B737 FLT CREW REPORTS LANDING ON RWY 26R AT ELP DURING DUST STORM AFTER FLYING VOR 26L AND BEING CLEARED TO LAND ON RWY 26L.

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ON INITIAL BRIEFING TO FO; SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE FORECAST AT ELP FOR BLOWING DUST/LIMITED VISIBILITY/STRONG GUSTY WINDS. INFORMED THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT AND TOLD HER TO EXPECT A BUMPY ARR AND ANTICIPATE CLEANING THE CABIN EARLY. ENRTE TO ELP; RECEIVED UPDATED ATIS AND NOTAMS (NO CHANGE IN WX AND RWY 4/22 CLOSED). WITH FORECAST TURB FROM 16000 FT TO THE GND; SECURED THE CABIN DURING INITIAL DSCNT; FO COMPUTED LNDG DATA; AND CAPT CONDUCTED BRIEFING FOR VOR 26L COMPANY PROCS AS ATIS VISIBILITY WAS 1 1/4 MI. SPECIFIC MENTION WAS MADE OF WHERE TO EXPECT TO SEE THE RWY IN RELATION TO THE WIND SCREEN; CONFIRMING I SELECTED THE OUTBOUND 245 DEG COURSE AFTER THE FAF AS WELL AS MISSED APCH PROCS AS THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF THEIR EXECUTION. UPON HDOF FROM ZAB TO ELP APCH; CTLR INFORMED US VISIBILITY WAS 3 MI. SINCE THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT WITH THE FO; BASED ON THE MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS AND EXPERIENCE LEVELS; I STATED I WOULD FLY THE APCH UTILIZING THE FLT DIRECTOR AND AUTOPLT. CONFIGURED EARLY TO GET STABILIZED WITH AUTOPLT HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME KEEPING VOR ENGAGED (CDI DISPLACED 1 DOT L AND BEARING POINTER XCHKED). APCHING THE FAF; AUTOPLT CLBED AND AIRSPD RAPIDLY DECREASED REQUIRING ME TO DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AND ADDING PWR. PASSING THE FAF; THE CDI WAS DISPLACED 1.5 DOTS R REQUIRING COURSE CORRECTION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PROX TO CONE OF CONFUSION AND PREVAILING WINDS. MINIMUMS REACHED PRIOR TO MISSED APCH; RWY CAME IN SIGHT AT ANTICIPATED POS; RWY 26 CONFIRMED WITH FO AND XCHKED HDG INDICATOR FOR 260 DEG HDG. BLOWING 'SHEETS OF DUST' INTERMITTENTLY OBSCURED PORTIONS OF THE RWY AND WOULD SUDDENLY CLR MAKING THE RWY 26R MARKING DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM ALTHOUGH THE RWY 26 WAS VISIBLE. NORMAL FINAL APCH AND LNDG MADE (AUTOBRAKE 2 FOR GUSTY WINDS); AND LNDG ROLLOUT ACCOMPLISHED UNEVENTFULLY. AT THIS TIME; TWR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE ON RWY 26R; NOT RWY 26L -- THE LNDG RWY. TAXIED ONTO TXWY V AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN TO THE GATE. AS FAR AS THE CAPT FLYING OR HAVING THE FO FLYING USING COMPANY PROCS; I FEEL BOTH HAVE PROS AND CONS. THE BRIEFING WAS THOROUGH BUT I SHOULD HAVE PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON WHERE THE RWYS WERE LOCATED IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER; NOTING RWY 26L WAS THE SECOND RWY WE SHOULD SEE AND; WITH INCREASED EMPHASIS ON; NOT ONLY WHERE WE WOULD SEE THE RWY BUT PUTTING MORE EMPHASIS ON RWY LIGHTING NOTING RWY 26R HAD NO LIGHTING SO WE SHOULD 'SEE LIGHTS' FOR OUR INTENDED RWY; WHICH WE DID NOT. CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRED AUTOPLT DISENGAGEMENT APCHING THE FAF INTENSIFIED THE WORKLOAD DEGRADING PROMPT AND ENHANCED COURSE ALIGNMENT. LASTLY; FROM THE INITIAL VIEW OF THE FORECAST WX CONDITIONS AND SUBSEQUENT UPDATES; I HAD A BAD 'GUT FEELING.' LOOKING BACK; I FEEL WE WERE APCHING THE TIME FOR SOMEONE TO STEP UP; EXHIBIT SOME LEADERSHIP; AND QUESTION THE NEED FOR CONTINUED OPS. IN THIS REGARD; I FEEL REMISS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 781807: WHILE DSNDING INTO EL PASO; THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE APCH; VOR 26L. WE HAD THE ATIS AND THE CAPT PROCEEDED TO BRIEF THE APCH. HIS BRIEFING WAS THOROUGH AND WELL THOUGHT OUT. HOWEVER; I BELIEVE THIS WAS OUR FIRST MISTAKE OF MANY. IN HIS BRIEFING WE DID NOT DISCUSS RWY 26R AND HOW CLOSE IT WOULD BE TO OUR COURSE AND THE FACT THAT WE MIGHT SEE IT FIRST. AFTER HIS BRIEFING I NOTED THAT I SHOULD FLY THE APCH; COMPANY PROCS; BECAUSE OF THE VISIBILITY OF 1 1/4 MI IN THE ATIS. HE AGREED. BUT THIS LED TO THE NEXT MISTAKE IN MY OPINION. SINCE I WAS NOW FLYING THE APCH; I SHOULD HAVE REBRIEFED THE APCH. BUT SINCE HE HAD JUST DONE IT SECONDS EARLIER; IT SEEMED REDUNDANT. PLUS; I WISH I HAD BEEN DETERMINED TO BE THE PF AT THIS TIME. INSTEAD; THE PLAN WAS TO GIVE ME THE AIRPLANE LATER INTO THE FLT. I THINK WE PLANNED ON DOWNWIND OR THE LAST VECTOR TO FINAL TO HAVE ME FLY. DSNDING THROUGH APPROX 12000 FT MSL; WE EXPERIENCED MODERATE TURB AND WERE TOLD TO EXPECT THAT ALL THE WAY TO TOUCHDOWN. SOMEWHERE ON THE DOWNWIND LEG; BEFORE BEING VECTORED TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE; ATC TOLD US THE VISIBILITY WAS NOW 3 MI. I REMEMBER SAYING; 'WELL LOOKS LIKE YOU CAN SHOOT IT;' OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT. DUMB THING OF ME TO SAY. THE CAPT SAID 'YEAH; I'LL GO AHEAD AND FLY IT.' I THINK THAT WAS A CRUCIAL MISTAKE BECAUSE WE SHOULD HAVE STUCK WITH OUR PLAN AT THIS POINT IN THE FLT. PLUS; DUE TO MY RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE WITH THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT AND LNDG IN EL PASO; I FEEL THE CAPT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE BETTER PLT MONITORING IN THIS CASE. PLUS; AFTER HEARING THE VISIBILITY WAS NOW AT 3 MI I LET A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY CREEP IN. AS YOU KNOW; 3 MI TO A PLT IS FOREVER; BUT AS I WAS TO FIND OUT IT WASN'T REALLY 3 MI VISIBILITY AND FLYING INTO A DUST-/SANDSTORM IS MUCH DIFFERENT THAN BREAKING OUT UNDER A LOW OVCST. BEFORE CONTINUING; PLEASE NOTE THAT I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY ACTIONS/INACTIONS THAT LED TO THIS ERROR AND IT WILL NOT BE MY INTENTION TO IMPUGN THE CAPT IN ANY WAY. I AM TRYING TO BE HONEST AND HELPFUL SO THAT THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN AGAIN. NOW; WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL COURSE. THE LOC CAPTURED THE COURSE BUT IT WAS HOLDING US A STEADY DOT AND A HALF TO THE R OF COURSE. THE TURB WAS MODERATE AND THE AIRSPACE FLUCTUATED QUITE A BIT. WHILE LEVELING OFF AT 5400 FT MSL BEFORE THE VOR; THE AIRPLANE GOT TOO SLOW AND PITCHED UP TO MAINTAIN ALT. WE BOTH NOTICED AND THE CAPT RIGHTLY CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND ADDED SIGNIFICANT PWR TO GET THE PROPER PITCH AND SPD. THIS WAS OUR BIGGEST MISTAKE. BY NOT MAINTAINING SPD; WE WERE FORCED TO CLICK OFF THE AUTOPLT. I THINK BY HAVING THE AUTOPLT HELPING US WOULD HAVE REDUCED OUR CHANCES OF MAKING THIS MISTAKE. AFTER THE VOR WE CHANGED OUR COURSES TO 245 DEGS AND THE CAPT HAND FLEW THE ACFT TO THE MDA. AT THIS POINT THE VOR PROPERLY SHOWED US TO THE L OF COURSE AND I FEEL THAT BY TRYING TO CORRECT TOO MUCH TO THE R TO GET ON COURSE; WE LOST A LITTLE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. AS I WRITE THIS; I'M CONVINCED THAT I BECAME FIXATED ON THE COURSE AND FOCUSED ON IT TOO MUCH. THE CAPT FLEW THE ACFT GREAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE TURB WAS STILL MODERATE WITH LARGE SPD FLUCTUATIONS. IT WAS A LOT OF WORK AND HE HAD TO CONCENTRATE A LOT INSIDE THE ACFT. HE NEVER BUSTED MDA AND WE WERE ON COURSE BUT STILL IN A SLIGHT INTERCEPT ANGLE TO THE R THAT GOT US THERE. WHEN WE REACHED THE FAF WE CALLED 'THE' RWY IN SIGHT. IT WAS THE ONLY RWY IN SIGHT. AND THERE WAS NO WAY THE VISIBILITY WAS 3 MI. RWY 26L WAS NOT IN SIGHT; NOR THE TWR; NOR THE END OF RWY 26R. THE CAPT DSNDED SMOOTHLY FOR THE RWY AND WAS IN A GREAT 'SLOT' TO LAND THE ENTIRE WAY. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE RWY NUMBERS; THEY WERE OBSCURED WITH DUST AND SAND. IT REALLY LOOKED LIKE RIVERS OF SAND FLOWING OVER THE RWY. RWY 26R WOULD COME AND GO WITH SAND COVERING THE PAINT COMPLETELY OR PARTIALLY THE WHOLE TIME. I CAN HONESTLY SAY I DO NOT REMEMBER SEEING THE 'R' AND THAT IS MY FAULT AS THE PLT MONITORING FOR NOT POSITIVELY IDENTING THE RWY AND RWY ENVIRONMENT. BEING IN SUCH A GOOD POS TO LAND AND HAVING 'THE' RWY BE RIGHT WHERE IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ON THE APCH LULLED ME INTO THINKING IT WAS CORRECT. WE WERE THE PROPER DME AWAY THE RWY WAS THE PROPER COURSE; ETC. I MADE THE MISTAKE OF 'PRESSING THE FIELD.' IT JUST SEEMED RIGHT. THE LNDG WAS VERY SMOOTH; AUTOBRAKES 2 WAS USED; AND THE ACFT WAS SLOWED TO SLOW TAXI SPD WELL BEFORE WE TURNED OFF ONTO TXWY V. THE CLEAN-UP AND TAXI IN WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. WHILE I STARTED GETTING THE PLANE READY FOR THE NEXT FLT; THE CAPT MADE PHONE CALLS TO THE NECESSARY PEOPLE. I HONESTLY THINK THAT BY STICKING WITH COMPANY PROCS THIS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. DUE TO MY RELATIVE LACK OF EXPERIENCE INTO EL PASO; I'M CERTAIN THE CAPT WOULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB AS THE PLT MONITORING. AGAIN; PLEASE DO NOT LET THIS REFLECT ON THE CAPT IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT. BUT AS MANY PLTS DO; HE (AS THE CAPT) THOUGHT HE WAS BETTER SUITED TO FLY UNDER THOSE WX CONDITIONS. THIS IS ANOTHER CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THE CAPT FLYING WHILE THE FO DOESN'T DO A GOOD ENOUGH JOB AS PLT MONITORING. WE NEEDED TO BRIEF THE APCH MORE THOROUGHLY TO INCLUDE A MAJOR DISCUSSION ABOUT RWY 26R. WHEN THE VISIBILITY WAS CALLED 3 MI ON DOWNWIND; I LET MYSELF RELAX. IF THAT CALL HAD NOT BEEN MADE WE WOULD HAVE STUCK WITH COMPANY PROCS; AND THERE WAS NO WAY WHEN WE TOUCHED DOWN THE VISIBILITY WAS EVEN CLOSE TO 3 MI. A POORLY FLOWN ACFT LED TO THE NEED TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT AND IT WAS NOT USED FROM THE FAF TO TOUCHDOWN. I THINK IT COULD HAVE HELPED US. FOR WHATEVER REASON; RWY 22 WAS CLOSED. IN THAT VISIBILITY; AN ILS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CHOICE. I THINK THE FACT THAT THIS WAS MY FIRST VOR 26L IAP INTO EL PASO AND I WAS NOT FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH THE ARPT; LED US TO MAKE THIS MISTAKE. SINCE IT WAS MY FIRST; I SHOULD HAVE STUDIED THE APCH MORE THOROUGHLY. PLUS; IT WAS MY FIRST FLT INTO A REAL SANDSTORM. IT WAS MUCH DIFFERENT THAN I THOUGHT. THE VISIBILITY WAS NOT GOOD AT ALL AND PERHAPS A GAR WAS IN ORDER. IN HINDSIGHT; IT DEFINITELY WAS. IF YOU REALLY STUDY THE APCH AND THE RWY LAYOUTS; WE FELL FOR THE TRAP. THIS APCH REALLY DOES SET YOU UP PERFECTLY FOR EITHER RWY. A LARGE NOTE ON THE PLATE WOULD HELP. AS IN SEATTLE; A CAUTION FROM THE TWR OR IN THE ATIS ABOUT THE PROX OF THE RWYS WOULD HAVE HELPED.