EMB145 FLT CREW DEPARTING JFK ON THE KENNEDY1 CRI CLIMB TURNS RIGHT AT CRI 176 R AND 2 DME DIRECT FIRST WAYPOINT.

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ENTERED KENNEDY 1 DEP IN FMS PRIOR TO DEP. DEPARTED RWY 31L. AT APPROX 400 FT; FO TURNED TO CRI VOR. AT 600 FT AUTOPLT ON. AFTER CRI VOR; ACFT TURNED TO TRACK 176 DEG RADIAL OUTBOUND AS PUBLISHED FROM CRI. LESS THAN 1 MIN LATER; ACFT MADE UNCOMMANDED TURN TO THE R DIRECT TO COATE INTXN. CREW IMMEDIATELY REACTED AND CAPT GRABBED CHART TO VERIFY CORRECT PROC. WHILE CREW WAS REMEDYING THE UNCOMMANDED TURN; ATC SAID TO TURN L IMMEDIATELY TO 130 DEGS; FO DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND TURNED TO 130 DEGS. ATC INDICATED THAT OTHER CREWS HAD MADE THIS SAME R TURN PREVIOUSLY. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THIS SITUATION; THE CREW FOUND THAT THE 176 DEG RADIAL LOCATION AS DESCRIBED IN THE INFO SECTION OF THE FMS WAS APPROX 2 MI S OF CRI VOR; WHICH IS WHY THE ACFT TURNED R TOWARDS THE NEXT WAYPOINT WHICH WAS COATE INTXN. HOWEVER; THE 176 DEG RADIAL PICTORIAL ON THE KENNEDY 1 DEP CHART DOES NOT DEPICT THIS 2 MI FIX AND THE RADIAL GOES OFF TO INFINITY; WHICH CORRESPONDED TO THE DISPLAY ON THE ACFT'S MFD. THE CORRECTION COULD BE THAT THE 2 MI FIX ON THE CRI 176 DEG RADIAL SHOULD BE LOCATED MUCH FURTHER TO THE S TO PREVENT SIMILAR SITUATIONS. 781369: WHILE WORKING THE JFK DEP RADAR POS AT THE NEW YORK TRACON; A FLT DEPARTING RWY 31L WAS INSTRUCTED TO FLY THE CRI SID BY JFK TWR. THE ACFT CHKED IN WITH JFK DEP AND PROCEEDED TO THE CRI VOR AND THEN MADE A R TURN TO THE NW. THE SID INSTRUCTS THE PLT TO FLY OUTBOUND CRI ON THE 176 DEG RADIAL. THE ACFT WAS HEADING INTO THE LGA FINAL AND ENTERED THE LGA CTLR'S AIRSPACE BEFORE BEING TOLD TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO THE SE. WHEN QUESTIONED; THE PLT COULD GIVE NO ANSWER ABOUT WHY HE HAD FLOWN THE SID THE WAY HE DID. THIS IS AN INCREASINGLY ONGOING PROB. THE PLTS ARE FLYING THIS SID INCORRECTLY WITH AN EMPHASIS ON COMMUTER PLTS WITH LOW TIME AND INEXPERIENCE. THESE ERRORS COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES DUE TO THE PROX OF LGA ARPT TFC TO JFK AND THE COMPLEX AND RESTRICTIVE AIRSPACE IN THE NEW YORK AREA. AN NMAC OR MIDAIR COLLISION IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. PLTS NEED TO BE AWARE OF THIS IMPORTANT SITUATION; AND THE FAA NEEDS TO TAKE ACTION TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF ERRORS THAT ARE OCCURRING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 780665 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT WAS THE PNF DURING THIS DEPARTURE AND WAS USING RAW DATA TO BACK UP THE FMC AND DID NOT NOTICE THAT THE FO HAD CLOSED THE ROUTE DISCONTINUITY; THUS COMMANDING THE ACFT TO TURN AFTER THE 2 DME FIX.