACE; AND DID NOT FEEL IT WOULD BE WISE TO SWITCH TANKS UNLESS I WAS CLOSER TO AN ARPT. ABOUT 9 NM FROM ZZZ2; I CONTACTED THE TWR CTL TO ESTABLISH 2-WAY COMS; AND ADVISED HIM I PLANNED TO DO SEVERAL TOUCH-AND-GOES. HE GAVE ME INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO; HOWEVER; I DECIDED INSTEAD TO PROCEED BACK TO ZZZ. THERE WERE SOME DARK CLOUD FRONTS MOVING IN FROM THE W; HDG EBOUND; AND I DECIDED IT WOULD BE BEST TO RETURN TO ZZZ AND SIMPLY DO PATTERN WORK THERE; RATHER THAN DOING SO IN ZZZ2 AND POSSIBLY RISK BEING STUCK IF POOR WX MOVED IN. ONCE BACK AT ZZZ; I SWITCHED TO THE L TANK; ONCE I WAS WITHIN A SAFE DISTANCE OF THE ARPT. I PERFORMED TOUCH-AND-GOES AT ZZZ FOR WHAT I ESTIMATE WAS AT LEAST 1.5 HRS. THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL OTHER ACFT DEPARTING OR ARRIVING; AND AT TIMES I HAD TO EXTEND MY DOWNWIND; PERFORM 360 DEG TURNS OR S-TURNS; TO ALLOW FOR SEPARATION. I DID NOT SWITCH BACK TO MY R TANK; AS I FELT THE PREVIOUS PORTION OF MY FLT HAD BEEN LONG ENOUGH AND THE TANK WAS POSSIBLY NEAR EMPTY. ALSO; THE FUEL GAUGE WAS READING 'E' FOR EMPTY. ALTHOUGH I REALIZED THE FUEL GAUGES WERE NOTORIOUSLY FAULTY; I DID NOT WANT TO PUT MY ACFT IN A COMPROMISING SITUATION BY SWITCHING BACK TO THAT TANK; BECAUSE IF IT WAS IN FACT EMPTY; THE ENG WOULD SHUT DOWN. I STILL BELIEVED I HAD ENOUGH FUEL IN THE L TANK TO CONTINUE MY PATTERN WORK. AT APPROX XA15; I WAS PREPARING TO MAKE MY FINAL TOUCH-AND-GO; AND RETURN TO THE RAMP; AS DAYLIGHT REMAINING IN THE DAY WAS NEAR END. ON MY TURN FROM MY XWIND LEG TO DOWNWIND LEG; CLBING THROUGH APPROX 700 FT MSL; MY ENG CEASED OP. I IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THE TWR I HAD AN ENG FAILURE; AND REQUESTED IMMEDIATE LNDG ON RWY XY; WHICH WAS THE BEST RWY FOR ME TO RETURNTO SOONEST. THE TWR CTLR CLRED ME TO LAND; AND INSTRUCTED ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY XX TO GO AROUND (R SIDE). GIVEN MY EXTREMELY CLOSE PROX TO RWY XY (LESS THAN 1/2 MI FROM THE RWY); I 'SLIPPED' THE ACFT DOWN TO THE THRESHOLD; AND LANDED IT SAFELY. I WAS UNABLE TO MAKE THE TURNOFF ONTO THE TXWY; AND ADVISED THE TWR CTLR I WAS NOT DECLARING AN EMER. UPON INSPECTION OF MY FUEL TANKS; I DISCOVERED THE L FUEL TANK WAS EMPTY; AND THE R FUEL TANK HAD A SMALL AMOUNT OF FUEL LEFT. I STARTED THE ENG USING THE R FUEL TANK AND TAXIED OFF THE RWY AND TO THE RAMP. I REALIZE I WAS TREMENDOUSLY FORTUNATE TO HAVE BEEN IN THE POS I WAS; AND TO HAVE HAD ACCESS TO RWY XY IN SUCH SHORT TIME. SEVERAL FELLOW PLTS COMMENDED MY RESPONSE IN DEALING WITH THE EMER AND LNDG; AND KEEPING A 'COOL HEAD' DURING THE CRISIS. HOWEVER; I ALSO REALIZE THE MISJUDGEMENT DURING MY PREFLT; IN DETERMINING IF AN APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF FUEL WAS AVAILABLE FOR MY FLT. I HAVE TAKEN THIS EVENT TO BE AN EXTREME LESSON THAT FUEL MGMNT IS ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL ASPECTS TO FLT SAFETY; AND THERE IS NO ROOM FOR ERROR IN JUDGEMENT.