VPS APCH CTLR PROVIDING OJT EXPERIENCED CONFLICT AT 2700 FT WITH IFR DEP AND VFR OVERFLIGHT; CITING SHORTFALLS BY BOTH CI AND RADAR CTLRS.

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VPS S FLOW; RWY 12/19 IN USE. DTW RPTING RWY 32 IN USE. WIND AT VPs 250 DEGS AT 13 KTS GUSTING TO 20 KTS (APPROX). ACFT ALL DAY HAD BEEN REQUESTING TO DEPART RWY 30 DUE TO THE WIND. ACFT ARRIVING HAVE BEEN USING RWY 19 AND RWY 30 -- NEITHER RWY FAVORED FOR ARRS. DTW ARRS WERE GENERALLY USING RWY 32. APCH CTL WAS SPLIT -- S APCH AND S ASSIST; BOTH OPEN; N APCH; N ARR; ARR; N APCH ASSIST; N ARR ASSIST; AND ARR ASSIST ALL COMBINED TO THE N APCH POS. ADDITIONALLY; COORDINATOR WAS OPEN. TRAINEES WERE IN S APCH; S ASSIST; AND N APCH. I WAS WORKING N APCH WITH A TRAINEE. ACFT Y (C172) WAS VFR CONDUCTING A STANDARD PATROL EBOUND AT 2500 FT. TWR CALLS TO REQUEST RELEASE FOR ACFT X OPPOSITE DIRECTION RWY 30 DEP. COORDINATOR ANSWERS THE REQUEST AND ISSUES A TURN (HDG 360 DEGS) TO THE TWR AND INSTRUCTS TWR TO GIVE ACFT X TFC ON ACFT Y. TWR ACKNOWLEDGES ALL. EGLIN RADAR CTL FACILITY RELEASES ARE VALID FOR 5 MINS. WHILE WE ARE WAITING ON ACFT X TO GET AIRBORNE; I EXPLAIN TO THE TRAINEE THE IMPORTANCE OF TFC CALLS AND HAVE HIM ISSUE TFC TO ACFT Y ON THE DEPARTING ACFT X. BY THE TIME ACFT X IS AIRBORNE AND ON THE 360 DEG HDG CHKING IN WITH N APCH; ACFT Y IS NNE OF VPS; STILL 2500 FT EBOUND. WE REISSUE THE TFC TO ACFT Y; ACFT X CHKS IN; THE TRAINEE WAS UNCERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT TO ISSUE; SO I OVER-KEYED; CALLED ACFT X RADAR CONTACT AND ISSUED THE TFC. AT THIS TIME THE SEPARATION WAS ABOUT 1 NM AND 750 FT. ACFT X RESPONDS AND SAYS THEY ARE RECEIVING AN RA AND ARE GOING TO 'PUSH' THROUGH 3000 FT. I ACKNOWLEDGE AND TELL ACFT X TO CONTINUE CLB TO 10000 FT. I GIVE THE TFC AGAIN TO ACFT Y WHO AT THIS TIME HAS CLBED TO 2700 FT. ON THE HDOF TO JACKSONVILLE CTR/CRESTVIEW SECTOR (ZJX/CEW(10)) ACFT X COMMENTS DEPS SHOULDN'T BE GIVEN A TURN ON TKOF TO TURN DIRECTLY INTO TFC. COORDINATOR INSTRUCTS TO SAY 'DON'T REQUEST OPPOSITE DIRECTION...DEPS.' ACFT X EXPLAINS THAT DUE TO THE CURRENT WINDS AND VARIOUS PERFORMANCE FACTORS; IT WAS THE ONLY RWY THEY COULD UTILIZE AND REMAIN WITHIN LIMITS. HE TAKES THE FREQ CHANGE TO ZJX AND IS GONE. BREAKDOWNS SURROUNDING THIS EVENT BEGIN WITH THE COORDINATOR RELEASING ACFT X OFF RWY 30 WITH A R TURN TO HDG 360 DEGS. THOUGH I THOUGHT IT WOULD PROBABLY WORK; I WAS SLIGHTLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SITUATION; THOUGH I DID NOT SAY ANYTHING MORE THAN HAVE THE TRAINEE ISSUE THE TFC. WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED IS I SHOULD HAVE CALLED BACK THE TWR AND HAD THEM DISREGARD THE TURN ON DEP AND THE TFC WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN A FACTOR. THERE ARE 2 THINGS THAT I THINK CONTRIBUTE TO THIS TYPE OF OCCURRENCE. FIRST; THERE SHOULD BE VFR SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS -- IF NOT EVERYWHERE; AT LEAST IN THE PART 93 AIRSPACE. A SIMPLE +/-500 FT AND/OR 1 NM WOULD BE EASILY IMPLEMENTED AND ENSURE NO ACFT IS PUT IN AN UNSAFE SITUATION. SECOND; THE CTLR MINDSET NEEDS TO CHANGE. TOO MANY CTLRS HAVE THE MINDSET OF 'OH; HE'S VFR; IT DOESN'T MATTER.' THIS IS NOT A SAFE APPROACH TO ATC AND IS NOT PROVIDING A SVC TO ANY USER OF THE NAS. CTLRS NEED TO HAVE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR DUTIES REITERATED TO THEM AND THE CULTURE OF 'OH WELL; HE'S JUST VFR' MUST CHANGE.