UPON LANDING A B717-200 (MD-95); PILOT REPORTS THE LEFT THRUST REVERSER DID NOT DEPLOY WITH A LEVEL ONE ALERT FAULT. THIS WAS FIRST FLIGHT FOR ACFT OUT OF MAINT CHECK.

Date: 2008-09 · Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95) · Phase: landing

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

UPON LANDING A B717-200 (MD-95); PILOT REPORTS THE LEFT THRUST REVERSER DID NOT DEPLOY WITH A LEVEL ONE ALERT FAULT. THIS WAS FIRST FLIGHT FOR ACFT OUT OF MAINT CHECK.

Narrative

SEP 08; FLT #AB ZZZ1-ZZZ; ACFT X. UPON LNDG IN ZZZ; OUR L THRUST REVERSER DID NOT DEPLOY AND WE GOT THE LEVEL 1 ALERT -- REVERSER L FAULT; WITH A CONSEQUENCE OF 'THRUST REVERSER MAY NOT DEPLOY.' WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. CONTRACT MAINT WAS CALLED AND THEY DISCOVERED THAT THE L THRUST REVERSER HYD SHUTOFF LEVER (WHICH IS LOCATED BEHIND THE THRUST REVERSER HYD SVCING ACCESS PANEL) WAS POSITIONED INCORRECTLY CAUSING THE THRUST REVERSER FAULT. CONTRACT MAINT COORD WITH MAINT CTL AND THE L THRUST REVERSER HYD SHUTOFF LEVER WAS POSITIONED CORRECTLY. AFTER CHKING BOTH THE CURRENT AND PREVIOUS ACFT LOGBOOKS; NO ENTRIES WERE FOUND THAT WOULD INDICATE ANY HYD OR THRUST REVERSER MALFUNCTIONS THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE MOVEMENT OF THE L THRUST REVERSER HYD SHUTOFF LEVER. ACFT X HAD JUST BEEN RELEASED TO SVC EARLIER THAT MORNING; AFTER THE COMPLETION OF AN AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTION. MAINT PERSONNEL SHOULD REVIEW THEIR PROCS BEFORE RELEASING AN ACFT INTO SVC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE LEFT ENGINE REVERSER CONTROL IS ACCESSED THROUGH THE LEFT SIDE OF THE FUSELAGE TAIL SECTION BELOW THE LEFT ENG STRUT. REPORTER ASKED THE CONTRACT MAINT MECHANIC TO VISUALLY POINT OUT THE CONTROL HANDLE AND THE CORRECT; OR 'NORMAL'; POSITION THE HANDLE SHOULD BE IN. HANDLE LEVER IN THE HORIZ POSITION WAS THE 'NORMAL' MODE. BUT ALSO NOTICED; WAS HOW LITTLE MOVEMENT OF THE HANDLE; PERHAPS 45 DEGREES OR LESS OF HANDLE ROTATION WOULD POSITION THE CONTROL VALVE TO ABNORMAL OR LOCKOUT MODE. REPORTER STATED THE DIFFERENCE IN HANDLE POSITION BETWEEN 'NORMAL' AND 'ABNORMAL' WAS BARELY NOTICEABLE AND BELIEVED THIS COULD EASILY BE MISSED BY ANYONE. THE UNUSED LOCKOUT SAFETY PIN DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A SAFETY STREAMER ATTACHED. CURRENTLY THEIR FLIGHT CREWS ARE ONLY USING IDLE REVERSE DURING LANDING DUE TO FUEL COSTS. REPORTER ALSO STATED PART OF THEIR REQUIRED SECURITY SAFETY WALKAROUND CHECKS INCLUDE LOOKING INSIDE CERTAIN ACCESS PANEL AREAS OF THE EXTERNAL FUSELAGE.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.