UPON ENCOUNTERING YELLOW CHIP INDICATION AND MASTER WARNING LIGHTS; FLT CREW OF PC12 REQUEST EXPEDITED HANDLING AND THEN DECLARE AN EMERGENCY TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DES.

Date: 2008-10 · Aircraft: PC-12 · Phase: descent

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe

Synopsis

UPON ENCOUNTERING YELLOW CHIP INDICATION AND MASTER WARNING LIGHTS; FLT CREW OF PC12 REQUEST EXPEDITED HANDLING AND THEN DECLARE AN EMERGENCY TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DES.

Narrative

ON APCH VECTORS FOR THE ILS X TO ZZZ AT APPROX 4000 FT MSL AND ON A 350 DEG HDG; WINDS 075 DEGS AT 5 KTS; 1800 FT BROKEN; 10 MI VISIBILITY; OVER THE NORTHERN COAST OF THE ISLAND; WE HAD A YELLOW MASTER CAUTION WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATE AND A YELLOW CHIP INDICATION LIGHT ON THE ENG INST SYS. WE WERE INSTRUCTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO CONTINUE OUR DSCNT TO 2000 FT. I ASKED ATC FOR AN IMMEDIATE SHORT VECTOR TO FINAL SINCE WE WERE E OF THE FIELD AND ON DELAYING VECTORS FOR SEQUENCE; AND ATC WAS ONLY ABLE TO GIVE ME A SLIGHT L TURN. THESE VECTORS WOULD HAVE BROUGHT US N OF ZZZ VOR AND THEN WOULD HAVE HAD TO TURN SW AND FLY PAST THE ARPT AGAIN TO LINE UP FOR THE ILS X. MY FO AND I MONITORED ALL ENG PARAMETERS AND DID NOT SEE ANYTHING ABNORMAL. WE RAN THE CHKLIST FOR THE EIS CHIP LIGHT UNDER ENG EMERS IN THE QRH. BEING AT SUCH A LOW ALT AND GOING OUT OVER THE ISLAND SOUND; HAVING A POSSIBLE ENG FAILURE WAS HAZARDOUS IN MY OPINION; ESPECIALLY HAVING ONLY 1 ENG; AND THE CHKLIST INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICAL. SINCE ATC WAS UNABLE TO ACCOMMODATE US GOING DIRECTLY TO THE FIELD UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES; I FELT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY IT WAS BEST FOR ME TO EXERCISE EMER AUTH. WE REQUESTED A LOWER ALT AND WERE GIVEN 1500 FT MVA FOR THAT AREA; AND HEADED STRAIGHT INTO RWY XX FOR A VISUAL APCH. THIS ACTION MINIMIZED OUR TIME ALOFT AND BROUGHT US TO A SAFE LNDG MUCH FASTER. ON SHORT FINAL; THE CHIP LIGHT EXTINGUISHED; AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT ON RWY XX. AFTER SHUTDOWN; I ESCORTED OUR PAX; CALLED OPS; AND INFORMED THE CHIEF PLT AND MAINT OF THE EVENT. I ALSO SPOKE WITH THE ARPT AUTH AND EXPLAINED WHAT HAPPENED. IN ADDITION; I WROTE UP THE DISCREPANCY IN THE ACFT FLT LOG; AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE ACFT NOT BE FLOWN AGAIN UNTIL THE ENG WAS INSPECTED; WHICH IS NOTED IN THE LAST PART OF THE QRH CHKLIST. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES; I BELIEVE MY FO AND I MADE THE RIGHT CHOICES AND PUT SAFETY FIRST INSTEAD OF ASSUMING IT WAS A FALSE WARNING.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.