A LEAD MECHANIC WITH AN INSPECTION AUTHORIZATION AUTHORITY REPORTS ABOUT A LINE FOREMAN DIRECTING A LINE SERVICE INDIVIDUAL TO REPLACE TWO UPPER CABIN WINDOWS ON AN AS-350B2 EUROCOPTER. PROCEDURES WERE NOT FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO REPAIR STA. MANUAL AND FAR 43.9.
Synopsis
A LEAD MECHANIC WITH AN INSPECTION AUTHORIZATION AUTHORITY REPORTS ABOUT A LINE FOREMAN DIRECTING A LINE SERVICE INDIVIDUAL TO REPLACE TWO UPPER CABIN WINDOWS ON AN AS-350B2 EUROCOPTER. PROCEDURES WERE NOT FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO REPAIR STA. MANUAL AND FAR 43.9.
Narrative
THE SHOP FOREMAN DIRECTED THE LINE SVC INDIVIDUAL TO REPLACE 2 UPPER CABIN WINDOWS. THE LINE SVC INDIVIDUAL IS NOT A CERTIFICATED MECH AND HAS NO DOCUMENTED TRAINING ON THIS ACTION. THERE WAS NO POST-INSTALLATION INSPECTION AND THE ACFT REMAINED IN SVC. THE WINDOWS WERE AN AFTERMARKET TYPE WITH AN ASSOCIATED STC FOR APPROVAL. THERE WAS NO LOG ENTRY OR 337 COMPLETED. THE PARTS WERE NEVER ISSUED OUT FROM THE PARTS DEPT FOR THAT PARTICULAR ACFT. PROCS WERE NOT FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO REPAIR STATION MANUAL AND FAR PART 43.9. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED NO WORK ORDER WAS INITIATED; WHEN THE SUPERVISOR DID NOT FOLLOW THEIR MAINT PROCEDURES AND DIRECTED THE UNLICENSED LINE SERVICE PERSON TO CHANGE THE TWO UPPER CABIN WINDOWS ON THE AS-350B2 EUROCOPTER. AS RESULT; NO ONE SUPERVISED THE UNLICENSED INDIVIDUAL DURING THE WINDOW CHANGES AND ALL MAINT WORK WAS NOT DOCUMENTED UNTIL MUCH LATER; WHEN REPORTER NOTICED THE REMOVED CABIN WINDOWS ON THE SHOP FLOOR WITHOUT PAPERWORK. THE AFTER-MARKET TYPE CABIN WINDOWS WERE RECEIVED AT AN OFFSITE LOCATION AND BROUGHT OVER TO THEIR FACILITY; BUT NEVER ENTERED INTO THEIR INVENTORY DATABASE. REPORTER STATED ALL MAINT WORK; INSPECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS HAVE SINCE BEEN ADDRESSED. REPORTER STATED THEY ARE A FAR 135 OPERATOR AND 145 REPAIR FACILITY.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.