ACR MLG UNABLE TO EXTEND FLAPS MADE NO FLAP LNDG AND STRUCK RWY END LIGHT ON APCH.
Synopsis
ACR MLG UNABLE TO EXTEND FLAPS MADE NO FLAP LNDG AND STRUCK RWY END LIGHT ON APCH.
Narrative
WX AT DULLES WAS RPTED AS W 4 OBSCURED; 1 1/4 S-F 229/19/18/3608/019. WHEN FLAPS WERE SELECTED ON THE APCH TO RWY 1R; A 'FLAP FAULT' LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL AND THE FLAPS FAILED TO EXTEND. WE MISSED THE APCH AND ASKED FOR VECTORS AROUND THE AREA TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. UPON COMPLETION FOR THE APPROPRIATE EMER CHKLIST; VERIFYING VISUALLY THAT INDEED THE FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND; AND TALKING TO OUR DISPATCH AND MAINT PEOPLE; I REALIZED THAT A FLAPS UP LNDG WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE. WE CIRCLED FOR APPROX 40 MINS TO BURN OFF FUEL TO LOWER OUR LNDG WT AND DETERMINED THAT OUR LNDG WOULD REQUIRE APPROX 7600' AND AN APCH SPD TO TOUCHDOWN OF 165 KTS. BRAKING ACTION ON THE 11500' RWY WAS RPTED AS FAIR AND ALL OTHER ARPTS WITHIN OUR FUEL RANGE HAD THE SAME OR WORSE CONDITIONS DUE TO THE SNOWSTORM. THE APCH WAS NORMAL AND AT 400-500' AGL WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. I THEN DESCENDED VISUALLY AND FLATTENED OUT OUR APCH ANGLE AS PER COMPANY TRAINERS PROC AND MADE A LNDG TOUCHING DOWN APPROX 500' FROM THE APCH END OF THE RWY. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT OUR HIGH APCH SPD AND THE BRAKING ACTION ON THE SNOW COVERED RWY AND ELECTED TO LAND CLOSE TO THE APCH END. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL AND THE ACFT DECELERATED SURPRISINGLY WELL; AND WE TURNED OFF ABOUT HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY. AFTER CLEARING THE RWY; WE CONTACTED GND CTL AND ASKED THEM TO SECURE THE EMER EQUIP THAT I REQUESTED BEFORE LNDG. I THEN HEAR A CONVERSATION OVER THE FREQ BTWN AN EMER VEH AND GND CTL THAT ONE OF OUR MAIN GEAR TIRES MAY HAVE HIT ONE OF THE RWY THRESHOLD LIGHTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION IN THE COCKPIT OR CABIN THAT WE MAY HAVE MADE CONTACT WITH A RWY LIGHT. I THEN TAXIED TO OUR GATE AND OUR MAINT MET THE ACFT; INSPECTED IT AND FOUND NO DAMAGE. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE DID CONTACT THE RWY LIGHT; IT WAS BECAUSE OF MY CONCERN OVER THE STOPPING DISTANCE AVAILABLE ON THE SNOW COVERED RWY; THE HIGH APCH SPD; THE FLATTER THAN NORMAL APCH AS PER COMPANY PROC AND THE REDUCED VISUAL CUES DUE TO THE SNOW ON THE APCH AND TOUCHDOWN AREAS CREATING A SORT OF WHITE-OUT EFFECT. MY SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THESE TYPES OF INCIDENTS WOULD BE TO EXPAND FLT TRAINERS TO INCLUDE MORE SIMULATED FLAPS UP APCHS; SPECIFIC DESIRED TOUCHDOWN POINTS ON THE TYPES OF AND EXPANDED INFO AVAILABLE TO PLTS ON THE CLRNC BTWN ACFT STRUCTURES AND RWY OR RWY OBSTRUCTIONS AT DIFFERENT FLAP SETTINGS AND DIFFERENT TOUCHDOWN POINTS. ALSO; I STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT MORE SPECIFIC INFO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PLTS; SUCH AS A SPECIFIC COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION; THAT WOULD BE MEASURED ON THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF A WET OR SNOW COVERED RWY AND COULD THEN BE APPLIED DIRECTLY TO ACFT LNDG DISTANCE CHARTS. THE PLTS WOULD THEN HAVE A MORE ACCURATE IDEA OF RWY STOPPING DISTANCES OTHER THAN THAT RPTED BY PREVIOUS ACFT OR SOME ARPT GND VEH. I UNDERSTAND THIS TYPE OF INFO IS AVAILABLE IN SOME FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.