AN A300 ECAM INDICATED A LEFT SIDE BLEED LEAK. MECHANIC ATTEMPTED TO TALK THE CAPT INTO ALTERNATE PROCEDURES TO PREVENT A DELAY. A BLOWN LEFT WING DUCT WAS DISCOVERED.

Date: 2008-06 · Aircraft: A300 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

AN A300 ECAM INDICATED A LEFT SIDE BLEED LEAK. MECHANIC ATTEMPTED TO TALK THE CAPT INTO ALTERNATE PROCEDURES TO PREVENT A DELAY. A BLOWN LEFT WING DUCT WAS DISCOVERED.

Narrative

AFTER WE SECURED THE ACFT FOR DEP; BEFORE PUSH OR ENG START; THE ACFT INDICATED A L SIDE BLEED LEAK WITH A LIGHT AND ECAM PROC. WE FOLLOWED THE ECAM PROCS. AT THIS TIME; I TOLD THE MECH ON THE HEADSET THAT WE HAD A BLEED LEAK LIGHT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS AN AIRBUS ANOMALY ASSOCIATED WITH THE HIGH OUTSIDE TEMP AND THAT SIMPLY TURNING OFF THE BLEED VALVE FOR A FEW MINS; THEN RESTORING IT WOULD TELL IF THIS WAS AN ANOMALY; OR AN ACTUAL LEAK. I SAID AT THAT TIME I NEEDED MORE TIME TO COMPLETE THE FLT MANUAL INFO; AND EVALUATE THE PROB. THE MECH THEN AGAIN INTERRUPTED THAT IT WAS PROBABLY AN ANOMALY ASSOCIATED WITH THE HIGH OUTSIDE TEMP; AND IF I WOULD RESTORE THE AIR AND TURN THE VALVE BACK ON; THAT WE WOULD SEE IF IT WAS AN ACTUAL LEAK; AND COULD BLOCK OUT IF THE LIGHT DID NOT COME BACK ON. I RESISTED THIS AND CONTINUED WITH THE FLT MANUAL. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY HAD A SIMILAR SITUATION ON AN ACFT IN THE HEAT AT ZZZ1 WHERE THE OUTSIDE HIGH TEMP HAD BEEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION WHERE THE SYS DETECTED A LEAK THAT HAD BEEN ONGOING; AND FELT THAT THIS NEEDED TO BE EVALUATED. I NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE FLT MANUAL SUPPLEMENTAL INFO AND I WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT THIS WAS AN ANOMALY. THE MECH THEN STATED THAT IF I INSISTED ON THIS RTE; THAT I SHOULD OPEN THE DOOR. THE FLT MANUAL STATED AND UNDERLINED IN BOLD FACE IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL INFO; THAT A PRIMARY BLEED LEAK DETECTION WOULD EXTINGUISH WITH THE AIR SOURCE REMOVED AND DO NOT REAPPLY AIR TO THE SYS. THE MECH THEN IMMEDIATELY ENTERED THE ACFT; AND SAW THAT THE APU BLEED VALVE WAS OFF; AND STATED THAT WE WOULD NOT KNOW IF I DID NOT REAPPLY THE AIR. I FELT AT THIS TIME THAT I WAS NOT CONFIDENT OR COMFORTABLE WITH ADVICE FROM THE MECH TO DO THIS; AND HE DEMANDED THAT IF I WOULD NOT FOLLOW HIS COURSE OF ACTION; THAT WE WERE ON A DELAY; AND I NEEDED TO ENTER THIS IN THE LOGBOOK. I DID ENTER THIS ITEM IN THE LOGBOOK. I WOULD LIKE TO STATE AT THIS TIME THAT I FELT THAT THE MECH'S ACTIONS WOULD HAVE POSSIBLY PRESSURED ANOTHER CREW TO RE-ESTABLISH THE AIRFLOW; WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE AGAIN SHOWN A BLEED LEAK; AND THE CREW WOULD HAVE CONTINUED THE BLOCK OUT. I FELT THAT I NEEDED TO CONTINUE THE FLT MANUAL PROC CHKLIST AND SUBSEQUENT NEED TO REF THE FLT MANUAL SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FOLLOWING THE FLT MANUAL PROC. I FELT THAT THE MECH'S INSISTENCE THAT SIMPLY TURNING THE BLEED VALVE OFF THEN BACK ON AND RESTORING THE AIRFLOW WAS CONTRARY TO MY FLT MANUAL GUIDANCE; AND WAS THE WRONG COURSE OF ACTION. AT THE POINT THAT THE MECH CAME INTO THE ACFT; HIS WAS OBVIOUS AGITATION WITH US NOT FOLLOWING HIS RECOMMENDED PROCS; EVEN AS I WAS TRYING TO EVALUATE THE PROPER COURSE VIA THE FLT MANUAL WAS A VERY UNSAFE ATMOSPHERE. WHILE I RESPECT THE NECESSITY OF OPERATING AN EFFICIENT OP; AND I RESPECT THAT MECHS KNOW MUCH MORE ABOUT THE ACFT SYS THAN ME; AS A CAPT; I AM NOT GOING TO ENDANGER MY CREW OR ACFT BY BEING RUSHED TO MAKE A DECISION BASED ON THE IDEA THAT SOMETHING AS MAJOR AS A PRIMARY BLEED LEAK WARNING IS A SUSPECTED AIRBUS ANOMALY. THE MECH LEFT; AND SHORTLY 3 DIFFERENT MECHS ARRIVED AT THE ACFT. I ASKED WHAT WAS GOING ON; AND THEY STATED THEY WERE HERE TO FIX OUR ACFT. THESE MECHS THEN CHKED THE FAULT CODES; WHICH INDICATED A LEAK AT THE L WING; AND PERFORMED AN INSPECTION WHICH CONFIRMED A BLOWN DUCT SEAL AND AN ACTUAL BLEED LEAK IN THE L WING ROOT. THE FLT ENDED UP CANCELED BECAUSE OF THE MECHANICAL; AND I APPROACHED AND THANKED THE MECHS FOR THEIR RESPECT AND DILIGENCE IN INVESTIGATING THE PROB; AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE WING BLEED LEAK. WHILE I WILL STATE THAT COM OVER THE HEADSET IS DIFFICULT; THE MECH'S ACTIONS WERE NOT WHAT I EXPECTED IN THE SUPPORT OF A SAFE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. I FOUND THE MECH UNWILLING TO LISTEN TO MY COM OF THE PROB. HIS INTERRUPTIONS AND INSISTENCE ON FOLLOWING HIS OWN COURSE OF ACTION; EVEN IN THE CASE OF MY REQUEST FOR A COUPLE OF MORE MINS TO EVALUATE OUR OWN PROCS AS NECESSARY VIA OUR GUIDANCE; AS IMPROPER AND UNSAFE.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.