AIRBUS A300 PILOT RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT HIS COMPANY'S NEW POLICY OF PULLING ALL PAGES OF THE LOGBOOK INCLUDING THE CARBON; IN EXCESS OF SEVEN DAYS OLD AND ALLOWING DEFERRAL OF AN ITEM AS INOP; AGAINST AN ITEM REQUIRED TO BE FUNCTIONAL; THAT WAS ALSO DOWNGRADED.
Synopsis
AIRBUS A300 PILOT RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT HIS COMPANY'S NEW POLICY OF PULLING ALL PAGES OF THE LOGBOOK INCLUDING THE CARBON; IN EXCESS OF SEVEN DAYS OLD AND ALLOWING DEFERRAL OF AN ITEM AS INOP; AGAINST AN ITEM REQUIRED TO BE FUNCTIONAL; THAT WAS ALSO DOWNGRADED.
Narrative
WE ARRIVED AT ACFT TO OPERATE ZZZ-ZZZ1. ACFT HAD MEL FOR THE #2 PITCH TRIM INOP. THIS MEL STATES 'ALL FUNCTIONS OF THE UNAFFECTED 'FAC' MUST BE OPERATIVE (YAW DAMPER; PITCH TRIM; ETC).' UPON A REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK; THE #1 PITCH TRIM WAS ON 'ALERT' FOR REPEATED DISENGAGEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE PITCH TRIM 1 HAD BEEN CLRED; THE COMPLETE TEST PROCS HAD NOT OCCURRED WITHIN THE REQUIRED 7 DAYS. CONSEQUENTLY; A 20 DAY 'ALERT WATCH' HAD BEEN INITIATED AND THE ACFT WAS DOWNGRADED TO CAT I. AFTER CHKING WITH THE ZZZ MAINT SUPVR; HE STATED THAT NEITHER THE 'ALERT WATCH' PROGRAM NOR THE CAT I DOWNGRADE FOR THE #1 PITCH TRIM CONFLICTED WITH THE CURRENT MEL FOR PITCH TRIM #2. HE STATED IT WAS JUST A PAPERWORK ISSUE; HOWEVER; I STATED I DID NOT FEEL THE COMPANY OR THE FAA WOULD GENERATE PAPERWORK FOR THE SAKE OF GENERATING PAPERWORK. WE THEN CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND SPOKE WITH THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT AND MAINT CTL. THEY STATED THE #1 PITCH TRIM SYS WAS FULLY OPERATIONAL AND; THEREFORE; DID NOT CONFLICT WITH THE MEL. I INSISTED THE SYS WAS 'SUSPECT' WHICH WAS WHY IT WAS ON AN ALERT STATUS AND; THEREFORE; DID NOT MEET THE BACKUP REQUIREMENTS FOR PITCH TRIM #2. THE DISCUSSION WENT SEVERAL ROUNDS; NEITHER SIDE MAKING HEADWAY. I EXPRESSED CONCERN OF TAKING AN ACFT THAT THE FAA COULD ALSO FIND SUSPECT. THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT STATED; 'THIS IS A RECORDED LINE. THE FAA WILL AGREE WITH OUR INTERP. IF I WERE IN YOUR SHOES; I WOULD TAKE THE ACFT NOW.' WITH THAT DIRECTIVE; WE PROCEEDED TO ZZZ1. THE FLT TO ZZZ1 WAS UNEVENTFUL; HOWEVER; LATER THAT DAY WHILE DEPARTING IN THE SAME ACFT THE #1 PITCH TRIM DISENGAGED WHILE CLBING THROUGH 11000 FT MSL. THE #1 YAW DAMPER ALSO DISENGAGED AND COULD NOT BE RESET. AFTER LEVELING AT FL310; THE #1 PITCH TRIM AND YAW DAMPER WERE RESET NORMALLY AND THE FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. WE SENT IN-RANGE MESSAGES ALERTING ZZZ2 OF THE #1 PITCH TRIM PROB WE HAD HAD; AND ALSO INFORMED MAINT CTL OF THE PROB. UPON ARRIVING IN ZZZ2; THE MECHS MET US AND INFORMED US THAT THEY WERE TOLD TO REMOVE ALL PAGES OF THE LOGBOOK; INCLUDING THE GOLD PAGES; IN EXCESS OF 7 DAYS OLD. THESE ARE THE PAGES THAT MADE ME AWARE OF THE MULTIPLE PROBS -- AND PROVIDED MORE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH THE ACFT. THE REMOVAL OF THESE PAGES ARE NOW DEPRIVING SUBSEQUENT CREWS OF THIS COMPLETE HISTORY. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE POLICY OF PULLING ALL LOGBOOK PAGES BEYOND 7 DAYS (WE HAVE NEVER HEARD OF THIS PROC BEFORE) BE REVIEWED. I WOULD LIKE A DEFINITIVE FAA INTERP OF MEL DIRECTIVE ADHERENCE WHEN THE COMPANY HAS TAKEN ACTION TO DOWNGRADE AN ACFT'S STATUS ON AN ITEM REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ANOTHER DEFERRED ITEM (IE; PITCH TRIM #2 INOP REQUIRED PITCH TRIM #1 TO BE FUNCTIONAL -- BUT THE ACFT STATUS HAD BEEN DOWNGRADED AS A RESULT OF FREQUENT DEACTIVATIONS OF THE NECESSARY; SUPPORTING SYS).
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.