FLT CREW OF MEDIUM TRANSPORT MUST GAR TWICE DUE TO BEING HIGH AND FAST DURING VISUAL APCHS.

Narrative

APCHING THE MKE ARPT; WE WERE VECTORED FOR THE APCH (VISUAL RWY 7R) HIGH AND WE WERE TOO HIGH. WE DIDN'T EXPECT A SHORT APCH. AT APPROX 1.5 MI FROM THE RWY AND APPROX 850 FT AGL; WE DID NOT MEET STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA; SO I CALLED FOR A GAR. THE PF (FO) HIT TOGA BUT DID NOT MAKE THE APPROPRIATE CALLOUTS. GAR PWR FLAPS 15 DEGS. I CALLED POSITIVE RATE AND HE CALLED GEAR UP; BUT I WAS SLOW IN RAISING THE FLAPS. BUSY TRYING TO TURN THE HDG BUG AND ALT SELECTOR. MY MISTAKE WAS CALLING THE TWR BEFORE COMPLETING THE BASIC GAR TASKS. WE HAD PLENTY OF ALT AND THE PF DID A GOOD JOB OF FLYING CLOSE TO THE FLAP LIMIT SPD BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THE ACFT EXCEEDED THE FLAP LIMIT SPD. THE FLAPS WERE AT 40 DEGS. THE PF CALLED FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS (AT APPROPRIATE SPD) IN AN ATTEMPT TO SET UP A STABILIZED APCH. IT WAS SHORTLY AFTER SELECTING FLAPS 40 DEGS THAT I CALLED FOR THE GAR. WE COMPLETED THE CLB CHK AND ATC GAVE US VECTORS FOR ANOTHER SHORT APCH. THIS ONE EVEN SHORTER THAN THE FIRST ONE! WELL INSIDE THE FAF. AFTER TURNING TOWARD THE RWY; IT WAS IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS THE APCH WASN'T GOING TO WORK SO I CALLED FOR A SECOND GAR. THIS TIME IT WAS A TEXTBOOK GAR. WE WERE AWARE OF OUR FUEL SITUATION (ABOUT 4.3 TTL) BUT WHEN WE TURNED DOWNWIND TO BASE FOR THE THIRD APCH (UNEVENTFUL) THE L FUEL INDICATOR LOW WARNING ILLUMINATED. (IT SEEMED TO STAY AT ABOUT 1.93?) OF NOTE: THE NEXT DAY; WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 7R FOR TKOF WHEN AN RJ HAD TO EXECUTE A GAR. THE TWR CTLR ASKED 'WHY...HIGH AND FAST?' THE RJ CREW REPLIED 'YES.' RE POSSIBLE FLAP OVERSPD: WHEN DISCUSSING THE EVENT THE FOLLOWING DAY; THE FO REMEMBERED THE AIRSPD INDICATOR WAS RIGHT UP AGAINST THE RED LIMIT SPD. WE REMAIN UNCERTAIN IF A FLAP OVERSPD CONDITION EXISTED. AFTER THE SECOND GAR IT WAS CLR TO ME THAT I HAD TO BE VERY CLR AND ASSERTIVE IN TELLING ATC EXACTLY WHAT WE WANTED. TIME AND LONG VECTORS TO FINAL. THEY COOPERATED AND THE THIRD APCH WAS UNEVENTFUL. NO NOTICE FROM ATC THAT WE COULD EXPECT A SHORT APCH. MY EXPERIENCE WITH MKE WAS THAT WE ALWAYS HAD LONG DOWNWINDS AND PLENTY OF TIME TO GO DOWN/SLOW DOWN. I HAD A 'MINDSET' FOR A NORMAL LENGTH DOWNWIND AND ALSO NO 'HEADS UP' FOR A SHORT APCH FROM ATC. ANYWHERE WE FLY; AN ADVANCE NOTIFICATION 'EXPECT SHORT APCH' FROM ATC IS VERY HELPFUL. AT OTHER ARPTS WHERE WE ARE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL ON THE DOWNWIND; WE ARE ABLE TO JUDGE JUST HOW MUCH FARTHER WE SHOULD REMAIN ON THE DOWNWIND IN ORDER TO POS OURSELVES FOR A STABILIZED APCH. IN MKE'S CASE; ATC GAVE US VECTORS TO BASE BEFORE CLRING US FOR THE APCH. THEY SEEMED VERY ANXIOUS FOR US TO CALL THE FIELD IN SIGHT. AS CAPT; I SHOULD HAVE APPLIED COMMAND AUTH AND NOT ACCEPTED THE UNACCEPTABLE VECTORS FOR A SHORT APCH. ESPECIALLY; THE SECOND TIME. AFTER THE FIRST GAR; I FAILED TO COM TO ATC OUR NEED TO HAVE AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND. I GUESS I MIGHT HAVE ASSUMED ATC WOULD KNOW THAT AN AIR TRANSPORT ACFT CANNOT SAFELY DO A GAR/MISSED APCH AND LAND SO QUICKLY. END OF 12 HR DUTY DAY COULD HAVE COMPROMISED MY PERFORMANCE. MKE APCH SHOULD BE BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH THE SAFE LIMITS OF AIR TRANSPORT ACFT AND OUR REQUIREMENT FOR AND DEFINITION OF STABILIZED APCH SO IF THEY VECTOR US FOR A VISUAL; THE ACFT WILL BE ABLE TO MEET STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. A NOTIFICATION FROM ATC ON DOWNWIND 'EXPECT SHORT APCH' WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. I RECOMMEND THEY BE COUNSELED ON THE LATTER. TO AVOID BEING RUSHED AFTER ANY GAR; TELL ATC THAT WE NEED AT LEAST AN 8 MI DOWNWIND TO GIVE US TIME TO SET UP FOR THE NEXT APCH (TIME TO ORDERLY COMPLETE THE CLB CHK; BRIEF PAX/FLT ATTENDANTS; RESTRING THE APCH; AND COMPLETE THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST). APCHING OR DURING THE DOWNWIND LEG; WE COULD ASK ATC 'HOW LONG IS THE FINAL?'