DISPATCHED TO A DESTINATION WITH BAD WEATHER; FLT CREW OF MLG DISCOVERS THAT THERE ARE NO APPROACH PLATES ABOARD FOR ANY OF THE THREE ALTERNATES ASSIGNED BY DISPATCH.

Narrative

WE WERE DISPATCHED TO RDU WITH 2 DESTINATION ALTERNATES; ORF AND RIC. RDU WAS FORECAST WITH RAIN INCREASING TO HEAVY RAIN AT ARRIVAL TIME. BOTH ORF AND RIC WERE HOLDING IMC CONDITIONS AROUND 300 TO 500 FOOT OVERCAST. ENRTE TO RDU; DISPATCH SENT US AN ACARS MESSAGE CHANGING 1ST ALTERNATE TO GSO WITH FUEL BURN OF 2080 LBS; 2ND ALTERNATE REMAINED RIC WITH FUEL BURN 2554 LBS. GSO AND WEATHER WAS HOLDING AT 300 FT OVERCAST WITH RAIN AND RIC WAS BETWEEN 300 FT AND 500 FT OVERCAST WITH RAIN. AT THIS TIME OUR FOB WAS AT 7200 LBS. PLANNING AHEAD; I ASKED FO TO GET THE ALTERNATE BOOK OUT FOR GSO. THERE WERE NO APPROACH PLATES FOR ANY OF THE THREE DESTINATION ALTERNATES GIVEN IN THE PILOT RTE MANUALS OR ALTERNATE AIRPORT MANUAL. I SENT ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH ADVISING OF OUR SITUATION AND ASK FOR CALCULATION OF HOLD AND DIVERSION FUEL TO GSO. DISPATCH NEVER REPLIED TO THIS MESSAGE! WITH MENTAL MATH; I QUICKLY DETERMINED WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR ONE MORE QUICK APPROACH ATTEMPT AT RDU AND THEN MUST DIVERT TO GSO (FOB 7200 LBS -1500 LBS FOR THE RDU ILS RWY 23R TO MISSED APPROACH =5800 LBS DIVERSION FUEL). PLANNING TO DIVERT AT 5800 LBS WITH BURN TO GSO AT 2080 LBS; WE WOULD HAVE TO FLY AN EMERGENCY ILS WITH VERBAL DESCRIPTION. WE WOULD LAND WITH MINIMUM FUEL OF 3800 LBS WITHOUT ANY AIRPORT INFORMATION OR APPROACH PLATES! ON FINAL APPROACH INTO RDU; THERE WERE MANY ISOLATED THUNDERSTORM SQUALL LINES MOVING QUICKLY ACROSS THE FIELD. AROUND 500 FT AGL RDU ILS RWY 05L TOWER ISSUED NEW ATIS CHANGING RUNWAY IN USE TO ILS RWY 23R. WE EXECUTED A MISSED APPROACH EXPECTING RADAR VECTORS TO RDU ILS RWY 23R. ON FINAL APPROACH ILS RWY 23R THE AIRCRAFT AHEAD OF US REPORTED WINDSHEAR PLUS 20 KNOTS. AT 800 FT AGL WE EXECUTED A SECOND MISSED APPROACH. AFTER THE GO AROUND TOWER ADVISED US THAT THE SQUALLS WERE MOVING QUICKLY ACROSS THE FIELD. WE AGREED TO TAKE 5-MINUTE DELAY VECTORS TO REGROUP AND LET THE SQUALL LINE PASS THE FIELD. WITH THESE NUMBERS IN MIND; WE DECLARED 'MINIMUM FUEL' AND RECEIVED PRIORITY HANDLING BACK TO THE RDU ILS RWY 23R APPROACH TO LANDING. IF WE HAD TO DIVERT IN THIS SCENARIO; WE WOULD HAVE TO LAND IN GSO WITHOUT ANY AIRPORT PLATES. I FIND THIS METHOD OF DISPATCHING IS PUSHED THE BOUNDARIES OF SAFETY AND LEGALITY! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER ADVISED THAT HIS CARRIER -- RECENTLY PURCHASED BY AND MERGED INTO ANOTHER -- PROVIDED EACH PILOT WITH A LIST OF OPSPEC APPROVED ARPTS. THE SURVIVING CARRIER DOES NOT DO SO. SUBSEQUENT CHECKS OF ALTERNATE BINDERS ON OTHER ACFT BY THE REPORTER DISCOVERED THAT ONLY ONE HAD ANY IAP'S FOR THE ALTERNATE ARPTS AND THAT ONE ONLY FOR ORF. NONE OF THE BINDERS CHECKED INCLUDED IAP'S FOR ANY OF THE OTHER ALTERNATES ASSIGNED TO THE FLT IN QUESTION. REPORTER FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVES ONLY GSO IAP'S WERE INCLUDED IN THE ACFT FMS DATABASE. THERE IS ALSO A COMPANY BULLETIN ADVISING THAT SOME ARPTS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE DATABASE AND THAT APCHES TO THOSE ARPTS WOULD REQUIRE MANUAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE APPROPRIATE IAP. THE BULLETIN DID NOT ADDRESS HOW TO BUILD THE MISSING DATABASE APCH IF THE APCH WAS ALSO ONE OF THOSE FOR WHICH NO PLATE WAS AVAILABLE.