B767 CAPT REPORTS BEING DISPATCHED ON FERRY FLT AT NIGHT TO UNFAMILIAR ARPT WITH THE ONLY INSTRUMENT RWY CLOSED. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION WITH CHIEF PILOT; FLT IS CANCELED.

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FERRY FLT WITH RESERVE PLTS CALLED OUT TOWARD THE END OF THEIR DUTY PERIOD; DISPATCHED TO AN UNFAMILIAR; UNCTLED ARPT AT NIGHT. FLT WAS DISPATCHED WITHOUT PROPER APCH CHARTS; PLANNING AND OVERSIGHT. THE ONLY AVAILABLE INST RWY WAS NOTAMED CLOSED AND CHARTS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE FERRY PACKET. UPON REQUEST; THE DISPATCHER DID FAX APCH CHARTS TO THE FLT CREW BUT THEY WERE FAA CHARTS THAT DID NOT CONTAIN ADEQUATE ARPT DIAGRAMS. THE CAPT TRIED TO CONTACT THE TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE THAT WAS LISTED ON THE FERRY FORM; ONLY TO DISCOVER THAT THE CONTACT LISTED HAS NOT WORKED FOR ACR FOR THE LAST 6 MONTHS. THIS WAS NOT A REAL CONFIDENCE BUILDER KNOWING THAT OUR FERRY PACKET WAS NOT BASED ON TIMELY ACCURATE INFO. THE CAPT CALLED THE DEST TWR AND WAS INFORMED THAT RWY 14/32 WAS IN FACT CLOSED. HE ALSO INFORMED THE FLT CREW THAT IF RWY 36 WAS USED; A 180 DEG TURN WOULD BE REQUIRED TO BACK-TAXI TO TXWY A; PORTIONS OF WHICH WERE CLOSED AND UNLIGHTED. THE PLT'S HANDBOOK HAS SEVERAL NOTES AND CAUTIONS ABOUT EXECUTING SUCH A TURN ON A 150 FT WIDE RWY. RWY 18/36 DID NOT HAVE A USABLE INST APCH FOR THE B767. THE CREW WOULD HAVE BEEN TASKED TO EXECUTE A NIGHT VFR APCH TO AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT. IT WAS THE FLT CREW THAT DISCOVERED THE DEFICIENCIES AND EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT ADEQUATE SAFETY MARGINS THE DISPATCHER WAS NOT TOTALLY CONVINCED OF FLT CREW'S CONCERNS AND TURNED THE SITUATION OVER TO A SUPERVISORY PLT. THIS CREATED A SUBTLE PRESSURE ON THE FLT CREW THAT THE MISSION HAD TO 'GO' DESPITE OUR FEEDBACK. SEVERAL MINS LATER; A FLT MGR DISCUSSED THIS SITUATION WITH THE FLT CREW AND CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE FERRY FLT WOULD BE CANCELED BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE SAFETY MARGINS. COMMAND AND CTL FAILURE. THERE WERE NUMEROUS 'RED FLAGS' WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED BY OPS BEFORE THE FLT WAS DISPATCHED AND A RESERVE CREW CALLED OUT TO FLY. IT APPEARS THAT THIS WAS A 'MISSION CRITICAL' EVENT THAT WAS NOT PROPERLY SCHEDULED; PLANNED; AND RELEASED. EVENTS SUCH AS THIS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE A PLT'S PERCEPTION OF THEIR COMPANY'S COMMITMENT TO SAFETY. PERHAPS AN OVERALL SAFETY AUDIT OF THE COMMAND AND CTL FUNCTIONS AT ACR IS IN ORDER. LAST MIN SCHEDULING OF RESERVE CREWS TO FLY THESE 'SPECIAL' MISSIONS FAILS THE TEST OF ADEQUATE RISK ASSESSMENT. LUCKILY; THIS WAS A LATENT FAILURE THAT WAS MITIGATED BY THE VIGILANCE OF A PROFESSIONAL FLT CREW. THAT WILL NOT ALWAYS BE THE CASE.