DHC8 CAPTAIN FAILS TO MITIGATE UNSTABILIZED LNDG APCH BY FO UNTIL LATE IN THE EVENT.

Narrative

ON APCH; WE DECIDED TO OVERFLY THE ARPT AND ENTER A L PATTERN FOR RWY 2. THE FO WAS THE PF. WE FLEW A TIGHT PATTERN EVEN THOUGH WE WERE A BIT HIGH AND FAST; WHICH I BROUGHT TO THE FO'S ATTN. AFTER WE GOT CONFIGURED; THE FO OVERSHOT THE RWY ON THE BASE TO FINAL TURN AND ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT AND RECAPTURE CTRLINE. ON OUR TURN FROM BASE TO FINAL; WE DRIFTED CLOSE TO THE HILL ON THE APCH END TO RWY 2. WE HEARD THE '500' FT CALL FROM THE RADAR ALTIMETER MIDWAY THROUGH THE TURN; AT WHICH POINT I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO START A CLB. WE WERE IN ABOUT A 300 FPM DSCNT AT THE TIME; WHICH THE FO ARRESTED. AS SOON AS WE WERE CLR OF THE CONFLICT WITH THE HILL; I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO INITIATE THE MISSED APCH AND THAT WE WOULD TRY IT AGAIN. AT NO POINT DID THE EGPWS ACTIVATE; OR WAS AGGRESSIVE ACTION NEEDED TO AVOID AN IMPACT. WE INITIATED THE MISSED APCH AND FLEW A PATTERN TO LNDG WITHOUT INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THAT THE LARGEST FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS A LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON THE PART OF THE FO. DURING THE APCH AND ON THE BRIEFING; I MENTIONED THE HILL TO THE FO; AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN. I SAW THE CONFLICT COMING; BUT I FAILED TO PREVENT IT FROM BECOMING AN ISSUE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS AN UNSAFE SITUATION; BUT I DID LET IT GO TOO FAR.