B737 CAPT ELECTS TO REJECT TKOF AT HIGH SPEED AFTER BIRD STRIKES.

Date: 2008-07 · Aircraft: B737-300 · Phase: takeoff

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|ground-event-encounter-other-unknown|ground-event-encounter-person-animal-bird

Synopsis

B737 CAPT ELECTS TO REJECT TKOF AT HIGH SPEED AFTER BIRD STRIKES.

Narrative

I WAS THE PNF. WX WAS NEAR PERFECT WITH LIGHT WINDS AND VFR CONDITIONS. WE WERE PUT INTO POS AND HOLD BEHIND A DEPARTING COMPANY ACFT. ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT WAS ON A 2-3 MI FINAL WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. ALL PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL AND ALL CALLOUTS WERE MADE. AFTER THE 80 KTS CALLOUT AND BEFORE V1 AT 125 KTS; THE CAPT ABORTED THE TKOF. I SAW NO REASON FOR THE ABORT AND DID NOT KNOW WHY WE WERE ABORTING AT THE TIME. I TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE ABORTING AND THEY HAD US CLR THE RWY. AFTER CLRING THE RWY I ASKED THE CAPT THE REASON FOR THE ABORT AND AFTER PROMPTING FOUND OUT THAT HE DECIDED TO ABORT DUE TO A BIRD STRIKE. WE PULLED OFF THE RWY AND WORKED WITH ATC AND RAN THE ABORT CHKLIST IN THE QRH. THE CAPT BRIEFLY SET THE PARKING BRAKE (2 SECONDS MAX) AS I STARTED TO RUN THE CHKLIST; WHICH STATES NOT TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE. WE USED THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER TO FIND OUT OUR COOLING TIME. WE HAD THE FIRE TRUCKS COME OUT DUE TO HOT BRAKES. ONE TIRE DID MELT THE FUSE PLUGS AND THUS WENT FLAT. AFTER THE COOLING TIME WAS REACHED WE WERE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE. COM WAS LACKING HERE; MY SCAN AS THE PNF WAS MORE INSIDE THAN OUTSIDE ON THE TKOF ROLL. THUS; I DID NOT SEE THE BIRDS OR KNOW WHY THE CAPT HAD DECIDED TO ABORT. BEING OUT OF THE LOOP CONCERNED ME. A HIGH SPD ABORT IS SOMETHING NOT TO TAKE LIGHTLY. NOT KNOWING WHY WE ABORTED MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ME INITIALLY TO BE A FULLY ACTIVE CREW MEMBER DURING THIS EVENT (COMS TO ATC; CHKLIST; ETC). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 795012: I WAS THE PF DURING TKOF. WX WAS CLR; 10+ MI; AND WINDS 230 DEGS AT 4 KS. AT ABOUT 100-110 KTS DURING THE TKOF ROLL; I OBSERVED SOME BIRDS IN OUR FLT PATH. I HEARD AN IMPACT AS SEVERAL OF THE BIRDS PASSED ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. I BELIEVED THAT WE COULD HAVE INGESTED THEM IN THE #1 ENG AND ELECTED TO REJECT THE TKOF. I PERFORMED THE MEMORY ITEMS FOR A REJECTED TKOF; BUT ASSUMED THAT MY FO HAD SEEN AND HEARD THE SAME THINGS I HAD AND UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS HAPPENING. I FAILED TO PROPERLY COM WITH HIM MY INTENTIONS WHILE I BROUGHT THE AIRPLANE DOWN TO A SPD AT WHICH WE COULD CLR THE RWY. TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CLR THE RWY WITHOUT DELAY AS THERE WAS AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL. WE CLRED THE RWY AND COMPLETED THE REJECTED TKOF CHKLIST IN THE QRH. I INITIALLY SET THE PARKING BRAKE; BUT ONLY FOR ABOUT 2 SECONDS AS MY FO READ ME THE CHKLIST WHICH TOLD US NOT TO SET THE BRAKE. WE COMPUTED THE BRAKE ENERGY AT 24.1 WITH A 112000 LB AIRPLANE AND BRAKES APPLIED AT 125 KTS. THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER DIRECTED US TO REMAIN CLR OF THE GATE FOR AT LEAST 53 MINS AND TO NOTIFY THE FIRE DEPT; WHICH WE DID. WHILE WE SAT THERE; THE FIRE DEPT NOTIFIED US THAT ONE OF OUR TIRES HAD GONE FLAT. AFTER GETTING CLRNC FROM THE FIRE DEPT; WHO MEASURED BRAKE TEMPS AT 250 DEGS AND 150 DEGS ON THE L AND R RESPECTIVELY; WE WERE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE WHERE WE DEPLANED OUR CUSTOMERS. I SHOULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB OF COMMUNICATING THE SITUATION TO MY FO AND GOTTEN HIM IN THE LOOP EARLIER. ONCE HE WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED ABOUT OUR SIT; HE PROVIDED SOME INVALUABLE INSIGHT AND SUGGESTIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE SAFE OUTCOME OF THIS EVENT.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.